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The British defence of Malaya and Singapore was seriously jeopardized once Germany 
conquered France in June 1940, as this event encouraged both Italy and Japan to join the Axis 
Powers and opened the way for Japan to occupy the air and naval bases in French Indochina. Yet 
how does one explain the speed and scale of the British surrender at Singapore? How did the 
British Army lose Malaya and Singapore so easily, even though it had an overall numerical 
superiority of two to one over the Imperial Japanese Army? Why did British Empire troops not 
put up a better and longer fight in the Malayan Campaign? How did strategic defeat turn into 
tactical disaster? This thesis seeks to answer these questions by focusing on the tactical aspects of 
the Malayan Campaign. 
 Relatively few authors have specifically looked at how British military disaster happened 
on the Malayan battlefields. They typically mention British Malaya Command‟s weaknesses vis-
à-vis the Japanese 25
th
 Army‟s strengths in command, control, communications and intelligence, 
tactical doctrines, training, experience, ethos, morale, organisation and equipment in isolation, 
without making the connections between them to identify the main overarching problem. This 
thesis fills an important gap by examining the institutional forces that influenced, shaped and 
caused the strengths and weaknesses of the Japanese and British armies respectively, while, not 
discounting the role of circumstantial factors and personalities. 
 This thesis argues that institutional forces in the form of the British military system were 
the decisive and prime mover influencing and affecting most, if not all, of the weaknesses of the 
British Army in 1940-1942. They were, hence, the main determinant of the British tactical 
disaster in the Malaya Campaign. It makes three assertions. First, the British military system was 
primarily responsible for the many flaws of the British Army in the Malayan Campaign. Second, 
the British military system is more responsible for the British Army tactical disaster in Malaya 
than adverse circumstantial and personality factors. Third, the British Army‟s tactical disaster in 
 vi 
Malaya was not an isolated case but was part of a global chain of failures, revealing the general 



































 The size of the British surrender at Singapore, the scale of the British defeat in the 
Malayan Campaign and the great strategic and political impact that followed, have rarely been 
matched throughout the long military campaigns involving the British Empire. Although the 
British government never conducted an official inquiry regarding the fall of Singapore, 
postmortems and reviews were conducted in both private and official capacities in Britain, India, 
Australia and Japan, starting soon after Singapore surrendered. This process still continues, 
boosted by the declassification of official documents in the public archives of Britain and 
Australia in the 1990s.  
 Three questions tended to dominate the scholarly debates and controversies in the 
historiography of the reasons for the British defeat in Malaya - Who was ultimately to blame for 
the defeat? Was the British defeat inevitable? Why were the British defeated so quickly and 
easily by the Japanese? The first two questions examine the Malayan Campaign mainly at the 
strategic level.
1
 Amidst controversy, eminent military historians, such as Raymond Callahan, 
Alan Warren, Karl Hack, Kevin Blackburn and Brian Farrell, have convincingly argued that the 
ultimate blame for the British defeat in Malaya lie with the successive war planners in Whitehall, 
in the two decades leading up to December 1941 - they all decided to put the defence of the UK 
homeland and the Mediterranean region on a higher priority than the Far East.
2
 They also agreed 
that British defeat was hard to avoid, as the strategic and tactical situation in the first six months 
of the Pacific War favoured the Japanese overwhelmingly.
3
 
                                                 
1
 According to Jonathan M. House, Combined Arms Warfare in the 20
th
 Century (Lawrence, Kansas: 
University of Kansas Press, 2001), 5, strategic level of warfare „takes into considerations the political 
objectives and limitations of governments‟. In this thesis, the strategic level of command is equivalent to 
the command of army groups and theatres of war. 
2
 Raymond Callahan, The Worst Disaster – The Fall of Singapore (Singapore: Cultured Lotus, 2001 
(1977)), 271; Brian Farrell, The Defence and Fall of Singapore 1941-1942 (Stroud, Gloucestershire: 
Tempus Publishing Ltd., 2005), 173-182. 
3
 Alan Warren, Singapore – Britain’s Greatest Defeat (London, Talisman, 2002), 289-291; Farrell, 379-
382; Karl Hack & Kevin Blackburn, Did Singapore Have to Fall? Churchill and the Impregnable Fortress 
(New York, Routledge, 2003), 87-88. 
 2 
 The British defence of Malaya and Singapore was seriously jeopardized once Germany 
conquered France in June 1940, as this event encouraged both Italy and Japan to join the Axis 
Powers and opened the way for Japan to occupy the air and naval bases in French Indochina. Yet 
how does one explain the speed and scale of the British defeat? How did the British Army lose 
Malaya and Singapore so easily, even though it had an overall numerical superiority of two to one 
over the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA)? It must be remembered that although the US also 
suffered the humiliation of surrendering the Philippines to Japan in May 1942, it did so only after 
five long months of struggle during which the defending American and Filipino soldiers were 
able to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy at Bataan. Why did British Empire troops not put up 
a better and longer fight in the Malayan Campaign? How did strategic defeat turn into tactical 
disaster? This is the concern of the third question, which seeks to explain why the British Army 
collapsed as swiftly as it did.  
 Relatively few works have specifically looked at how British military disaster happened 
on the Malayan battlefields. Tim Moreman‟s The Jungle, the Japanese and British 
Commonwealth Armies at War 1941-1945 – Fighting Methods, Doctrine and Training (2005), 
was an exception. In it, he aptly said, „Very few books deal with these issues specifically while 
devoting much time on narrating the battles. They may mention the lack of training [in jungle 
warfare] of the British Empire forces, for example, but do not explain the reasons‟.4 They also 
typically mention British Malaya Command‟s weaknesses vis-à-vis the Japanese 25th Army‟s 
strengths in command, control, communications and intelligence (collectively known as C3I), 
tactical doctrines, training, experience, ethos, morale, organisation and equipment in isolation, 
                                                 
4
 Tim Moreman, The Jungle, the Japanese and British Commonwealth Armies at War 1941-1945 – 
Fighting Methods, Doctrine and Training (New York: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 2005), 7. While “jungle 
warfare” predominated in the Malayan Campaign, most combat actually took place in a variety of “bush 
terrain” such as rice-fields, orchards, plantations, mangroves, scrubs and jungle near settlements, roads and 
tracks. The tactical objective was actually to control the crucial paved trunk roads rather than the “bush 
country” surrounding them. This was unlike in the Southwest Pacific Theater 1942-1945, some aspects of 
the Burma Campaign 1942-1945, the Malayan Emergency 1948-1960, the Indonesian Confrontation 1963-
1966 and some aspects of the Vietnam War 1965-1975, where the strict term “jungle warfare”, could be 
more appropriately used. See Ian Stewart, History of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders 2
nd
 Battalion 
(London: Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd, 1947), 2. 
 3 
without making the connections between them to identify the main overarching problem.
5
 David 
Fraser‟s book, And We Shall Shock Them – The British Army in the Second World War (1983) 
was another exception. He linked these British shortcomings together and attributed them to one 
common source – the British military system itself.  
At the heart of the matter, however, was the unpreparedness of the British Empire for 
crisis‟ … „The consequent was a system completely unfitted to take the first shock of war. 
All else – the incapacity of commanders, the poor training of troops, the failure of morale, 





 In his landmark work, The Defence and Fall of Singapore 1941-1942 (2005), Brian 
Farrell concurred that ultimately it was the inherent flaws of the British military system itself, or 
what could be termed as “institutional forces”, rather than the particular circumstances faced by 
Malaya Command, or mistakes made by any of its generals, which converted defeat into disaster.
7
 
In other words, a more complete explanation of the British tactical disaster warrants deeper 
analysis beyond just examining Malaya Command‟s deficiencies. It must examine the 
institutional forces behind these as well. David French, in his Raising Churchill’s Army (2000), 
took this approach to explain the British Army‟s tactical defeat in the European and 
Mediterranean theatres in the first half of the Second World War.
8
 However, other than Farrell, 
only Toh Boon Ho and Toh Boon Kwan have in recent years explicitly taken the approach of 
analyzing the British tactical defeat in Malaya in the light of institutional forces.
9
 This thesis fills 
this important gap by expanding and going beyond the works done by the above authors. 
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 4 
 This thesis argues that institutional forces in the form of the British military system were 
the decisive and prime mover influencing and affecting most, if not all, of the deficiencies of the 
British Army in 1940-1942. They were, hence, the main determinant of the British tactical 
disaster in the Malaya Campaign. In this thesis, the British military system is taken to encompass 
factors such as British Army organization, ethos, doctrine, established practices, standard 
operating procedures, beliefs, attitudes and tradition. This thesis examines the Malayan Campaign 
mainly at the tactical level.
10
 The thesis necessarily excludes the local civilian authority‟s 
culpability in the fall of Singapore but does not ignore military decisions made at the strategic 
level and operational level where they affected the course and outcome of battles.
11
  
 While being primarily concerned with institutional forces, the thesis does not totally 
ignore circumstantial factors such as British material deficiencies on land, sea and air, Britain‟s 
adverse circumstances in having to fight a three-front war, the British military‟s lack of unified 
command over the three services and the personalities of their senior commanders such as Air 
Chief Marshal Robert Brooke-Popham, Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) Far East Command, 
Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival, General Officer Commanding (GOC) Malaya Command, 
and Lieutenant-General Lewis Heath, GOC III Indian Corps, as these things can also dictate the 
outcome of battles. Finally, this thesis focuses on the British Army, in particular, the infantry, 
armour and artillery combat arms, rather than the Royal Air Force (RAF), Royal Navy (RN) and 
the British Army‟s other combat and supporting arms. Timothy Harrison Place rightly argues that 
although the British Army classified engineers, signals and reconnaissance corps as combat arms, 
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 House, 5, defined “tactical level of warfare” as „the process of combining of different arms and services 
to win a battle‟. In this thesis, the tactical level of command is equivalent with the command of divisions, at 
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11
 House, defined “operational level of war” as involving „sequence steps, co-ordinating actions and battles 
to achieve the strategic goal‟. In this thesis, the Operational level of command is equivalent with the 
command of armies and corps.  
 5 
their main role was „not to fight but to perform some other function that served to facilitate the 
fighting action‟ of the other three combat arms.12  
 The chapters in this thesis are grouped around themes. Chapter 1 sets the background and 
context by reviewing primary sources in the form of dispatches and memoirs written by key 
British, Australian, Indian and Japanese military officers who fought in Malaya. It will establish 
that the strengths of 25
th
 Army and the weaknesses of Malaya Command reflected those of their 
respective armies and military systems. Chapter 2 examines and evaluates how the pre-war and 
early war British military system laid the foundations for the British Army‟s tactical disaster in 
the Malayan Campaign. Conversely, Chapter 3 examines and evaluates how the pre-war and 
wartime Japanese military system laid the foundations for the IJA‟s tactical victory in the 
Malayan Campaign. This is necessary as any attempt to account for the British Army‟s poor 
performance in Malaya would not be complete without examining the IJA. 
 The next three chapters analyse how the unique characteristics of the British and 
Japanese military systems interacted with circumstances and personalities to influence the 
battlefield performance of both armies, in six Malayan battles. It is important to include two 
major battles each from defence, counterattack and delay missions as case studies, to ensure that 
the full range of combat missions in Malaya is represented. Chapter 4 examines the British 
Army‟s set-piece defences of Jitra and Kampar. Jitra is selected as it was the first major clash 
between the two forces and their opposing systems in Malaya. Here, the British Army‟s rigid, low 
tempo, linear tactics were pitted against the IJA‟s fluid, high tempo, encirclement tactics. 
Kampar, on the other hand, was an atypical battle where the British Army defended in depth, at a 
strategically strong position which nullified the IJA‟s tactical advantages. 
 Chapter 5 examines the British Army‟s counteroffensives at Bukit Pelandok and Bukit 
Timah. These were the only battles in the entire campaign where the British Army went on the 
                                                 
12
 Timothy Harrison Place, Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944 (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 
4. 
 6 
offensive, with the equivalent of a battalion and a brigade respectively. The two battles 
demonstrated the contrast between the two military systems – the typical linear, sluggish, un-
coordinated and piecemeal attacks of the British Army, and the typical fast tempo, aggressive 
offensive-defence tactics of the IJA. Chapter 6 examines the British Army‟s delaying actions at 
Kuantan and Telok Anson. Delaying actions are the most difficult tactical missions to perform 
and can be good gauges of the strengths and weaknesses of a military system. Near failure at 
Kuantan and success at Telok Anson reveal the difference in the tactical systems and training 
emphasis of two very different brigades in Malaya – the “conventional” 22nd Indian Brigade and 
the “unconventional” 12th Indian Brigade. The delaying actions also illustrate how failures in the 
operational leadership of the British Army jeopardized its tactical mission in Malaya. 
 Chapter 7 examines two other disastrous British Army campaigns in 1941-1942 – Greece 
and Burma. If institutional forces really did play a large part in the British Army‟s tactical 
disaster in the Malayan Campaign, then they should also account for other British Army tactical 
disasters during World War II. The Greek Campaign bore many circumstantial similarities with 
the Malayan Campaign and occurred just seven months before the outbreak of the Pacific War, 
which meant there was little time for the British Army to digest and apply any lessons learnt in 
Greece to Malaya. Since the IJA‟s system was modelled after the German Army‟s system, there 
is consistency in our comparison of the two campaigns. The Burma Campaign is even more 
relevant as the British Army faced a similar enemy, under similar strategic circumstances, in the 
same time period and in similar terrain as in Malaya. 
 Finally the concluding chapter examines how the transformation of the British military 
system in 1943 allowed the British Army to shed its earlier systemic weaknesses, and surpass the 
IJA‟s combat performance in Burma and the Far East from 1944-45. This long path to victory 
further highlights the role played by institutional forces in the making of the British Army‟s 
tactical disaster in the Malaya Campaign. It then sums up the three arguments of our research 
thesis. First, the British military system was primarily responsible for the many shortcomings of 
 7 
the British Army in the Malayan Campaign. Second, the British military system was more 
responsible for the British Army tactical disaster in Malaya than adverse circumstantial and 
personality factors. Third, the British Army‟s tactical disaster in Malaya was not an isolated case 
but was part of a global chain of failures, revealing the general failure of the British military 























CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
This chapter examines memoirs and reports written by British, Australian, Indian and 
Japanese military officers who fought in the Malayan Campaign. They are chosen for their 
significance and perspective. As such, repetition of points will largely be omitted. The focus is on 
their main arguments for the British Army‟s tactical defeat in Malaya to establish commonalities 
and the overarching links behind them. When examined collectively, they reveal that Malaya 
Command‟s weaknesses and 25th Army‟s strengths reflected those of their respective armies and 
military systems.  
 The man often blamed for the loss of Singapore was Percival, most senior British Army 
field commander in the campaign, who wrote the dispatch, Operations of Malaya Command from 
8 December 1941 to 15 February 1942 (1948). This was subsequently incorporated into his 
memoir, The War in Malaya (1949).
13
 Percival‟s memoirs highlighted the many difficulties he 
faced at the operational level. The British High Command‟s unrealistic strategy to make the RN 
and the RAF the mainstays of Singapore‟s defence, despite being unable to reinforce both 
services, jeopardised the army‟s ability to defend ground. Moreover, in a display of typical 
British poor inter-service cooperation, the RAF did not consult the army concerning the 
defensibility of their chosen site for airfields. This, and the British loss of air and sea control 
forced Percival to disperse his army widely all over Malaya to defend airfields in strategically 
poor positions such as Alor Star, Kota Bahru and Kuantan and rear coastal areas such as Mersing 
and Singapore.
14
 What stood out was his assertion that the many reasons for the fall of Singapore 
was due to British institutional failure to prepare for war in peacetime:  
A great many of the causes which contributed to our defeat in Malaya, had a common 
origin, namely the lack of readiness of the British command for war. Our shortage in 
fighting ships and in modern aircraft, our lack of tanks, the inexperience of many of our 
                                                 
13
 A.E. Percival, Operations of Malaya Command from 8 December 1941 to 15 February 1942 
(Supplement to the London Gazette, February 1948), <http://www.britain-at-
war.org.uk/WW2/London_Gazette/Malaya_Command/>; A.E., Percival, The War in Malaya (London: 
Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1949). 
14
 Ibid, 297-300. 
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leaders, the lack of training of most of our troops can all be attributed to a failure to prepare 





 Seeing the campaign from the artillery‟s perspective was Brigadier E.W. Goodman, 
Commander Royal Artillery (CRA) 9
th
 Indian Division, who wrote a dispatch, Notes on the 
Campaign in Malaya from the Artillery Point of View” (1946).16 With the artillery units of his 
division separated halfway across the east coast of Malaya, Goodman could not play his 
designated role of coordinating their actions, but instead took on a supervisory and advisory role 
for them. In this capacity, he toured the country widely and made many pertinent observations 
regarding the close jungle terrain‟s limitations on the use of artillery. First, the lack of large open 
spaces made it difficult to deploy artillery in the conventional way, which necessitated its 
dispersal. Second, the lack of visibility hampered the work of observation posts. Third, Malaya‟s 
hot and wet climate disintegrated cable lines, while the ever presence of tall trees interfered with 
wireless communications. Thus the artillery arm, upon which British tactical doctrine placed so 
much emphasis on, proved less effective in Malaya than in North Africa and Europe, to the 
detriment of Malaya Command.
17
 
Seeing the campaign from the combat engineer‟s perspective was Brigadier Ivan Simson, 
Malaya Command‟s Chief Engineer, who toured Malaya and Singapore extensively and wrote a 
published memoir, Too Little, Too late (1970).
18
 His main argument was that the British Army‟s 
complacency and underestimation of the IJA led to it neglecting to build fixed defences in 
Malaya. In peacetime, the War Office failed to allocate enough money for the recruitment of local 
labour for the construction of permanent defences in Malaya and Singapore, which meant that 
much of the work then had to be done by troops who were already busy and weary with training. 
                                                 
15
 Percival, 306. 
16
 E.W. Goodman,  Notes on the Campaign in Malaya from the Artillery Point of View (Delhi: War 





 Ivan Simson, Singapore: Too Little, Too Late (London: Leo Cooper, 1970). 
 10 
Moreover, most senior commanders, including Lieutenant-General Lionel Bond, the previous 
GOC Malaya Command, and Percival, were reluctant to construct a comprehensive permanent 
defence system to cover strategic positions throughout Malaya and Singapore. Percival claimed 
that such constructions would affect the morale of troops.
19
 Simson recalled attending many 
lectures which also preached this position and pointed to the British Expeditionary Force‟s 
similar neglect in preparing fixed defences in France in 1940. From these instances, he surmised 
that there was a systemic “anti-defence mentality” amongst British Army senior commanders 
since the end of World War I, who feared that troops would not have an offensive spirit in the 
presence of fixed defences.
20
  
As Malaya Command HQ‟s Director of Operations and Training and then its GSO I, 
Lieutenant-Colonel B.H. Ashmore was most qualified to comment on its operations and training. 
He did so in his dispatch, Some Personal Observations of the Malayan Campaign 1940-1942 
(1942), written after he had been safely evacuated to Ceylon.
21
 Ashmore noted that Malaya and 
India Commands emphasized training for desert warfare until 1940 when a manual on jungle 
warfare was finally issued by each command.
22
 However, Percival gave Ashmore only an 
assistant for training, which was insufficient to ensure that all formations put them into practice. 
In any case, training at all levels was hindered by many factors - the hot and humid climate, 
inexperienced officers and NCOs, frequent changes in formation organization, the wide dispersal 
of troops all over Malaya to perform a great variety of tasks such as building fixed defences, 
guard key installations and the late arrival of certain weapons, heavy equipment and artillery. In 
addition, Ashmore lamented the fact that staffwork was patchy as many untrained regular unit 
                                                 
19
 Ibid, 20, 21, 30-38, 45-47, 57, 68-71. 
20
 Ibid, 73-74.  
21
 Percival Papers P49, “Some Personal Observations of the Malayan Campaign 1940-1942”, Lieutenant-
Colonel B.H. Ashmore, Ceylon 1942. 
22
 These were MTP 9: Extensive Warfare - Notes on Forest Warfare (New Delhi: HQ India Command, 
October 1940) and “Tactical Notes for Malaya” (Singapore: Malaya Command, December 1940). 
 11 
officers were brought in to fill vacant positions. As will be elucidated in Chapter 2, the problems 
which hampered military training in Malaya mirrored what was happening in the UK at that time. 
Furthermore, the reinforcements that arrived after the conflict started did not have the 
time nor chance to acclimatize and train systematically and collectively for six months before 
being committed into battle - a requirement that Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery understood 
as necessary. In addition, Ashmore criticised Malaya Command‟s senior commanders for their 
flawed tendency to remove units from formations and dispatch them to widely separated areas, to 
launch piecemeal counterattacks without collective cohesion.
23
 As will be highlighted in 
subsequent chapters, this is a trait that characterized British Commonwealth commanders in all 
theatres of war, especially in the early war years. 
One memoir which revealed the poor state of Malaya Command‟s intelligence was, The 
Jungle is Neutral (1948) written by Major Spencer Chapman, the Commander of 101 Special 
Training School.
24
 Chapman‟s main grouse was that the IJA‟s advance down Malaya would have 
been severely delayed to allow British reinforcements to arrive in time, had his plans of 
organizing “stay behind” guerilla and reconnaissance parties involving locals led by British 
officers, been approved by Percival before the war.
25
 He recorded that as late as two weeks into 
the campaign, the III Indian Corps was starved of information about the enemy‟s equipment, 
transport and tactical methods. Thus, Heath approved of his long range penetration mission to 
Perak to gather information and sabotage the enemy.
26
 As will be mentioned in Chapter 2, Malaya 
Command‟s poor intelligence about the enemy was not unique in the British Army. 
 The man most suited to present the campaign from the infantry‟s perspective was 
Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Stewart, Commanding Officer (CO) of the most renowned and probably 
the best “jungle-trained” British infantry unit in Malaya – the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland 
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 Spencer Chapman, The Jungle is Neutral (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 1997 (1948)). 
25
 Ibid, 11-12, 70. 
26
 Ibid, 14-17. 
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Highlanders. Although scoffed at by Brigadier Kenneth Torrance, Brigadier General Staff Malaya 
Command, for training his unit realistically and rigorously for jungle warfare, this battalion 
proved to be one of the few that matched the IJA in the campaign. This was recognized by 
General Archibald Wavell, C-in-C India Command, who ordered Stewart to escape to pass on his 
personal knowledge of jungle warfare.
27
 In the safety of India, Stewart wrote the dispatch, 
Comments on the Loss of Singapore (1942), of which a shorter response to Percival‟s dispatch 
appeared in the form of The Loss of Singapore – A Criticism (1948). 28  Uniquely, Stewart 
downplayed the tactical impact of the Japanese control of the air and sea and their use of tanks. 
Instead, having been vindicated by the events in Malaya, his thesis was that the British Army was 
a flawed organization with no commonly enforced jungle warfare tactical doctrine, an unrealistic 
and low tempo infantry training system which put insufficient emphasis on jungle warfare 
training, inadequate and over-theoretical system of officer training, and a mistaken reliance on 
static linear defences.
29
 He argued that all these defects had a common systemic origin:  
It [the disaster] was the failure of a mental outlook and of [the British Army‟s] system 
which was its expression. [British] leaders faithfully and efficiently served that system in 




One British junior officer who wrote his memoir, Singapore – The Inexcusable Betrayal 
(1992) from the “grassroots” level, was Lieutenant George Chippington, a platoon commander in 
the 2
nd
 Leicesters, which fought in many major battles in the Malayan campaign.
31
 He wrote his 
memoirs to defend the honour of the common British soldiers whom he felt were made 
scapegoats for the fall of Singapore to cover up for the complacency and negligence of politicians 
and local senior military commanders.
32
 Chippington revealed the grueling conditions British 
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 CAB106/91, “The Loss of Singapore – A Criticism”, Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Stewart; WO106/2579B 




 WO106/2579B, Stewart. 
31
 George Chippington, Singapore – The Inexcusable Betrayal (Harley Swan, Woves, United Kingdom: 
SPAL, 1992). 
32
 Chippington, 9-12. 
 13 
soldiers had to endure which undermined morale even before contact was made with the enemy – 
frequent enemy air attacks, fatigue caused by the need to dig and prepare fixed defences, and 
discomfort and deprivation of sleep caused by constant rain.
33
 He also noted that the British 
Army‟s standard doctrinal emphasis on motorised mobility, which was drilled into him as an 
officer cadet in the UK, proved useless in Malaya. He also lamented the fact that junior officers 
were not issued with maps, binoculars and compasses, as Malaya Command was disinclined to 
entrust them with initiative and responsibilities.
34
 As will be elaborated in Chapter 2, this system 
of “autocratic command” was practiced throughout the British Army. 
The most important contemporary Australian perspective was articulated by Major-
General Gordon Bennett, the GOC 8
th
 Australian Division, who was also the most senior 
Australian soldier in Malaya. Bennett was an arrogant and controversial figure who fled to 
Australia just before the fall of Singapore without official permission, where he wrote the 
dispatch, On the Malayan Campaign 7
th
 December 1941 to 15
th
 February 1942. The 8
th
 
Australian Division‟s two brigades were amongst the best jungle-trained formations in Malaya 
Command and performed admirably against the IJA in Johor. Bennett‟s dispatch displayed 
nationalistic bias in extolling the high morale, tough qualities and jungle fighting skills of 
Australian soldiers while alluding to the lack of these in British and Indian troops.
35
 This sense of 
self-importance and need to defend his escape from Singapore made him incorporate the contents 
of his dispatch into his published memoir, Why Singapore Fell? (1944).
36
  
Like Stewart, Bennett downplayed the tactical effectiveness of Japanese warplanes and 
tanks. Instead, he looked to human factors to explain the fall of Singapore:  
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To summarise, the loss of Singapore was not due to lack of skill in the senior leaders. It 
was due in the main to poor leadership on the part of the commanders of most units. This 




Although Bennett absolved senior commanders like himself from blame, he obviously 
had Heath and Percival in mind as candidates for „poor leadership‟ with the reference to Heath‟s 
tendency to advocate retreat and Percival‟s failure to rein in on him.38 Bennett attributed the cause 
of „poor leadership‟ to the British Army‟s flawed system of „selection and training of junior 
officers'. Bennett, a militia officer, had prejudices against regular officers and believed that they 
lacked the aggressiveness, enterprise and resilience of militia officers, who needed these qualities 
to excel in their civilian jobs. However, he also singled out the British „system of training for all 
ranks‟ for not imbibing offensive spirit, aggressive patrolling, individuality, initiative and 
resourcefulness, which were all needed in jungle warfare. In addition, he disparaged the British 
Army‟s tropical clothing, heavy equipment and its tactical doctrine of emphasising long-range 
artillery firepower and motorised mobility for being suited to open rather than jungle terrain.
39
 
Finally, in his dispatches, he also critiqued the British Army‟s poor intelligence and staff work for 
being inefficient and geared towards peacetime low tempo.
40
 
Considering that Indian soldiers comprised half of all troops who fought under the British 
flag in Malaya, it is most important to include memoirs that saw the campaign through their eyes. 
Fortunately, we have the memoirs of two prominent native Indian officers, Soldiers’ Contribution 
to Indian Independence (1974) by Major Mohan Singh and, India’s Freedom Struggle and the 
Great INA (1992) by Major Mohammad Zaman Kiani.
41
 Singh was a company commander in the 
1/14
th
 Punjabs, who surrendered to the Japanese after being cut off from his unit when the war 
was barely one week old. He then became the commander of the Japanese-sponsored, First Indian 
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National Army (INA). Kiani served as General Staff Officer (GSO) III (Intelligence) of the 11
th
 
Indian Division HQ throughout the campaign. After the fall of Singapore, he joined the INA and 
commanded one of its divisions.  
Although the focus of both memoirs was about the founding of the INA, its activities and 
contributions to Indian nationalism and independence, they included some important insights 
about the pre-war British Indian Army. Both officers noted that during peacetime, the British 
Indian Army had an officer corps that took preparation for war lightly, had an inadequate and 
unrealistic training system, and largely neglected jungle warfare training.
42
 Furthermore, they 
noted that it was a mercenary force which lacked motivation to fight for the British cause.
43
 
Finally, Kiani reflected that the British early war system of „milking‟ regular units of experienced 
officers and NCOs to help form a cadre of newly raised conscript units, robbed Indian units in 
Malaya of experienced leadership. The replacement British Emergency Commissioned Officers 
(ECOs) were inexperienced and, having received little study in Indian languages, culture and 
customs, could not bond effectively with the sepoys.
44
  
 To make the literature review complete, it is necessary to include Japanese sources. There 
are not many due to the linguistic barrier and the fact that many military documents and diaries 
were destroyed in the course of the Pacific War. The most prominent and most significant of the 
English-translated Japanese memoirs is Singapore – The Hinge of Fate (1951), written by the 
controversial Lieutenant-Colonel Masanobu Tsuji, 25
th
 Army HQ‟s staff officer in charge of 
operations. In this capacity, he often went right up front as liaison officer and tactical advisor.
45
 
Tsuji‟s memoirs owed much in content to the wartime post-campaign report produced by the 25th 
Army HQ, Outline of the Malayan Campaign (1942), which he must have played a large part in 
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 His memoir had the stated aim of responding to some facts and opinions in 
Churchill‟s memoirs which differed from the Japanese perspective.47 It was a largely self-serving 
nationalistic account, prone to exaggeration and biased coverage at several points. 
Notwithstanding that, it provided insights on the IJA‟s ingredients for victory and its assessments 
of the British Army. 
 What was groundbreaking was Tsuji‟s claim that the IJA‟s thorough and intensive 
gathering of information and combat preparations in tropical climate and jungle terrain were all 
carried out during the first six months of 1941.
48
 Augmented by good intelligence about the 
dispositions and intentions of the enemy through clandestine air and ground reconnaissance, the 
IJA formulated highly successful “unorthodox” tactics, based on the principles of speed, surprise 
and flexibility - tanks, light artillery and some infantry were employed to attack frontally on the 
road, while other infantry flanked through the jungle and in small boats along the coast and rivers, 
to trap and annihilate the enemy.
49
 Tsuji credited the extraordinary efficiency and resourcefulness 
of Japanese combat engineers, in improvising and repairing bridges in a much shorter time than 
expected, and the IJA‟s use of bicycles, for maintaining the rapid speed of advance and pursuit 
through all terrain despite the British use of demolitions. Consequently, given neither rest nor 
opportunity to regroup, the British Army often retreated without destroying its „Churchill 
supplies‟ - petroleum, food, weapons, ammunition, motor vehicles and heavy equipment, which 




Tsuji stated that the Malayan Campaign was given top priority in Japan‟s military 
preparations for war, so the GOC 25
th
 Army, Lieutenant-General Tomuyuki Yamashita, his staff 
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officers and three well-trained, crack divisions were all “specially selected” for the task.51 He also 
gave credit to the close co-operation and support given by the Imperial Japanese Navy and the 
Imperial Japanese Army Air Force to the IJA.
52
 However, Tsuji‟s thesis was that victory in 
Malaya was mainly due to spiritual and moral factors:  
It was not jungle experience or training in jungle warfare but the indomitable fighting spirit 
of the officers and men [of the 25
th
 Army] which enabled them to surmount difficulties and 




As will be addressed in Chapter 3, contrary to Tsuji‟s claims, the thorough and intensive 
preparations and training made by 25
th
 Army for the Malayan campaign and its use of so-called 
“unorthodox” tactics were characteristics of the IJA. The 25th Army‟s capture and use of 
„Churchill supplies‟ was possible only because the British Army traditionally placed great 
emphasis on logistics, as will be highlighted in Chapter 2. 
Another useful Japanese memoir written in English is Lieutenant Takao Fusayama‟s, A 
Japanese Soldier in Malaya and Sumatra (1997). He was the commander of the 2
nd
 Radio 
Platoon of the Imperial Guards Division.
54
 In this capacity, Fusayama served near the frontline 
with the Kunishi Detachment HQ in its small boat flanking operations along Malay‟s west coast 
from early January 1942 onwards. Like Tsuji, Fusayama‟s memoirs was unashamedly 
nationalistic and claimed that the main reasons for the Japanese victory were the brilliance of the 
leadership of the 25
th
 Army and the spiritual and moral superiority of its men over those of the 
enemy, which was especially crucial in the close jungle terrain. He also noted the devolution of 
command amongst Japanese field and junior commanders, which allowed the 25
th
 Army to 
conduct high tempo operations.
55
 As will be elaborated in Chapter 3, this system of “mission 
command” was practiced throughout the IJA. 
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 This chapter has established that most of the strengths of 25
th
 Army and the weaknesses 
of Malaya Command actually reflected their respective armies and military systems. Malaya 
Command‟s tardiness in preparing fixed defences, its flawed intelligence, its “autocratic 
command” system, its inadequate system of officer selection and training, its decentralized, 
unrealistic and low tempo system of training, its use of “milking” as a system for expanding the 
army, its cumbersome equipment and its static linear defence tactics focusing on the artillery arm 
and motorized mobility – all reflected the British military system. Conversely, the 25th Army‟s 
thorough and professional preparation for war, its excellent intelligence, its “mission command” 
system, its centralized, realistic and high tempo system of training for all ranks, its light 
equipment and its flanking offensive tactics focusing on the infantry arm - all reflected the 
Japanese military system. Thus, the tactical outcome of the Malayan Campaign was decided by 
















CHAPTER 2: THE BRITISH ARMY IN 1941 
 The British Army had strengths which eventually helped to win the war. However, in the 
early years of the war when defeat was the norm, its weaknesses were more evident. This chapter 
examines and evaluates how the pre-war and early war British military system laid the 
foundations for the British Army‟s tactical disaster in the Malayan Campaign. It asserts that the 
shortcomings of Malaya Command actually reflected the shortcomings of the British Army as a 
whole. 
 Malaya Command‟s lack of homogeneity betrayed systemic weakness. Although known 
collectively as the “British Army” (the generic term used in this thesis), it was in reality a diverse 
Commonwealth and Empire army, administered by three affiliated yet separate armies – the 
British Army, the Indian Army and the Australian Army.
56
 This multi-national and multi-ethnic 
army was largely structured, organised, led, trained and fought according to a common imperial 
system. Only the Australian Army had a considerable measure of autonomy as Australia was a 
Dominion within the British Empire. However, differences in culture, customs, background, 
motivation, religion, food requirements and languages, undermined collective cohesion and 
complicated command and supply requirements.
57
  
War Office and Malaya Command‟s complacency and lack of preparation for war laid 
the foundation for British defeat in Malaya.
58
 Wavell wrote that this was „typical of the British 
way of war‟, a verdict that Brian Bond and Fraser agreed with.59 Mark Urban contended that the 
British Army traditionally started every major war since the 18
th
 century unprepared, and then 
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progressed in combat proficiency until a peak of excellence was reached. Then, with the coming 
of peace, the army would lapse into unpreparedness again until the next war, and repeat the whole 
cycle.
60
 Simson added that British democratic institutions tended to focus on popular domestic 
priorities at the expense of sound but unpopular military preparations. Finally, in the interwar 
years, the British nation naïvely believed in the viability of international collective security and 
was reluctant to wage a major war.
61
  
Moreover, Martin van Creveld and French observed that the British Army had a tradition 
of “muddling through a crisis” rather than preparing thoroughly for it, due to its officer corps 
regarding war as a “great game”.62 Similarly, there was consensus opinion that British and Indian 
Army officers were conservative, amateurish, and given to sports, recreation and socialisation 
rather than preparing for war.
63
 The British Army‟s “unpreparedness” for the campaign was thus 
systemic in its origins. 
Farrell argued that the greatest flaw of the British military system was that it insisted „the 
situation must fit the plan at all levels.‟ This resulted in what he called the frequent „disconnect‟ 
in planning at all levels.
64
 Brooke-Popham imposed on Percival the mission to keep the enemy as 
far away as possible from the Singapore Naval Base until reinforcements arrived to “roll” back 
the enemy‟s advance.65 Aware that 11th Indian Division would have to bear the brunt of delaying 
the enemy until substantial reinforcements arrived at Singapore to turn the tide, Percival then 
instructed all its successive GOCs to „preserve their division as an effective fighting formation‟.66 
Yet the 11
th
 Indian Division had no hope of imposing maximum delay on the enemy unless it 
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fought hard with all its might. This contradiction would lead to a half-hearted defence of Malaya 
and the constant danger of the division being overwhelmed piecemeal, as Tsuji noted.
67
  
Another example of British rigidity in sticking to an original plan without changing to fit 
circumstances was Percival‟s reluctance to build a permanent defence network throughout 
Malaya – a fact which Tsuji noted in bewilderment.68 Wavell subsequently asked Percival to 
rectify this but advised that it be done in secrecy, which gave greater credence to Simson‟s claim 
of a systemic “anti-defence mentality” amongst British Army senior commanders.69 This attitude 
made sense only if Wavell and Percival still expected British reinforcements to somehow turn up 
on time and in numbers to counterattack as originally envisaged. They were thus concerned that 
the offensive spirit of these troops might be dented by the sight of permanent defences. However, 
this delusion was out of sync with the reality of the grave strategic situation and undermined 
defence preparations.   
The British Army paradoxically lacked knowledge of the equipment, tactics, capabilities 
and intentions of the IJA, despite possessing rather accurate assessments of them. It had 
erroneously underrated the IJA as a weaker opponent than the Italian Army.
70
 This was in part 
due to complacent ethno-centrism displayed by British officers of all three services, as well as the 
British Army‟s flawed assessments of the IJA‟s performance against the Chinese and Red armies 
in the 1930s.
71
 However, French also noted that British Army commanders at home tended to see 
the German Army from their own perspectives, instead of recognising that different armies had 
different ethos and ways of working. Consequently, the British Army‟s Staff College, which 
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produced most of its senior officers, neglected the study of foreign armies until 1936.
72
 Malaya 
Command‟s intelligence failure was also due to its under-emphasis on the value of active fighting 
patrols.
73
 However, the German Army also noted that the British Army in Greece seldom sent 
patrols, which reinforced the pattern of British Army systemic failure in intelligence.
74
 
The combat divisions of Malaya Command were rigidly organised along standard British 
Army lines without modification for local conditions. Except for territorial divisions, British and 
Indian divisions and brigades were not permanent structures and had no regional affiliations - 
battalions within a brigade and even brigades within a division were often transferred from one to 
another due to the need to scatter the army to garrison far-flung colonial territories. Thus, there 
was often insufficient esprit de corps within a brigade or division.
75
 Although divisional assets, 
were more commonly decentralised in 1941 to form temporary combined arms “brigade groups” 
for specific tasks, close co-operation between them was markedly less effective and expended 
more time than if they had been permanently grouped together for training in peacetime.
76
  
British and Indian infantry battalions were recruited from a particular region in the UK 
and India, to foster regimental esprit de corps and pride. This was the basis of the British Army‟s 
famous regimental system imbibed through regimental parades, customs, uniform distinctions and 
history lessons on the regiment‟s glorious deeds. Although the regimental system sustained 
morale during combat, it also led to “tribal elitism” which hindered combined arms and inter-
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 The adverse impact of the lack of cohesion within British and Indian 
formations and units on their combat performance in Malaya will be evident in subsequent 
chapters. 
Due to the perceived lack of threat from a major modern army in jungle terrain, the 
British Army did not conceptualise a specific doctrine for jungle warfare but instead relied on one 
standard doctrine until 1940. It assumed that preparing for conventional warfare, with correct 
application of general tactical principles, could be prepared for other forms of warfare in the 
colonies.
78
 This “one size fits all” approach to doctrine was due to the many roles assumed by the 
British Army and Indian Army since the early 20
th
 century. The first was traditionally 
preoccupied with continental war in open terrain against Germany, while the second was 
traditionally preoccupied with mountain warfare in Afghanistan against the Russian Army and 
Pathan irregulars. In addition, throughout the interwar years both armies were heavily involved in 
“policing” the vast empire in India and Palestine. With Italian entry into the Second World War, 
the Middle East, East and North Africa became the main overseas preoccupation of the British 
Army, which changed the emphasis to desert warfare.
79
 As a result, many formations and units in 
Malaya were trained in garrison work and warfare in open terrain rather than jungle warfare. 
Even when directives were finally given by Malaya and India Commands regarding 
jungle warfare, Brigadier W. Carpendale, CO 28
th
 Indian Brigade, lamented that Malaya 
Command HQ did not set up any jungle warfare school nor gave assistance on jungle warfare 
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training. As a result, each formation and unit commander was left to his own devices to train his 
troops, with most of them being ignorant about jungle warfare training.
80
 Simson discovered large 
quantities of unissued War Office anti-tank pamphlets stored in Malaya Command HQ and also 
cited Percival‟s refusal to allow him to conduct centralised training for combat engineer units, 
despite the fact that some of them had little knowledge of camouflaging, bridge demolition 
techniques, pillbox, anti-boat and anti-tank defence construction and close co-operation with 
infantry.
81
 In addition, useful lessons learnt by British and Indian units in Malaya during outfield 
exercises were also not followed up or passed on to higher command.
82
 Unfortunately, in all these 
cases, valuable lessons were not transmitted to Malaya Command HQ for deliberation and 
circulation.  
The lack of circulation and centralisation of a common doctrine was not unique to 
Malaya Command. After all, the British Army traditionally viewed doctrine, as encapsulated in 
its many versions of Field Service Regulations (FSR), as merely broad principles to be adapted by 
unit and formation commanders, rather than common technique to be prescribed authoritatively in 
detail. In the same grain, Moreman noted that India Command had since the late 19
th
 century been 
reluctant to issue specific manuals prescribing mountain warfare techniques for its units fighting 
on the Northwest Frontier, for fear of over-specialisation.
83
 Similarly, while the two jungle 
warfare manuals produced in 1940 contained sound principles, they did not deal with minor 
tactics.
84
 This made sense as the multiple-roles performed by British and Indian armies globally 
required local garrison commanders to have some autonomy over the use of doctrine and tactics. 
Moreover, the Directorate of Military Training (DMT) in the UK had too many duties to enforce 
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a common interpretation of doctrine. Furthermore, the British Army‟s regimental system also 
hindered the passing on of good practices. In addition, most British Army officers typically 
detested intellectual pursuits and so ignored reading the voluminous issues of doctrinal manuals.
85
 
Thus, in the UK, many division and corps schools issued their own supplementary doctrinal 
manuals, instead of issuing a common one.
86
  
Standard British Army doctrine in the interwar years emphasised the need to avoid the 
mass slaughters in the trenches of the First World War.
87
 Thus, senior commanders preferred 
what Martin van Creveld termed „timetable war‟ and what Martin Samuels called „restrictive 
control and timetable tactics‟, which brought victory to the British Army on the Western Front in 
1918.
88
 Such tactics were characterized by meticulously planned, centrally controlled and 
methodically executed set piece battles, with an emphasis on careful consolidation of ground 
rather than active pursuit and exploitation of breakthrough opportunities.
89
 As Place asserted, the 
British Army had so assumed that the artillery would be able to suppress the enemy that, „Little 
thought had been given to the training of the infantry in the minor tactics [in the last two hundred 
yards] needed to close in with an unsuppressed enemy'.
90
  
The British Army failed to recognize that lack of visibility and wealth of cover provided 
by the jungle terrain favoured the offense over the defense, in which infantry played a more 
crucial role than artillery. Consequently, Malaya Command relied on fighting World War I-style, 
static, linear defensive warfare on the road, supported by heavy artillery firepower and reinforced 
by motor-borne infantry.
91
 This fact was well-documented even in Japanese sources.
92
 The 
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assumption that jungle terrain was “impenetrable” might explain why Lieutenant-Colonel M. 
Elrington, CO 2
nd
 Loyals, claimed that machetes for cutting jungle vegetation were not standard 
issues within Malaya Command.
93
  
 Standard British artillery doctrine and tactics, which envisaged the systematic use of 
centrally massed divisional artillery to neutralise the enemy in support of the infantry, were not 
suitable for jungle warfare. Due to the close terrain of Malaya and the lessons learnt from the 
French Campaign, artillery batteries were now frequently attached to brigades instead of being 
concentrated at divisional level. However, the standard lengthy process needed by brigade and 
battalion commanders to obtain firepower support from the CRA, slowed the rate of firing. 
Moreover, the jungle terrain reduced visibility and hindered signal communications which 
hampered the use of the artillery‟s new and effective method of short concentrated area-firing.94  
Insulated by the RN and the RAF in home defence, the British Army‟s mobilization 
system was geared towards fighting small colonial wars, which resulted in its quality being 
diluted when expanding rapidly in times of major war. Alone amongst its European counterparts, 
the British Army was a small core of long-service regular force, backed up by a larger part-time 
territorial force and reserves. Conscription was only made universal in the two world wars.
95
 The 
British Army had been using the system of “milking” to expand its size quickly since 1918. 
However, this system robbed existing units of experienced leadership.
96
 Indian units especially, 
had their combat cohesion and performance undermined by the inability of British ECOs to speak 
the local languages of the sepoys, and the lack of familiarity with their different culture and 
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 British units were not spared from having inexperienced leadership due to “milking,” 
but they were at least spared linguistic and cultural problems.
98 The effects of “milking” on 
selected British and Indian Army units can be seen from Appendix One. 
The British Army‟s poor pool of infantry recruits laid the foundations for the poor 
performance of Malaya Command‟s infantry units. The close combat nature and rigours of jungle 
warfare required good quality infantrymen with aggressiveness, ruggedness, enterprise and 
initiative.
99
 However, in line with the erroneous British Army‟s doctrinal belief that infantrymen 
needed no quality other than obeying orders, the better educated recruits were channelled to other 
combat arms and services, while the infantry took in the rest.
100
 Moreover, its system of assigning 
recruits to a branch and service according to the recruiting officer‟s recommendation, based on 
their professional trade, choices and medical test, proved unsatisfactory. Tests done by Northern 
Command at home in May 1941 showed that 20% of an infantry intake lacked the aptitude 
needed, which affected their morale.
101
 Thus, many recruits lacked the necessary qualities for 
jungle warfare. 
 Japanese Army veterans had scant respect for the spiritual and moral qualities of British 
Empire troops.
102
 Undoubtedly, being on the losing side, with no air or naval support, and in a 
constant cycle of retreat, prepare defences, fight and retreat again without sufficient sleep, 
undermined the latter‟s morale and confidence.103 In the first place, the British military system 
was not designed to produce aggressive soldiers. After all, British soldiers were literate urban 
products of an interwar liberal democratic and un-militaristic generation, who were cynical about 
making unnecessary sacrifices due to their memories of the futility of World War I. 
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Consequently, despite government propaganda, many of them were apathetic about the 
ideological cause of their struggle, had no personal hatred for the enemy, and no fervor for close 
quarter combat. Instead, regimental and small group loyalties, and the desire to do their duty and 
return safely to their loved ones, served as their motivations to fight. This was reflected in the 
popularity amongst British troops in what Michael Howard called „the nostalgic, home-sick 
refrains‟ of Vera Lynn and Gracie Fields.104 Such traits hardly conditioned them for the demands 
of jungle warfare. 
To make matters worse, the Indian soldiers who made up half of Malaya Command‟s 
troops, traditionally based their motivation on career advancement and a sense of duty to their 
regiment, clan, caste and religion, rather than patriotism for the British crown. By the outbreak of 
war, most native Indian officers had divided loyalties, due to their sympathy with the Indian 
National Congress. They were also resentful about the overt racism and the unequal treatment 
perpetuated by the British military establishment.
105
 The potential unreliability of Indian troops 
and their susceptibility to anti-British propaganda were noticed by Japanese officers and noted in 
the tropical warfare pamphlet issued to every Japanese soldier.
106
 A few days before the fall of 
Singapore, Major Iwaichi Fujiwara, commander of F-Kikan, which aimed to subvert Indian 
troops, even managed to persuade an entire Indian battalion to defect.
107
  
Indian and British officers alike noted the inadequate training of Malaya Command‟s 
troops. This is evident from the profile of selected British and Indian Army units in Appendix 
One. They usually trained for garrison duties, mostly near barracks rather than outfield, escaped 
indoors at noon to avoid the tropical heat, kept office hours and did not train at night for fear of 
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diseases spread by mosquitoes.
108
 Anti-tank training for infantry, apart from anti-tank rifle crews, 
was limited to a demonstration on the use of Molotov cocktails on dummy tanks. Finally, realistic 
military training was further compromised by an injunction against damaging private property or 
cutting down crops or trees.
109
 The inadequate nature of Malaya Command‟s training can be seen 
from the example of the 15
th
 Indian Brigade. Of the six collective exercises it had, all except one 
were single-day schemes. Its typical exercise had no bayonets fixed, with blanks fired only at 
twenty yards onwards, while artillery, engineers and enemies were often „imagined‟. Another of 
its schemes in November 1941 involving the defence of the Jitra Line against a „motorised enemy 
force‟ lasted for only five hours!110  
 Jeremy Crang, French and Bond also noted that the British Army‟s standard training 
regime at home was characterized by similar low tempo, unrealism and laxity.
111
 A large 
proportion of infantry training was spent on parade drills and endless fatigue duties designed to 
inculcate blind obedience, discipline and a sense of collective spirit. Many senior officers 
believed that these things were necessary to sustain morale, while cultivating independent rational 
thought and individualism would lead to insubordination and demoralization. Significantly, 




Although common “battle drills” were used in 1918, a combination of factors militated 
against their universal adoption – the British liberal tradition, the social belief in the adaptability 
of British “gentlemen” officers, and the perceived inability of lower class soldiers to perform 
without supervision.
113
 Instead, the British Army traditionally left infantry training in the hands of 
unit, regimental and formation commanders in depots and schools. Thus, depending on the 
                                                 
108
 CAB 106/53 Harrison, “History of the 11th Indian Division”; Kiani, 13-14; Percival, 300; Percival 
Papers P49. 
109
 Heath Papers LMH4; WO 172/120 Appendix II; Chippington, 29. 
110
 WO 172/117; WO 172/120 “1st Leicesters War Diary”; WO 172/121; Percival Papers P49. 
111
 Bond, 35-37; French, “Big Wars and Small Wars”, 42-43; Crang, 79. 
112
 French, Raising Churchill’s Army, 48, 55-57, 122, 124-129, 152-153; Fraser, 12-13; Crang, 79. 
113
 French, 21 
 30 
personality of individual commanders, training tempo and standards remained uneven at home.
114
 
The British Army‟s training system was inadequate to prepare its troops for conventional warfare 
against a modern opponent, much less to fight in the jungle. 




 AIF and 12
th
 Indian Brigades, 
had insufficient collective exercises, while the 22
nd





 Indian Divisions had a scheme with all its components.
115
 This reflected the situation at 
home where large scale maneuvers beyond brigade level rarely took place. This was due to the 
scattering of the army all over the Empire, the reluctance to call up territorials and reserves, the 
shortage of equipment, the instruction to respect private property and the lack of suitable training 
ground. As a result, monotonous and unrealistic exercises with flags representing troops and 
weapons were conducted.
116
 Naturally, co-operation of artillery with infantry in the attack was 
also insufficiently practiced.
117
 After 1940, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) also 
failed to introduce collective training for the concentrated army at home as there was a continued 
shortage of weapons and heavy equipment, while troops had to dig trenches, man coastal 
defences and provide labour for civil needs.
118
 Thus, the factors which hampered collective 
training in Malaya also affected training in the UK. 
The leadership of Malaya Command at all levels left much to be desired. At the eve of 
the Kampar battle, Heath complained that many junior commanders and even some unit 
commanders „lacked tactical sense.‟119 The British Army‟s amateurish and unsatisfactory officer 
selection system laid the foundation for its poor leadership. It was unsatisfactorily leaned towards 
a subjective interview. In the case of pre-war regular officer candidates and ECO candidates, the 
interviewer favoured candidates of middle and upper class background who could be expected to 
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have the academic or professional qualifications, eloquence and bearings. Only the wartime 
officer selection system could be considered meritocratic as potential candidates had to be from 
outstanding conscripts with six months of service who had the recommendation of their unit 
commanders.
120
 However, regimental loyalties made unit commanders reluctant to send their 
better personnel as officer candidates, which retarded the quality of the army‟s officer pool. In 
any case, the officer selection system proved “unscientific” and inadequate, as failure rates in the 
Officer Cadet Training Units (OCTUs) reached 25% in 1941 at home.
121
  
 The British Army‟s system of training junior infantry officers was typically amateurish, 
haphazard and inadequate. It was a mere three months for wartime officers and ECOs.
122
 Upon 
graduation, officers underwent further practical training in their units by mentor officers, which 
typically resulted in uneven training standards. Infantry officer training was often a revision of 
recruit training but emphasised sports, riding, hunting, physical fitness and the inculcation of 
“gentlemanly” character and values. The cultivating of initiative, critical thinking and 
independent-thought was neglected, while man management skills were totally excluded, beyond 
the issue of a pamphlet. Tactical training consisted mainly of demonstrations and unrealistic 
“Training Exercises Without Troops” (TEWTs). The training of infantry NCOs was similarly 
conducted in the units and also failed in training initiative.  It was clear that the training system of 
infantry officers was unsatisfactory as many units complained about the unsuitability of the 
officers they received, with some invalided due to nervous breakdowns in action.
123
  
 OCTU Malaya‟s syllabus for infantry officer cadets conformed to those in the UK and 
suffered from the same deficiencies. Its three-month course mainly consisted of drills, weapons 
training and many lectures, demonstrations and films. The art of leadership was covered in only a 
lecture, while practical anti-tank warfare training was absent. There was only a day‟s outfield 
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training in jungle warfare and only two night training schemes. Throughout the course, none of 
the field training was multi-day and did not involve the other arms. Finally, tactical training 
consisted of only a mandatory five-day TEWT in Johor.
124
 A junior officer who had attended 
OCTU Malaya „remembered that its syllabus was based on doctrine laid down in the UK, with no 
specific lessons about conditions specific to Malaya,‟ which was most unhelpful.125 Considering 
that the close terrain and high tempo nature of jungle warfare required good leadership from 
junior officers and NCOs, it was most unfortunate that the British Army‟s system of selecting and 
training officers failed to supply this important ingredient. 
The British Army‟s system of training unit and formation commanders was just as 
inadequate, haphazard and amateurish. Since the 18
th
 century, the British Army believed that 
personal experience built upon public school education and sound character was sufficient to 
prepare officers for higher appointments.
126
 However, there were inadequate divisional and corps 
level exercises in the interwar period to help higher formation commanders gain experience. Until 
1939, when a Higher Commander‟s Course was finally instituted too late to have any impact on 
improving quality of higher leadership, formation commanders were trained by their superior 
officers in a combination of TEWTs, troop exercises, discussions and conferences. However, 
standards were typically patchy depending on the latter. A Senior Officer School had existed to 
train unit commanders since 1920, but it was typically unrealistic and lax. Training took place 




In the interwar years, the Staff College also trained field commanders, having 
erroneously thought that they were interchangeable with staff officers. As graduates were mostly 
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junior officers, their learning became outdated when they eventually became unit and formation 
commanders.
128
 This was bound to have a great impact on the high leadership of the army, 
considering that the majority of senior officers from lieutenant-colonel onwards were Staff 
College graduates and lecturers by the 1930s.
129
 This resulted in certain senior officers, such as 
Percival, Lieutenant-General Thomas Hutton, GOC Burma Command and Lieutenant-General 
Maitland Wilson, GOC “W” Force in Greece being given field command, when they were 
actually more adapt at staff work.
130
 To compound matters, hasty wartime expansion of the 
officer corps brought rapid promotion to inexperienced officers who had only participated in 
colonial “policing” during peacetime. Not surprisingly then, command of formations and units in 
the British Army was frequently poor in the early years of the war.
131
  
Typically, the training system in the British Army‟s Staff College left much to be desired. 
The course itself was narrowly designed to prepare graduates to take up appointment as brigade-
majors only. Its syllabus was typically characterised by sports, TEWTs and academic studies of 
subjects such as staff duties, politics and grand strategy but left out tactics and realistic field 
exercises. Military history instructors were often narrowly oriented towards the trench warfare of 
the Western Front, rather than the mobile warfare in Palestine, during World War I. Finally, with 
the emphasis on rote learning, the course did not prepare graduates for independent thinking and 
analysis. The many complaints about the poor quality of staff college graduates suggest that 
Malaya Command‟s shoddy staffwork was not merely circumstantial as claimed by Ashmore.132 
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 Malaya Command‟s use of “autocratic command” system was in fact characteristic of the 
British Army, which had since the 18
th
 century been using it to bring order out of battlefield chaos 
and unpredictability. In accordance with this, brigade commanders and below were expected to 
issue detailed verbal orders to subordinates which had to be later confirmed in writing, while 
divisional commanders and above had to write out all their orders in detail. Subordinates were 
expected not to deviate from their given orders and to report back when the situation changed.
133
 
In fact, a pre-war British officer‟s military manual recommended that orders be in written form 
„where possible‟ and stated that, „a formal order will never be departed from either in letter or 
spirit.‟134  The only concession made after 1940 was that orders would henceforth be issued 
verbally via radio or conferences, instead of in writing.
135
 This “autocratic” system of command 
allowed peacetime umpires to judge an exercise efficiently but ensured that the British Army 




To facilitate their “autocratic” system of command, British division commanders and 
below were expected to set up their HQ behind the front, so that they were in a better position to 
give and receive orders. Formation commanders were also expected to co-ordinate the work of 
their staff officers and execute orders personally. These often made them lose touch with the 
situation at the front in the early years of the war.
137
 This was only partially alleviated by the 
“Field Service Regulations” (1935), which recommended that divisional HQ should be split, into 
a “rear echelon” consisting of staff officers not needed for immediate operations and a smaller 
“forward echelon” with the commander and the staff officers needed for operations. 138  The 
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British Army‟s antiquated system of command made it unable to cope with the frequent loss of 
command and control which characterised jungle warfare. 
Malaya Command units were entirely motorised, just like the other British and Indian 
units. British Empire units were consequently very mobile on roads but had limited off-road 
capabilities. Moreover, in Malaya‟s jungle and Greece‟s mountainous terrain, where good roads 
were scarce, “bottlenecks” and traffic jams were inevitably created which were vulnerable to 
enemy air attacks and ambushes. Over-reliance on motorized transport also developed what 
Major-General Ian Playfair, Chief of Staff Far East Command, called the “Rolls Royce” attitude – 
the reluctance of troops to dismount and march on foot for short distances.
139
  
The British Empire soldier‟s standard tropical uniform and equipment were not 
conducive for jungle warfare, being more “sporty” than practical. Khaki-drill, the traditional 
colour of British tropical uniforms since the late 19
th
 century, blended well with desert terrain but 
stood out in Malaya‟s green jungle terrain. Moreover, the wearing of shorts exposed soldiers‟ legs 
to insect bites, the hard ground and thorns. Furthermore, the conspicuously shiny brass clasps of 
the belt and buckles were meant for peacetime “spit and posh” parade smartness and were 
impractical for combat. Finally, the studded heavy leather boots were meant for marching and 
were too noisy for stealthy movement.
140
 The unsuitable tropical uniform and equipment reflected 
the amateurish approach taken by the British Army towards jungle warfare preparations. 
 The British Army‟s “autocratic” command system and artillery required good 
communications to function effectively in a modern high tempo war. Unfortunately, its signaling 
methods had not progressed enough since World War I. Lacking high powered, secure radios and 
trained signalers, only the artillery and armour used wireless sets extensively. British Empire 
infantry divisions had so few wireless sets that only one set could be used to communicate with 
                                                 
139
 French, “Big Wars and Small Wars”, 46; Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East Vol. 2: The 
Germans Come to the Help of Their Ally (1941), (London: HMSO, 1954), 77-78, 91-92; CAB 106/193 
“Some Personal Reflections on the Malayan Campaign” (1943), Major Playfair; Percival Papers P49; 
WO106/2579B. 
140
 Martin Brayley, The British Army 1939-45 (3) The Far East (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002), 35. 
 36 
all three brigades if used exclusively. At battalion level, the sole wireless was used exclusively to 
communicate with the brigade. Thus field telephones lines, supplemented by civilian ones, were 
laid as the main form of communication as they were easy to maintain, more technically reliable 
and secure from enemy interception. However, cables could be easily cut when visible and had to 
be augmented by the use of dispatch riders and runners, which was time-consuming.
141
 Malaya‟s 
humid and hot climate and dense jungle terrain disrupted British field communications more 




The “retreat mentality” of British field commanders in Malaya in the face of Japanese 
flanking maneuvers is well-known.
143
 Due to its long tradition of fighting colonial warfare in 
difficult terrain, the British Army had always considered the management of logistics as of great 
importance.
144
 Logistics assumed an even greater priority in the interwar period as tactical 
doctrine shifted to an emphasis on firepower and motorization.
145
 However, this proved to be a 
“double-edged sword” – British field commanders became over-sensitive to the vulnerability of 
their lines of communications, while Ashmore and Tsuji revealed that too much British 
ammunition was “unwisely dumped” too far forward in northern Malaya, then subsequently 
captured and used by the IJA to sustain its operations.
146
 All these greatly facilitated the IJA‟s use 
of bold encirclement tactics. 
This chapter has examined in great detail how the shortcomings of Malaya Command in 
its C3I, tactical doctrines, selection and training of all ranks, ethos, morale, organisation and 
equipment actually reflected the shortcomings of the British Army as a whole. The pre-war 
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British military system was geared towards fighting low tempo “small wars” against an inferior 
opponent. Yet, its High Command adopted a rigid “one size fit all” systemic approach in 
preparing for war as it assumed that time and opportunity would always be given for the British 
Army to expand and adapt to meet the demands of a global war. After all, this had always been 
the case historically.  
Instead, the British Army found itself fighting a high tempo world war against several 
modern opponents simultaneously. In Malaya, it had the misfortune of facing an “unorthodox”, 
first-class, sufficiently well-equipped, battle-hardened and well-trained IJA, in a major war in 
predominantly jungle terrain, which was not conducive to standard British Army C3I, ethos, 
doctrine, tactics, training, organisation and equipment. Adverse circumstances did play their roles 
in bringing about ultimate British strategic defeat in Malaya. However, Malaya Command was 
unable to cope with and mitigate these adverse circumstances to prevent tactical disaster. As 
Farrell highlighted, this was due to the fact that the British military‟s “one size fit all” system was 
not robust and flexible enough to cope with anything other than what its High Command had 
envisaged – „predictable grand strategy, methodical strategy and set-piece tactics.‟147 Thus, the 
pre-war and early war British military system laid the foundations for the British Army‟s tactical 
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CHAPTER 3: THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY IN 1941 
 The IJA was modeled largely after the German Army.
148
 It had shortcomings which 
proved fatal in the latter half of the war. However, in the early victorious years of the war, its 
strengths were more evident. The capability of an army or the soundness of a military system is 
ultimately relative to that of its enemy. To be victorious, one side does not have to be perfect or 
even very good - it just has to be better than its enemy. This chapter examines and evaluates how 
the pre-war and wartime Japanese military system laid the foundations for the IJA‟s tactical 
victory in the Malayan Campaign. It asserts that the strengths of the 25
th
 Army actually reflected 
the strengths of the Japanese military system itself. 
Unlike the British Army, the IJA, like the German Army, regarded war as a “science” 
rather than a “great game” and had a culture of planning thoroughly and professionally for war.149 
This was reflected in their planning and preparations for tropical warfare. The Imperial General 
Headquarters (IGHQ) commissioned the “Taiwan Army Research Department” in January 1941 
to gather information about operating and fighting in the tropics, culmination in the publishing 
and distributing of a doctrinal manual. This it did in six months with a small staff, despite the fact 
the IJA had previously been preparing for war against Russia in the open terrain of mainland 
northeast Asia. The department meticulously looked into every aspect of tropical warfare, 
including geography, equipment, tactics, sanitation, supplies and organization.
150
 It sent 
clandestine reconnaissance over land and air to study the area and terrain in which the IJA would 
attack, in order to resolve tactical issues.
151
 It also conducted two realistic and rigorous exercises 
over long distances and under anticipated wartime conditions, such as difficult terrain and the 
expected enemy‟s use of demolitions to slow down advance, to test out and refine the 
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The combat divisions of the 25
th
 Army were organized along typical IJA lines. Unlike 
British Empire divisions, all IJA divisions were recruited from a particular region and had a 
“twin” depot division to train conscripts and replacements for field service. Subordinate 
formations and units were permanently assigned to their parent divisions. This enhanced the 
esprit de corps and collective cohesion of units within a division. Typically, independent task 
forces and combat groups could be flexibly formed from formations and units detached from 
divisions.
153
 Japanese infantry units had lesser long ranged firepower, such as artillery and 
mortars, than British Empire units but had more close range firepower, such as machineguns and 
grenade dischargers.
154
 This would have placed the IJA at a disadvantage in open terrain but not 
in the close jungle terrain of Malaya, where combat took place at point blank range.  
The 25
th
 Army‟s tactical doctrine reflected standard IJA doctrine. The IJA had no specific 
doctrine on jungle warfare until IGHQ published a tropical warfare manual, in 1941, which 
emphasised superiority of the spirit, night attacks, forced fast march, active fighting patrols and 
outflanking through difficult terrain. This comprehensive manual was focused on general tactical 
principles instead of spelling out detailed tactics, as it was meant to be flexible and integrated into 
existing IJA tactics as used against irregular Chinese guerilla armies and the modern Red Army in 
the 1930s, which everyone understood.
155
 However, contrary to his claims, the tactics that the 25
th
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Army used in Malaya were not revolutionary. They were simply existing standard IJA tactics 
adapted by the “Taiwan Army Research Unit” for jungle warfare and then passed on to IGHQ to 
be centrally disseminated to every soldier serving in the tropics.  
The IJA‟s tactical doctrine emphasised good quality infantry, with tank and artillery in 
supporting roles, which harked back to the pre-modern tradition of having samurai warriors as the 
mainstay of Japanese armies. This was the logical result of Japan‟s industries being unable to 
produce enough heavy armaments and mechanical transport to match its Western enemies. Unlike 
the British Army, the IJA did not suffer prolonged heavy casualties in trench warfare during the 




Fundamental to the prowess of the Japanese infantry was the belief that the indigenous 
tradition of cultivating superior “seishin”, or spirit and morale, could bring victory over its more 
technologically advanced Western enemies.
157
 This belief in the moral over the material became a 
codified doctrine with the Field Service Regulation (1928), which famously removed the words 
“surrender”, “retreat” and “defence”, as they were deemed cowardly and bad for spirit and 
morale. Instead, it prescribed annihilating the enemy in an offensive, especially when the latter 
was regarded as spiritually “weak” and susceptible to unorthodox tactics.158  
Principles of speed, surprise, boldness and determination were to be applied through the 
use of “guerilla” type tactics - ruses, night attacks, aggressive combat patrols, “hugging” and 
melee tactics involving closing in with the enemy to nullify his superior firepower, and finally 
encirclement tactics to spread confusion, cut supply lines and disrupt command, control and 
communications. If the enemy escaped annihilation, he should be pursued and destroyed before 
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he had the chance to regroup.
159
 These were the tactics that unraveled Malaya Command‟s 




 Japanese artillery doctrine and tactics in Malaya also followed standard IJA norms. These 
were outdated compared to the British Army‟s if applied in open terrain. However, in Malaya‟s 
close jungle terrain where there was limited space for deploying guns, the Japanese tendency to 
disperse in ones or twos and fired short barrages to suppress the enemy in support of the 
infantry‟s attack, proved effective enough. As some Japanese artillery officers still thought it 
dishonourable to position their guns in the rear and fire at the enemy, they preferred to deploy 
their guns at the frontline and fire over direct sights. This would have minimised the effect of 
Japanese artillery fire in open terrain. However, jungle terrain limited field of fire and hampered 
signal communications which often made this the only way artillery could be deployed.
161
 
 Japanese tank doctrine and tactics in Malaya utilised the IJA offensive principles of 
flexibility, speed, surprise, boldness and determination. Depending on the situation, they either 
supported infantry attacks in deliberate assaults such as at Jitra and Kampar or were employed in 
mass attacks, rapid pursuits and breakthrough exploitations without infantry support such as at 
Slim River and Bukit Timah.
162
 
 The IJA was able to expand rapidly in times of major war without compromising its 
quality due to its mobilization system, which was geared towards territorial expansion on 
continental Asia. This was despite Japan being an island nation like Britain, similarly with 
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homeland security primarily resting on the IJN. Unlike the British Army, the IJA was largely a 
conscript force augmented with reservists, backed up by a core of regulars and special volunteers.  
What made the IJA such a formidable force in jungle warfare was its good quality 
infantry. Its selection system laid the foundation for that. Conscripts were selected for a particular 
arm or service based on a medical examination and an aptitude test. Although there were 
substantial conscripts from an urban background, most were from peasant families, who were 
already used to hardship and deprivations. In contrast with the British Army, the better conscripts 
would be selected for the traditionally prestigious infantry arm.
163
 
Undoubtedly, being constantly on the winning side in the campaign with overwhelming 
air and naval support did boost the morale and confidence of Japanese soldiers in Malaya. 
However, the Japanese military system was also uniquely designed to produce “fanatical” 
soldiers, who were ideal for the arduous demands of jungle warfare. Psychological indoctrination 
for the Japanese soldier started in primary school onwards with the practice of emperor worship 
and the inculcation of the virtues of militarism, obedience, loyalty and duty to the Emperor and 
his officers.
164
 Official propaganda claimed that Japan was providing leadership for the liberation 
of Asia under the “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere”. This belief motivated Japanese 
soldiers to fight a “sacred war” to help Japan preserve its China interests and overthrow Anglo-
American domination, racism and colonialism.
165
 Patriotic and enthusiastic families of conscripts 
even arranged a grand “send off” procession to show support for them.166  
 Regimentation in the barracks was through the indoctrination of Emperor Meiji‟s famous 
five military virtues. Consistent with Confucianism, which exhorted collectivism over 
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individualism, conscripts were taught to see the company as one big “family”. Conscripts were 
also taught the nine “golden rules” of bushido or “warrior spirit”.167 They were exhorted to have a 
fatalistic view towards life and reminded that they were “expendable goods”. Dying in battle 
would result in a family pension for life and also personal honour in being enshrined at Yasukuni, 
where the Emperor worshipped annually. Committing suicide was considered more honorable 
than to be taken prisoner.
168
 The slightest infringements would be punished by typically abusive 
senior privates, NCOs and officers. Even senior officers were known to slap junior officers in 
front of their men.
169
 All this made Japanese soldiers patriotic, fanatical, resilient and aggressive 
fighters, who obeyed orders without question and could endure immense hardships.  
25
th
 Army‟s troops were unanimously regarded to be very physically fit and well-trained. 
A British Army officer, who witnessed the IJA‟s “ambush drills” in action at the Thai frontier, 
was impressed: 
They struck me as absolutely first-class. The speed with which they tumbled out of their 




In addition, Japanese mortar and machine gun fire were exceptionally accurate.
171
 These were the 
results of a comprehensive, rigorous and realistic system of training. As Japan was a highly 
militarised society, boys from the age of eight started semi-military training, which progressed to 
military training under regular army personnel after primary education.
172
  
Training of conscripts was done systematically from individual, to sub-unit, unit, higher 
formation level and also combined divisional exercises in the first year. In the second training 
cycle, more time and emphasis was given to vocational training. The comprehensive training 
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syllabus included physical fitness, target shooting, field works construction, battlefield 
maneuvers, quick route marches of twenty to twenty-five miles in hot and cold weather with full 
gear, bivouacking in the open, bayonet fighting, camouflaging, judo, field hygiene, patrolling and 
swimming. “Battle drills” and field exercises were very physically demanding and conducted 
performed realistically with the firing of live ammunition. In addition, there was at least one 
weekly night exercise.
173
 Conscripts also did part of their training in China, which helped them 
acquire battle experience and an aggressive spirit through the bayoneting of “live” prisoners.174 
The high tempo, realistic, rigorous, and thorough training of the Japanese soldier contrasted with 
the amateurish, “spit and polish” peacetime low tempo training of British soldiers.175  
Unlike in the British Army, the Inspectorate General of Military Training efficiently 
supervised the technical and tactical training of the combat arms and services to ensure they 
conformed to Japanese doctrine.
176
 This ensured that IJA units and even subunits could be 
detached and combined with others to form ad hoc battlegroups without loss of cohesion and 
effectiveness, unlike their British counterparts. 
 The 25
th
 Army‟s leadership at all levels was excellent due to the IJA‟s rigorous and sound 
selection and training system for officers and NCOs. Except for a small but important core of 
usually upper and middle class regular officer candidates, officer candidates had to be outstanding 
conscripts recommended by their unit commanders, who had served for six months in the ranks, 
while NCO candidates had to have served a year in the ranks.
177
 The IJA‟s system of selecting 
officers from amongst soldiers who had already proven themselves was more sound, meritocratic 
and egalitarian than the British Army‟s system.178  
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Training of Japanese officers was characteristically comprehensive, rigorous and 
realistic, requiring officer cadets to serve eight months with units after the usual training phase at 
the War Academy.
179
 Officer training was just as comprehensive as that for recruits and consisted 
mainly of theoretical studies of tactical textbooks, battle drills and training regulations, spiritual 
training, physical fitness and vocational fieldwork training. After graduation, all new officers had 
to undergo a four-month probation period as sergeant-majors in units before being 
commissioned.
180
 A “special field operations training exercise” of about a week was also held by 
regiments in China, to induct newly commissioned officers. This consisted of battlefield tours, 
lectures, and might even involve a demonstration and practice of beheading a prisoner to 
“bloody” the young officer.181  
The excellent planning and coordination done by the staff of the 25
th
 Army in Malaya 
was due to the IJA‟s rigorous and sound system of selecting and training Staff College cadets. 
Staff College graduates were the “cream” of the IJA. They dominated the army‟s combat function 
hierarchy to such an extent that almost all generals were staff graduates. Moreover, most Japanese 
officers aspired to be staff officers.
182
 Thus, places for the staff college course were very 
competitive, ensuring that only the best officers were admitted to it.
183
 Training was typically 




 The IJA‟s thorough and sound system of selection and training prepared its officers for its 
unique command and control system. One feature of this was the extraordinary authority given to 
staff officers at divisional HQs, which was practiced by the 25
th
 Army in Malaya. Although IJA 
division HQs had a smaller staff than typical British ones, staff officers practically planned and 
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managed all aspects of the division. Although final approval and authority lay with the divisional 
commander, they were usually expected to be mentors and not expected to interfere in the work 
of staff officers, unless circumstances dictated.
185
 This freed the divisional commander to tour the 
frontline to assess the situation, motivate the men and supervise the execution of orders, while the 
function of planning and conveying orders was being carried out by the staff officers at divisional 
HQ. This allowed Japanese divisions to be managed efficiently and flexibly at a high tempo in 





 Army‟s use of “mission command” in Malaya mirrored standard IJA practice. 
Japanese senior officers usually issued vague, broad, objectives and orders to junior officers, who 
were expected to use their initiative to work out the detailed plans, without reporting back and 
asking for further orders. The IJA had adopted the German Army‟s approach of empowering 
junior officers with the authority to react to the inevitable chaos and unpredictable nature of war, 
which was the opposite of the British Army‟s approach. This also allowed IJA divisions to be 
flexible in detaching units and subunits into task forces under relatively junior field officers to 
achieve a particular mission, as was often the case in Malaya.
187
 Unlike the British Army‟s 
“autocratic” command system, the IJA‟s “mission command” system allowed its units to react 
quickly to the often fluid situations that jungle warfare produced.  
 Finally, the IJA‟s command and control system emphasized the need for its commanders 
at all levels to exercise personal leadership, in true samurai fashion.
188
 Although this was 
especially so for platoon leaders who were supposed to lead and charge from the front with their 
men, company leaders were also expected to personally lead a column at night. Even senior 
commanders such as brigade, regimental, division and even army commanders did so quite often 
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in China, as well as in Malaya.
189
 Consequently, Japanese command posts were found further in 
the front than those of Western armies.
190
 Leading from the front allowed Japanese officers to 
boost the morale of their men and direct their actions more effectively. This was especially 
important in the close jungle terrain of Malaya where communications often failed. The IJA also 
often sent out staff officers as liaisons to deputise for the senior commander and to give tactical 
advice to the field commanders. This was a role which Tsuji and the other staff officers of the 25
th
 
Army often did in Malaya, which was a key factor in the Japanese ability to conduct and sustain 
high tempo operations throughout the campaign despite frequent communication disruptions.
191
  
Most IJA divisions still used animal transport. The exceptions were the 5
th
 and the 
Imperial Guards Divisions, which were the first two divisions to be motorised as part of the 1941 
modernization program. Displaying the typical Japanese flair for thorough planning, IGHQ had 
specially assigned them to advance down the west coast of Malaya, which was well-served with 
good roads. The 18
th
 Division, by contrast, remained largely horse-drawn, like most, and was thus 
assigned to advance down the east coast of Malaya, where roads were undeveloped.
192
 Uniquely, 
bicycles were provided to every Japanese infantryman in Malaya who had no space on the trucks 
and wagons, in order to allow them to advance and pursue rapidly on any kind of terrain. It was 
easy to find replenishments and spare parts for these bicycles as they were widely used 
throughout the land.
193
 The use of bicycles enabled every Japanese soldier to be a “light 
cavalryman” on the trunk roads of Malaya as they could even cross demolished bridges, which 
became impassable to motor vehicles. 
The IJA‟s equipment in Malaya was well-known to be very light and well-suited for use 
in the jungle terrain.
194
 Yet these were also standard characteristics of IJA equipment - the result 
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of Japan‟s inferior industrial capability, shipping constraints and doctrine. Their tanks of all make 
were designed to be easily transportable by sea, very maneuverable and could use most bridges in 
Malaya, while their infantry guns and mortars were designed to be man-portable in the jungle.
195
 
The IJA‟s cotton tropical uniforms, worn with canvas shoes, proved to be especially light-weight 
and practical in the jungle. Finally, the full load of equipment carried by Japanese soldiers was, at 
only sixty-five to seventy pounds, half as heavy as those that were supposed to be carried by 
British soldiers, which conferred a great advantage to them in jungle fighting.
196
  
 IJA field communications were no better than those of the British Army‟s. At divisional 
and regimental HOs, field telephones were used as they were easy to maintain, more secure from 
enemy interception and more reliable. Wireless radios were used only for high tempo situations 
by units constantly on the move, such as by units on small boat operations in Malaya, as testified 
by Fusayama. At battalion HQs, “runners” were used. 197  With such technology, field 
communications often broke down in the close jungle terrain of Malaya. In fact, Fusayama 
observed that the Imperial Guards Division‟s field commanders quite often sited their front HQs 





signal communications often broke down in Malaya, unlike for the case of Malaya Command, 
this did not hinder its operations due to its “mission command” system.  
 25
th
 Army often fought in Malaya with scant regard for logistics, which facilitated its 
flanking operations. This trait reflected the IJA‟s habitual neglect of logistics management, which 
was very unlike the British Army. The IJA‟s doctrinal emphasis on the spiritual and the offensive, 
its underestimation of the enemy‟s fighting power, its traditional frugality in logistical 
requirements compared to the British Army, and Japan‟s industrial inferiority all meant that 
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campaigns had to be conducted with limited resources.
199
 However, the IJA‟s ability to operate on 
a “shoe string” by improvising, “living off the land” and commandeering local resources worked 
to their advantage in jungle terrain with few good roads. Thus, its units were freed to infiltrate the 
flanks and rear of the British Army.
200
  
This chapter has examined in great detail how the strengths of the 25
th
 Army in its C3I, 
tactical doctrines, selection and training of all ranks, ethos, morale, organisation and equipment 
actually reflected the strengths of the IJA as a whole. The pre-war Japanese military system was 
geared towards fighting a high tempo conventional war against a first-class modern opponent. Its 
High Command adopted a flexible approach in preparing for war, knowing that the IJA had 
strong foundations, which could be easily adapted to fight guerilla warfare in China or jungle 
warfare in Southeast Asia.  
In Malaya, the IJA had the fortune of facing an albeit modern, but inexperienced, poorly-
led and poorly-trained British Army in a major war in predominantly jungle terrain, which was 
conducive to its standard C3I, ethos, doctrine, tactics, training, organisation and equipment. 
Fortuitous circumstances did bring about ultimate Japanese strategic victory in Malaya. However, 
the IJA‟s ability to exploit these fortuitous circumstances to achieve tactical victory was due to 
the fact that its system was robust and flexible enough to cope with whatever situation it faced. 
Japanese preparations for jungle warfare started only in 1941, while the British Army had been 
operating in jungle terrain since the 19
th
 century. Yet, the flexible IJA adapted itself to jungle 
warfare faster than the rigid British Army due to the fact that the Japanese military system was 
much sounder than the British military system. Thus, the pre-war Japanese military system laid 
the foundations for the IJA‟s tactical victory in the Malayan Campaign.  
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CHAPTER 4: THE BRITISH ARMY ON THE DEFENSIVE IN THE MALAYAN 
CAMPAIGN 
Malaya Command was most often on the defensive during the Malayan Campaign. This 
was not just due to strategic weaknesses shaping Percival‟s campaign strategy but also because 
the defence suited British Army doctrine. This was in contrast to the IJA‟s system which 
preferred the offense. This chapter examines the two largest British set piece defensive battles of 
the Malayan Campaign, Jitra and Kampar, to analyse the systemic differences between the two 
armies, which influenced the course and outcome of these battles.  
The Battle of Jitra, 11
th
 – 12th December 1941  
Jitra was the first major battle between Malaya Command and the 25
th
 Army. It was a 
classic encounter between the favoured static linear defense tactics of the British Army and the 
favoured mobile encirclement offensive tactics of the IJA. Despite the 11
th
 Indian Division having 
four months before the conflict to prepare the Jitra Line (a luxury denied to other defense 
positions in Malaya) elements of the Japanese 5
th
 Division broke through it easily in two days, 
with a much inferior force of two battalions. This mismatch between the tactics and systems of 
the British Army and the IJA was repeated time and again throughout the campaign. At Jitra, the 
11
th
 Indian Division suffered such heavy losses that it could not hope to gain a respite until the 
next viable position at Kampar. Thus, Farrell, Richard Holmes and Clifford Kinvig were right in 
regarding Jitra as the most crucial battle of the campaign, setting a trend for subsequent battles.
201
 
The British military‟s inflexibility in planning resulted in the contradiction in strategic, 
campaign and tactical objectives and dealt heavy blows to Jitra‟s defenders. Even after the RAF 
had evacuated Alor Star Airfield, Brooke-Popham still insisted that Percival hold Jitra to deny the 
airfield to the enemy instead of giving him freedom to withdraw to the more defensible pre-war 
reconnoitered Gurun position, some thirty miles south. Percival, too, was rigidly “fixed” into the 
idea of defending Jitra and feared the loss of morale in such a withdrawal despite this being 
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also resulted in him ignoring the latter‟s request for permission to withdraw from Jitra until too 
late on the night of the 12
th
, which led to many men and equipment being cut off.
203
  
Before hostilities, Percival gave the 11
th
 Indian Division two possible roles – “Operation 
Matador” (an advance into southern Thailand to contest the expected Japanese landing) and “Man 
Jitra” (defending the Jitra Line to deny Alor Star Airfield), without giving clear direction as to 
which was the priority. This was not just due to his indecisive personality. Brooke-Popham and 
Percival were reluctant to abandon “Operation Matador” even though realistically it could not be 
implemented. In addition, Heath erroneously delegated responsibility for “Krohcol” (a brigade 
group responsible for delaying the enemy‟s advance down the Kroh Road, which led to the rear 
of the division hundreds of miles away) to the 11
th
 Indian Division. As a result, the division‟s 
triple preparations overstretched the already undermanned and inexperienced division HQ, 
making them unable to devote sufficient time to consider the tactical problems of defending Jitra. 
As a result, even at the height of the battle, Murray-Lyon and his staff‟s attention remained split 
between Jitra and Krohcol. Murray-Lyon was so overworked he fainted from fatigue on the 13
th
 
while supervising the retreat.
204
   
Murray-Lyon, reflecting the rigidity of Percival and Brooke-Popham, wishfully assumed 
to the very last, that “Operation Matador” was the priority over “Man Jitra”. Many mines and 
cable lines were held in readiness in motor transports to move and not allocated for the Jitra Line 
until released by Percival with the cancellation of it on the 9
th
 of December. As late as the 11
th
, 
the defences were uncompleted with nine thousand land mines still short, while telephone lines 
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had not been completely laid in the 6
th
 Indian Brigade‟s sector.205 Murray-Lyon also planned for 
Jitra‟s defences leisurely. He took as long as until the last day of November to change the location 
of the tank ditch in Jitra to fit the anti-tank regiment, which had already arrived a month before. 
Consequently, it was never completed in time.
206
 This was not just Murray-Lyon‟s individual 
fault. He merely reflected the institution as a whole. As Farrell commented, „Far East Command 
was now so committed to Matador that it convinced itself events would unfold as it desired‟ to 
the detriment of Jitra‟s defences.207 
Murray-Lyon‟s rigid assumption also affected morale of troops. It resulted in the 
unexpected and inconvenient transition from offensive to defensive roles – which saw British and 
Indian troops digging and building defensive works for four consecutive days before the battle.
 
The last minute change in the pre-war dispositions of the 15
th
 Indian Brigade at the Jitra Line also 
caused further confusion, sapped morale and negated some of the familiarity of the ground which 
the defenders ought to have had.
208
 Thus, on the morning of the 12
th
, two companies of the 1/8
th
 
Punjabs were so tired and demoralised they would not respond even to Carpendale‟s and Murray-
Lyon‟s exhortations to advance.209  
Heath‟s and Murray-Lyon‟s career was typical of most British formation commanders 
and helped to explain their flawed decisions. Although Heath had combat experience as a division 
commander in Abyssinia and as Murray-Lyon was a brigade commander on the northwest 
frontier in India, both had not entered Staff College and were not trained for their present 
appointments. They were also deprived of the experience of commanding their complete 
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 Indian Division, newly formed only in 1940, had received 
its artillery only in October 1941 and was fully concentrated only in November, did not even have 
a collective exercise together with all its units and assets.
211
 Thus both had limited experience and 
no training in their new appointments before the war. 
By contrast, the IJA displayed typical operational flexibility. Although the outline 
operational plan and broad objectives for the capture of Malaya and Singapore had already been 
planned by IGHQ in November 1941, Yamashita and his staff were given authority to modify 
according to the circumstances they found. Having observed the weak British resistance on the 
Thai-Malayan border, the 25
th
 Army HQ decided on an immediate rapid advance with all haste to 
the Perak River. This was in contrast to the original slow and deliberate plan to consolidate in 
southern Thailand and await reinforcements, before taking the offensive. 25
th
 Army HQ‟s 
decision to advance swiftly and boldly caught the British and Indian defenders by surprise, and 
foiled Malaya Command‟s delaying tactics based on demolitions and fighting withdrawals to buy 
time for the completion of Jitra‟s defences.212 
Typical British intelligence failures crippled Jitra‟s defenders. The Jitra Line was still 
incomplete by the outbreak of hostilities as Malaya Command HQ assumed that the annual 
northeast monsoon would deter any Japanese invasion. It had thus commenced constructing it 
only in August 1941 and projected its completion in mid-February 1942 to coincide with the 
subsiding of the monsoon.
213
 The debacle at Changlun and Asun happened because Heath and 
Murray-Lyon assumed the IJA would consolidate its beachhead in Thailand before conducting a 
cautious, set piece offensive against Jitra, and that British demolitions at bridges would hold up 
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Japanese tanks for twenty-four hours at least.
214
 This underestimation of the IJA was institutional 
- Stewart‟s similar assumptions led to the disaster at Slim River. 215  British intelligence, in 
particular, was typically poor due to what Major Harrison, the GSO1 11
th
 Indian Division, 
described as „ineffective patrolling‟. This made it difficult for Murray-Lyon and Carpendale to 
identify the main offensive thrust of the enemy, as at Jitra.
216
 
By contrast, the 25
th
 Army had good intelligence of the 11
th
 Indian Division‟s 
dispositions and defences due to their thorough pre-war reconnaissance of northern Malaya and a 
lucky capture of an accurate map of the British defences around Changlun and Jitra in an action 
on the Thai-Malayan frontier, which accounted for the audacity of their tank „blitzkrieg‟ at 
Changlun.
217
 However, the IJA‟s emphasis on intelligence was evidenced by 25th Army HQ 
placing 5
th
 Reconnaissance Battalion as their advance guard in the invasion. Displaying similar 
emphasis on intelligence on the night of the 11
th
, Saeki and Tsuji envisaged this unit occupying a 
sector of the Jitra Line to reconnoiter the enemy before the main force of the 9
th
 Infantry Brigade 
attacked the next day. Their subsequent decision to attack that night was based on good 
intelligence given by patrols who noted the weaknesses in the British defences.
218
 
Murray-Lyon, Heath and Percival opted for linear defensive dispositions at Jitra, in 




 Indian Brigades abreast over 
twenty-four miles of mixed swamp, rubber, rice field and jungle terrain, where units and sub-
units were too isolated to give mutual support to one another. The 28
th
 Indian Brigade was both to 
screen as well as act as a reserve behind the other two.
219
 An outpost was supposed to be able to 
delay the enemy until the main defences were complete. The main line would then pin the enemy 
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while the artillery punished them. Any enemy breakthrough would be stopped by a reserve line 
and repelled by the motor-borne counterattacks of the reserve battalion of each brigade and the 
division‟s reserve brigade. Such tactical dispositions and planning reflected the British Army‟s 
early war preference for fighting in World War I-styled defensive linear entrenched positions 
under slow tempo and supported by powerful artillery, regardless of the ground.
220
  
Given the terrain and long frontage to cover, it would have been better for Murray-Lyon 
to concentrate his three brigades in depth along the trunk road and railway.
221
 Even during the 
battle, when the enemy was using outflanking tactics, Brigadier W. Carpendale, who had 
temporarily assumed command of 15
th
 Indian Brigade in the absence of its commander, thought 
in terms of linear tactics and was typically concerned with the security of lines of 
communications. In the wee hours of the 12
th
, he extended the reserve line of 2/2
nd
 Gurkhas at 





afternoon, he ordered most of the 1
st
 Leicesters to wheel southwards along the trunk road to link 
up with 2/2
nd
 Gurkhas, while 2/9
th
 Jats withdrew southwards to the reserve line already formed.
223
 
Consistent with the tactical thinking of Carpendale, Murray-Lyon later recalled most of the 2/9
th
 
Gurkhas from the airfield and, together with the sole remaining company of the 2/1
st
 Gurkhas, 
positioned them six hundred yards to the rear as a reserve.
224
  
Japanese senior commanders chose to fight a radically different battle than that envisaged 
by their British counterparts. They typically preferred the kind of „chaos‟ and „unpredictability‟ 
that an offensive „meeting engagement‟ produced. After all, the „battle drills‟ for conducting such 
a battle were well-prescribed in their doctrinal manuals and practiced thoroughly during 
maneuvers.
225
 Saeki accepted the risk of a night assault as it would allow his infantry to close in 
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These bold tactics reflected standard IJA doctrine, which were anathema to the British 
Army‟s doctrinal emphasis on careful consolidation of ground over bold and risky exploitation of 
the situation. For the night assault in the early hours of the 12
th
, Saeki chose to attack through the 
strategic „blind‟ gap near the trunk road between the 1st Leicesters and the 2/9th Jats, knowing that 
this would confuse the enemy and threaten to split his centre.
227
 Correctly identifying that this 
was the most vulnerable and crucial sector, he committed whatever reserves he had at dawn, to 
renew the attack here in coordination with tanks on the trunk road. Kawamura too saw this sector 




By contrast, throughout the battle, Carpendale typically launched only small, sluggish, 





 Jats failed counterattack on the trunk road after dawn on the second day 
involved two sections from the reserve platoon of the company.
230
 In the abortive attempt to 
retake the „market garden‟ copse and the observation pillbox, it was better for Carpendale to order 
the right and reserve companies of the 1
st
 Leicesters to co-ordinate with the left and reserve 
companies of the 2/9
th
 Jats and the reserve 2/2
nd
 Gurkhas to „pinch‟ out this wedge between them. 
In addition, all available artillery support should have been assigned for this mission.
231
 Instead, 
Carpendale, allowed the bulk of the two battalions to stay in their defensive positions while 
ordering the 1/8
th
 Punjabs, minus two companies, to undertake the task with a platoon of the 
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reserve „A‟ Company of the 2/9th Jats, supported by only an artillery battery.232 He was reluctant 
to commit the 2/2
nd
 Gurkhas as that was his last reserve.
233
  
Typically British field commanders strived to withhold a certain portion of a unit as 
reserve to maintain equal strength at every sector. However, this habit meant breaking up unit 
cohesion and placing together “penny pockets” of subunits and units which could not work 
collectively towards a common task. However, this was by no means unique to Malaya 
Command. House agreed with Montgomery‟s observation that in North Africa, the numerically 
superior British 8
th
 Army had a tendency to „fight as uncoordinated and dispersed collection of 




In conformity with British doctrine, Murray-Lyon stayed in his HQ and failed to visit the 
frontline until late morning of the 12
th
. This was even though he had no direct communications 
with the 6
th
 Indian Brigade HQ and his presence was needed to guide the unfamiliar 
Carpendale.
235
 Murray-Lyon arrived too late to prevent Carpendale from requesting 
reinforcements from 6
th
 Indian Brigade without his permission, earlier that morning. This act 
prevented Murray-Lyon from having the necessary strength in reserves to launch a successful 
counterattack later that day.
236
  
By contrast, the IJA‟s system of sending out staff officers to the frontline as liaison and 
empowering them with authority eased command and control and maintained their high tempo of 
operations. For instance, just after dawn on the 12
th
, Japanese communications failed and the 
progress of Saeki Detachment‟s attack was in doubt. Tsuji took the initiative to quickly drive to 
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the rear to urge Kawamura to send in his main force, which arrived later at noon to reinforce a 
hard pressed Saeki Detachment .
237
 
The British Army‟s “autocratic” command system made Chippington and the other junior 
officers unaware of the role of their subunits in the bigger scheme of things.
238
 Even before 
hostilities, Murray-Lyon interfered in all aspects of planning from locating the reserve battalion 
of the 15
th
 Indian Brigade to reducing the frontage of “B” Company, 2/9th Jats by eight hundred 
yards in September to deciding the location of its “C” Company in October, which should 
properly be the domain of the formation and unit commanders.
239
 In the heat of battle, when 
wireless failed to work and Japanese soldiers cut cables and intercepted dispatch riders, British 
command and control became paralysed throughout the battle and field commanders simply 
became passive.
240
 For example, the 2nd Leicesters and a company of the 2/9
th
 Jats, in the 
absence of any communication with higher command, maintained their positions even after the 
rest of the division had withdrawn. They were only withdrawn on the 13th, resulting in 
unnecessary stragglers being cut off.
241
  
By contrast, the IJA‟s “mission” command system and its effective infantry training 
using a series of “battle drills” enabled officers and men to react quickly to the chaos and 
ambushes that jungle warfare produced. After all, the well-trained 5
th
 Division was battle-
hardened through having fought in China since 1937.
242
 It is most telling that Saeki and Tsuji 
launched their night attack on the 11/12
th
 after Second-Lieutenant Oto had returned from his 
reconnaissance and insisted on the viability of a night attack.
243
 Farrell was right to observe that 
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this would have been unthinkable in the British Army.
244
 Saeki Detachment‟s night attack used 
dispersion to great effect, as its platoons, led by junior officers and NCOs, split up into sections 
and smaller detachments to infiltrate the positions of 2
nd
 Leicesters and 2/9
th
 Jats, which caused 
much confusion.
245
 Junior officers showed good tactical grasp by leading their men to attack 
using good cover. On the trunk road sector, the 1
st
 Company‟s leaders made their key objectives 
the huts along the trunk road and two copses opposite the 1
st





Using such cover, this company overran the Indian section occupying a crucial pillbox 
which contained a British artillery observation post and killed the forward observer there, thus 
preventing the enemy from using their powerful artillery arm.
247
 After this, it instinctively sent 
out parties to probe towards the rear of the 1
st
 Leicesters and the 2/9
th
 Jats on both sides of the 
trunk road.
248
 On the afternoon of the 12
th
, the Japanese II/41
st
 Battalion took cover from the 
heavy bombardment of British artillery in the anti-tank ditch just in front of „D‟ Company of the 
2/9
th
 Jats. It instinctively emerged to charge and overrun the enemy when the shelling slackened 
and the enemy‟s weapons jammed. This action unhinged the crucial trunk road sector.249  
The British Army‟s doctrinal emphasis on firepower at the expense of infantry proved to 
be liabilities in Malaya‟s terrain. This partially explained the reluctance of Lieutenant-Colonel 
Bates, CO 1/8
th
 Punjabs, to counterattack when ordered to by Carpendale at the trunk road sector. 
Left with two platoons out of two companies due to earlier “friendly fire”, he was discouraged by 
the lack of good visibility of the enemy‟s position, the bogging in the mud of 2/9th Jats bren 
carriers and the lack of a forward observation officer to co-ordinate artillery support.
250
 The 
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 60 
counterattack retook the pillbox but not the “market garden” copse, resulting in heavy losses.251 
This was unsurprising, since existing British doctrine and training assumed that the artillery 
would always be available to suppress the enemy before the infantry attacked, and had not 
prepared for the unexpected.
252
  
The isolated British and Indian troops demonstrated their weaknesses that night when 
they became so unnerved by small parties of Japanese soldiers infiltrating around them. 
Imagining themselves being surrounded by superior numbers of enemy, they fired at „targets‟ 
intermittently throughout the night, whether real or imagined, which expended large quantities of 
ammunition and deprived themselves of much needed sleep. So restless was the reserve platoon 
of the 2/9
th
 Jats that their unit commander had to move it to an alternative position near his HQ. 
Throughout the night, inexperienced officers called for „blind‟ artillery fire on suspected enemy 
troop concentrations.
253
 In the confusion, there were many false reports of enemy breakthroughs 
on the main trunk road sector and this made Murray-Lyon overestimate the enemy‟s strength as 
six battalions the next day.
254
 There was also a “friendly fire” involving the 2/9th Jats and the 1/8th 
Punjabs during Bate‟s countertattack on the 12th.255 Such jittery reactions, which were common 
occurrences throughout the Malayan Campaign, revealed the inexperience, lack of cohesion and 





 Indian Division‟s lack of training in dealing with tanks and in working with 
artillery crew was exposed at Changlun and Asun. The 1/14
th
 Punjabs and the 2/1
st
 Gurkhas were 
overrun by enemy tanks without the knowledge of dealing with them.
257
 The failure of 2
nd
 
Leicesters to send out a tank hunting platoon to deal with these tanks was an indication that none 
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of the infantry was confident and proficient enough in anti-tank warfare to do this hazardous 
job.
258
 A British anti-tank section in the sector of the 2
nd
 Leicesters was also forced to relocate the 
next day despite having done good work in keeping out enemy tanks, due to the fact that no 
infantry was posted to support it.
259
  
Japanese casualties numbered a mere two officers and twenty-five other ranks killed with 
another eleven officers and ninety-nine other ranks wounded.
260
 By comparison, the 15
th
 Indian 
Brigade lost three quarters of its strength and was left with six hundred men, the 6
th
 Indian 
Brigade was „seriously depleted‟, while the 28th Indian Brigade had two battalions with one 
hundred casualties each and a third was left with one company.
261
 It was a decisive defeat on all 
counts and at all levels.  
Japanese and British sources acknowledged the prowess of the British artillery in 
suppressing and breaking up many of their attacks, including the advance of Japanese tanks on 
the trunk road on the night of the 11
th
. The British artillery bombardment made Tsuji worry about 
the prospects of success initially, forced Saeki to relocate his HQ several times, killed the 
commander of 1
st
 Company, and caused most of their casualties. However, the Japanese 
disparaged the British infantry for being weak.
262
 This was hardly surprising given the emphasis 
of the British Army‟s doctrine on the artillery arm, which was constantly hailed as superior to the 
infantry arm by both British and German observers alike.
263
 At Jitra, the pattern of British 
superiority in artillery being unable to compensate for their inferiority in infantry was set for the 
rest of the campaign. 
Kampar, 30
th
 December 1941 – 2nd January 1942  
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 Kampar was the first attempt by Malaya Command to adjust its tactics according to those 
of its enemy. In contrast to previous attempts to defend static linear prepared positions, the 11
th
 
Indian Division deployed in depth along the main trunk road with fields of fire as wide as 1,200 
yards over open tin mines. It was also the first time in which the British Army had the time and 
opportunity to prepare and fight on a strategically strong position, which conformed to its tactical 




Despite the feat of resisting all frontal assaults by the Japanese 5
th
 Division for four days, 
the 11
th
 Indian Division, now commanded by Paris, withdrew when its flanks and rear were 
threatened by a Japanese double-envelopment by sea and through the marshes. In this sense, 
Kampar was still a typical Malayan battle, illustrating the British Army‟s inability to cope with 
the IJA‟s high tempo, aggressive, encirclement tactics. As Farrell noted, at Kampar, the British 
Army was unable to stand for long even when the terrain conformed to its tactical doctrine.
265
 
This reflected the inferiority of its system compared to the Japanese. 
The same British rigidity that created a dilemma between operational and tactical 
imperatives at Jitra, again haunted 11
th
 Indian Division at Kampar. The division was again limited 
by Percival‟s instructions not to risk the division being destroyed in sustained combat as it was 
needed for more fighting withdrawals further south, to buy time for British imperial 
reinforcements to arrive at Singapore. Already a rear position was reconnoitered at Slim River.
266
 
This contradicted the mission of holding Kampar for as long as five to six weeks if possible to 
prevent the enemy from capturing the Federal capital of Kuala Lumpur, with its several large 
military depots and airfields, and also allow reinforcements to arrive safely at Singapore.
267
 This 
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confusion over priority of roles partially led to Major-General Archie Paris, the second GOC 11
th
 
Indian Division, failing to implement the new tactics which would have held Kampar longer - 
fighting an in-depth defence along the main trunk road, screened by active fighting patrols, with 
units stocked with many days of supplies, so that they could hold tight when cut off by the 
enemy‟s predictable encirclements, and depend on mobile reserves to counterattack and relieve 
them.
268
   
The 5
th
 Division‟s battle plan was merely a larger scale version of the familiar IJA pin-
and-encircle tactics, with the objective of annihilating the defenders in a four-pronged attack. 
While the entire 41
st
 Regiment, supported by the divisional artillery, made frontal assaults to pin 
the enemy on the trunk road in the centre, and one and a half battalions of the 11
th
 Regiment 
feinted down the eastern loop road, the 42
nd
 Regiment was to flank Kampar‟s defences through 
the marshes and swamps on the western sector. Finally, the other one and a half battalions of the 
11
th
 Regiment, with an Imperial Guards Regiment, were to embark on a series of coastal hooks on 
the west coast of Perak and Selangor, to cut off the retreat of the defenders. Thus, the 11
th
 Indian 




Such a bold and aggressive plan entailed dispersing the 5
th
 Division over a very wide 
area, which complicated command and control problems and increased communication 
difficulties. Fortunately, the division was used to devolving command responsibilities to junior 
officers, which overcame these considerable problems. The plan also risked the division being 
“defeated in detail” as each of the four thrusts was unable to aid the other directly. It was based 
on the correct assumption that the British Army was slow to react and would “sit tight” and let the 
IJA “walk around them”. In typical IJA fashion, the attack was preceded by scout parties which 
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Paris previously commanded the 12
th
 Indian Brigade with much success. However, he did 
not have Staff College training and was untrained for his new appointment.
271
 This, and the 
contradictory mission given to him, made him display the same conservatism and “defensive-
mindedness” as Murray-Lyon. The enemy‟s main attack, with the 41st Regiment on the trunk road 
sector, stalled against stiff resistance by the well-entrenched British Battalion. Its advance down 
the loop road with the 11
th
 Regiment was much weaker and easily checked by the 28
th
 Indian 
Brigade‟s lead Gurkha battalion, with artillery support, on the 30th.272  
Paris should have used it in a pincer attack up the loop road on the flank of the main 
enemy force pinned on the trunk road sector.
273
 In fact, Tsuji admitted that with the 42
nd
 
Regiment stuck to the west of Kampar and the 41
st
 Regiment pinned down on the main trunk 
road, a British counterattack was what he feared most.
274
 Instead, on the 1
st, Paris‟ retracted his 
original counterattack plan and allowed Brigadier W. R. Selby, commanding 28
th
 Indian Brigade, 
to retreat his two battalions down the loop road to reinforce his divisional reserve at Temoh. No 
doubt this was influenced by the fact that British observation posts had spotted the wide flanking 
moves of the enemy to the west and along the coast.
275
 However, Paris‟ had given contradictory 
orders to the brigade to counterattack without danger of being cut off, which was similar to his 
own order from Percival to delay the enemy without losing too many casualties. This confusion 
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made the newly appointed and untrained Selby naturally opt for caution and withdraw when 
pressed by the enemy down the loop road.
276
  
On the afternoon of the 2
nd
, the similarly newly appointed and untrained Brigadier H. D. 
Moorhead, commanding the amalgamated 6/15
th
 Indian Brigade, displayed similar caution by 
launching two piecemeal unsupported company sized attacks with „A‟ and then „C‟ companies of 
his reserve Jat/Punjab Battalion, instead of as a unit in a decisive attempt to restore the British 
Battalion‟s right flank on Green Ridge. It was hardly surprising that the two companies were 
squandered in the ultimately successful attempt, which left the British Battalion still in a 
precarious position with the brigade having only two more companies as reserves.
277
 This 
Moorhead failed to do though even other sectors were quiet throughout the previous two days. 
Thus, all the British formation commanders displayed the characteristic inability to identify the 
main threat to their position and launch a decisive counterattack with adequate force.
278
 
This British habit of carefully holding back reserves and launching piecemeal 
counterattacks was characteristic even at unit and subunit level. On the morning of the 1
st
, upon 
learning that the Japanese had gained a foothold on the eastern edges of both Green and 
Thompson Ridges, Morrison ordered Captain Vickers, commander of the reserve „D‟ Company, 
to restore the situation. The latter led two of his platoons instead of his entire company in a 
counterattack which expelled the enemy from both ridges.
279
 The next morning, when the enemy 
had overrun 9
th
 Platoon of „A‟ Company on the eastern sector of Thompson Ridge, Morrison 
again ordered Vickers to counterattack, who led only a platoon of his company into the fray. 
While successfully relieving the immediate threat to „A‟ Company‟s hold on Thompson Ridge, 
the counterattack failed to dislodge all the Japanese from the upper slopes of the eastern edge of 
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 The two counterattacks could have been more effective and less costly had the entire 
reserve company been used, instead of a platoon or two at a time. 
By contrast, the 5
th
 Division‟s officers and NCOs displayed tactical flair and employed 
“mission” command to good use throughout the battle. On the morning of the 1st, the 41st 
Regiment used its main force to pin the British Battalion on Thompson and Green ridges along 
the trunk road, while companies, platoons and even sections infiltrated down the narrow 20-40 
yard cleared corridor that existed between the eastern ends of the ridges and the jungle-clad steep 
slopes of Bujang Melaka. Thus, they were able to gain temporary footholds on Thomson and 
Green ridges and threatened to overwhelm 10
th
 Platoon of „B‟ Company posted on the right-most 
sector of Green Ridge.
281
 The next morning, the 5
th
 Division employed pre-assault mortar and 
artillery bombardment to suppress the British infantry before the 41
st
 regiment closed in, using 
“hugging” tactics so that British artillery could not be used for fear of “friendly fire.” This paid 
off when the regiment managed to overrun a British platoon on the right-most sector of 
Thompson Ridge and again gained another temporary foothold on the eastern edge of Green 




On the afternoon of the 2
nd
, the Jat/Punjab Battalion demonstrated its lack of proficiency 
in counterattacking the enemy without artillery support.  As the enemy closed in on the British 
Battalion‟s positions on Green Ridge, it was impossible to call for artillery fire to dislodge the 
enemy from the right-most sector. The battalion‟s first effort to counterattack with its „A‟ 
Company failed miserably as Japanese machine guns mowned down two platoons in the charge, 
leaving the sole platoon too weak to continue the mission. The second effort was done by „C‟ 
Company, which successfully cleared the enemy out of their position on the ridge. However, it 
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 Such casualties incurred in the counterattack could have been 
minimized had the troops been adept at using the close terrain to advantage to close in on the 






 Indian Division‟s poor anti-tank training was best highlighted by the rearguard action 
of the 12
th




 of December at Dipang. Almost reminiscent of 
Changlun and Asun, the brigade was caught by surprise by Japanese tanks advancing down the 
road, while Japanese infantry dismounted at the rear and flanked through the surrounding 
country. As a result, the brigade withdrew with great difficulty through Kampar that day. If the 
best brigade of the III Indian Corps could not stand up to the frontal assault of enemy tanks, it is 
reasonable to suppose that the other brigades and units could not either.
285
 
Kampar was one of Malaya Command‟s better fought battles. British sources estimated 
Japanese casualties at five hundred.
286
 Tsuji‟s memoirs admitted that their assault on Kampar was 
so difficult that for the first time a set piece battle had to be staged and all available troops had to 
be used. He acknowledged that there were even times when he doubted whether his troops would 
prevail and that the Japanese suffered heavy casualties from the powerful British artillery. The 
42
nd
 Regiment had to make a bigger detour than expected to escape the attention of the British 




Nevertheless, the British Army failed to take full advantage of their superior ground, 
strong defences and powerful artillery at the tactical level. While it could match the IJA in open 
battle behind fixed defences with artillery support, it still had not found a way to counter the 
enemy‟s “hugging” and outflanking tactics. Overly dependent on artillery, its infantry could not 
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fight well without it. Its commanders also failed to muster all their reserves for a counterattack at 
the decisive point. Moorhead reported that Kampar „could not be held indefinitely‟. Despite the 
heroism displayed, the sub-units of his brigade were being “bled dry” piecemeal and yet Paris still 
declined to launch a strong and determined counterattack.
288
 Kampar demonstrated the great gulf 
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CHAPTER 5: THE BRITISH ARMY ON THE OFFENSIVE IN THE MALAYAN 
CAMPAIGN 
 The British Army rarely attacked in the Malayan Campaign. On the few occasions 
Malaya Command attacked locally, it was to relieve beleaguered forces or restore a defensive 
line. Despite the differences in circumstances and some of the personalities involved, the British 
Army‟s attacks in Malaya generally displayed similar characteristics and followed similar tactical 
procedures and principles as their counterparts in Europe and North Africa. Attacks tended to 
take place at dawn, preceded by a strong artillery bombardment, launched in a linear fashion, with 
preordained timetables and objectives dictated to all formations and units, as part of a centrally 
planned and managed set piece affair. The offensive required a good command and control 
system with well-trained troops, led by competent leaders, to succeed.
289
 Unfortunately, Malaya 
Command did not have these conditions.  
The IJA, by contrast, was seldom on the defensive in the Malayan Campaign and its 
tactical doctrine disdained defense. When facing an offensive, it tended to react boldly and 
aggressively by counterattacking immediately, using its famed encirclement tactics. This chapter 
examines the two largest British set piece offensive battles of the Malayan Campaign – Bukit 





 January 1942  
Bukit Pelandok is an example of British incompetence on the attack even when 
possessing overwhelming artillery superiority and the customary three to one numerical 
superiority military textbooks cited as necessary for a successful offensive. 53
rd
 Brigade could 
only field the equivalent of a battalion at most, throughout four days, in two sluggish, piecemeal 
and futile offensives against a Japanese task force that amounted to merely two infantry 
companies without artillery support. Although Japanese warplanes were more active than usual in 
supporting the army, this battle illustrated all that was wrong with the British military system - 
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poor leadership and command, the rigidity of its tactics, the leisurely tempo of its operations and 
the weakness of its infantry.  
The tactical objective of the 53
rd
 Brigade‟s counterattack to allow the remnants of the cut 
off 45
th




 Australian Imperial Forces (AIF) battalions at Bakri 
to retreat to safety, was difficult to achieve from the start but Percival‟s over-caution made it even 
more daunting. The geography of the whole position favoured defence - the hill features were 
covered in thick jungle except at the forward slopes, overlooked the British positions to the east, 
while the trunk road running through the defile had deep irrigation ditches on both sides 
preventing motor vehicles from going off-road.
290
 As Percival admitted, even if the 53
rd
 Brigade 
could drive the Japanese battalion from the two hills covering the defile, they would still need to 
clear another enemy battalion to the west covering the Bukit Payong defile along the seven mile 
trunk road leading towards Parit Sulong Bridge.
291
  
Percival should have allocated another brigade to support 53
rd
 Brigade - one to take the 
first defile and the other to „leapfrog‟ the first to capture the second defile.  In fact, by the 21st, the 
remaining two battalions of the well-trained 27
th
 AIF Brigade were in reserve at Yong Peng.
292
 
Unfortunately, Percival typically did not dare risk such a bold and decisive move. Warren rightly 
noted that Percival‟s „inability to concentrate his forces at a point of crisis, even with the location 
of the point of crisis was an enduring theme of the Malayan Campaign.‟293  
To make things worse, Percival‟s over caution also ensured that 53rd Brigade fought with 
only one of its integral infantry battalions at hand, the 6
th
 Norfolks. He had earlier detached its 
two other battalions to two different locations under different commands. As he himself admitted, 
this was „contrary to all military teaching‟ but attempted to  justify it by stating that, „but, with so 




 Brigade War Diary; Neil Storey, To Singapore and Beyond (Norwich, Norfolk: 
Holyboy Publications, 1992), 23. 
291
 Warren, 178; Percival, War in Malaya, 232. 
292
 Kirby, 313; Warren, 178. 
293
 Warren, 172. 
 71 
many danger points and so few troops to guard them, it proved most difficult to avoid.‟ 294 
Percival‟s decision to split up a brigade‟s infantry components piecemeal without regards for 
cohesion, was another constant feature of the Malayan Campaign. This was due to Percival‟s 
constant obsession to be “strong everywhere” and not take risks on any sector.295 In this, Percival 
was merely reflecting the typical British establishment‟s fear of taking risks.  
Brigadier C. L. B. Duke, commanding the 53
rd
 Brigade, was as inexperienced, poorly-
trained, cautious, pessimistic and “defensive-minded” as the other British formation commanders 
in Malaya.
296
  That being the case, it was all the more important for his superiors to visit and 
guide him. Key, whose HQ was at Yong Peng some seven miles away, came only on the second 
day, after the counterattack failed. Bennett, who absorbed 53
rd
 Brigade under his command on the 
21
st
, typically only sent Thyer as liaison to enforce his order.
297
 While Moorhead had experience, 
Elrington and Lieutenant-Colonel Lywood, CO 6
th
 Norfolks, did not. In fact, the latter was unfit 
for command. After the defeat on the 19
th, he had been so “shaken” that his adjutant effectively 
commanded the battalion after that.
 Unsurprisingly, Key found the battalion „very nervous and 
poorly deployed.‟298 Lywood‟s nervous breakdown in combat mirrored many such cases amongst 
British senior officers in the field throughout the early years of World War II which reflected an 
inadequate selection and training system for British senior commanders.  




 Norfolks to Mersing and 2
nd
 Cambridgeshires to Batu Pahat. This was most unfortunate as the 
original three battalions of this brigade were familiar with one another and had trained together in the UK. 
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Duke‟s counterattack plan was flawed. He should either have followed Moorhead‟s 
advice to counterattack quickly with all existing forces on the 19
th
 or wait till the bulk of the 2
nd
 
Loyals arrived the next day, before launching a coordinated set piece assault with artillery 
support. Instead, Duke decided on a pre-dawn attack the next day without the main force of the 
2
nd
 Loyals. Revealing his inexperience of local conditions which disrupted signal 
communications, he did not even relocate the supporting artillery battery at Yong Peng nearer to 
the brigade throughout the battle. Duke‟s dispositions exposed his over caution which reduced his 
numerical advantage - on his left sector, a company of the 6
th
 Norfolks and the sole company of 
2
nd
 Loyals were to attack Bukit Pelandok and the ridge to its south respectively. On his right 
sector, the 3/16
th
 Punjabs was to attack Bukit Belah and the ridge to its north respectively.
299
 
Despite being aware that he would soon be reinforced by the bulk of the 2
nd
 Loyals that morning, 
Duke retained the equivalent of two combat and two support companies as reserve at the 
causeway to guard the trunk road to Yong Peng. Duke‟s “defensive-mindedness” and obsession 




 Brigade‟s junior leadership was also culpable for the failure of the crucial 
counterattack. “B” Company, 3/16th Punjabs advanced and successfully occupied the ridge north 
of Bukit Belah that morning. It then inexplicably “sat tight” and later withdrew in the afternoon to 
no purpose instead of “marching to the sounds of guns” southwards, to counterattack the lone 
Japanese company of I/5
th
 Battalion on Bukit Belah from the rear.
300
 Meanwhile, on the other side 
of the road at dawn, “B” Company, 6th Norfolks advanced up Bukit Pelandok and were met with 
heavy fire from both hills. Demoralised, the company commander decided to withdraw 
immediately without waiting for the artillery to register its target.
301
 This lack of initiative and 
persistence in the attack was due to both company commanders being inexperienced, poorly 
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trained and unfamiliar in bush warfare, which exposed the shortcomings of the British Army‟s 
selection and training system for officers.  
Yet, such was the numerical superiority Duke had on Bukit Belah that the counterattack 
would still have worked if not for the shortcomings of the British military system. It was not 
Duke‟s fault that he did not have maps of the area. However, he erroneously considered 
aggressive patrols of the bushes beyond the company areas „not practical,‟ which prevented him 
from knowing that the enemy had only two companies in strength. This reflected the British 
Army‟s lack of training in „active patrolling‟ and flawed assumption that the jungle was 
“impenetrable”. The counterattack on Bukit Belah in the pre-dawn hours of the 20th would have 
been successful had British patrols located the lost company of the 6
th
 Norfolks and coordinated 
with it. The latter‟s “friendly fire” with a company of 3/16th Punjabs would also have been 
prevented had the British Army emphasised training in „active patrolling‟, night operations and 
standard „battle drills‟. This “own goal” disrupted the British counterattack, and killed the 
experience and dynamic Moorhead, amongst others.
302
  
By contrast, Major Yamamoto and his commanders proved to be enterprising and 
tactically competent, while their men had high morale and were familiar with chaotic night 
operations, having trained hard and realistically in “battle drills”. They were from the elite 
Imperial Guards Division, which uniquely took in recruits with the best physique and selected top 
officer graduates of the Military Academy from all over Japan. Although not as experienced as 
the other two divisions of the 25
th
 Army, the division had been in action in China and Indochina 
since 1940.
303
 Their lone company on Bukit Belah had not been content to “sit tight” after their 
successful attack in the afternoon of the 19
th
. Instead, it pressed on through the night to seize the 
summit. That paid off, when in the wee hours of the next day, it capitalised on the “friendly fire” 
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between a British and an Indian company to immediately counterattack. Without the chance to 
reorganise, both enemy companies suffered heavy casualties and were driven downhill.
304
 This 
was in accordance with Japanese tactical manuals which emphasized speed, surprise, 




Duke‟s over caution, pessimism and “defensive-mindedness” became even more 
pronounced after the failure of the counterattack on the 20
th
. Time was running out for the 
Australian and Indian troops withdrawing from Bakri, while the main force of the fresh 2
nd
 
Loyals arrived that day. Yet Duke declined to counterattack and made no offensive preparations, 
despite Key‟s repeated order.306 Instead, he feared for the safety of his brigade‟s communications 
at the rear, and opted for a defensive posture – he placed 3/16th Punjabs and 6th Norfolks in 
positions covering the western end of the causeway, while putting 2
nd
 Loyals in positions east of 
the causeway, to guard against enemy infiltration.
307
 Key, who finally visited the brigade later 
that day allowed Duke to postpone the counterattack till the next morning.
308
 Like Percival and 
other British field commanders, Key and Duke had only pessimistically considered their own 
difficulties without grasping that the enemy might be in a worse condition. 
Duke finally had to make belated offensive preparations on the 21
st
 as Bennett proved to 
be less patient and sympathetic than Key. However, Duke displayed rigidity in planning. When 
Thyer correctly pressed him for a “snap” counterattack, Duke insisted on a deliberate set piece 




 Loyals were typically so dependent on 
motor transport that Elrington did not attempt to march his widely dispersed companies across 
country to their assembly points, even after Japanese warplanes had interdicted the trunk road and 
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made travel by road risky. In accordance with British doctrinal manuals, proper reconnaissance 
and detailed briefing of orders had to be done before an offensive. Due to communication 
difficulties in Malaya‟s climate and terrain, much time was also spent coordinating with the 
artillery battery, which was still inexplicably left at Yong Peng! Consequently, Duke had to 
postpone the counterattack several times in the afternoon. Finally, he postponed it till next 
morning as the artillery was still unable to register its target by evening due to faulty fuses.
310
 In 
any case, it was unlikely that Duke would have ordered a night assault, given the British Army‟s 
disinclination for and lack of training in that. The rigid and leisurely way in which the brigade 
prepared its counterattack mirrored the British Army‟s preference for slow tempo operations. 
The British Army‟s doctrinal overreliance on artillery doomed the planned counterattack 
on the morning of the 22
nd
. The artillery battery yet again failed to register its target and so Duke 
postponed the counterattack until that was accomplished. As the sun rose, the British lost the 
element of surprise as Japanese warplanes heavily bombed the assembly area, causing Duke to 
finally cancel the counterattack for good.
311
 The decision to wait for the artillery to be ready was 
due to what Bennett attributed as 2
nd
 Loyals having „a strong disinclination to attack without 
artillery support to pave the way‟, which was typical of the British attitude in Malaya.312  
He was right. 11
th
 Indian Division HQ specified artillery support as a pre-requisite to any 
attack, in accordance with the British Army‟s doctrinal emphasis on firepower.313 Given that 
Malaya‟s dense jungle terrain hampered the use of artillery, this inflexible requirement slowed 
down the tempo of operations and made attacks predictable. In the absence of artillery support, 
the IJA would have placed faith in its well-trained infantrymen to “go in with the bayonets” and 
take both hills in a surprise night attack. This reflected a crucial difference in the two military 
systems.  
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 February 1942  
Bukit Timah, where “Tomforce” launched the largest British offensive in the campaign, 
was the ultimate showdown between the Japanese superiority in infantry and the British 
superiority in artillery. For once, Malaya Command was heavily outnumbered in infantry but it 
had overwhelming superiority in artillery against the bulk of two Japanese divisions with plentiful 
air support. Unfortunately, in the dense terrain, the British Army‟s powerful artillery proved 
unable to compensate for its flawed tactics, infantry weakness and poor leadership and command. 
The IJA, on the other hand, proved that their superior infantry, led by enterprising junior officers 
with good tactical grasp, could make use of the close terrain to overcome their lack of artillery. At 
Bukit Timah, the differences between the British and the Japanese systems were again clearly 
accentuated.  
Like many battles in the campaign, the outcome of the offensive was compromised by 
Percival‟s operational decisions. Once the Japanese 5th and 18th divisions breached the Kranji-
Jurong defensive line on the morning of the 10
th
, everything depended on a much-anticipated “all 
or nothing” counterattack. Yet, Percival remained obsessed with the threat of another Japanese 
landing on the northeastern part of the island. Despite the fact that ABDA Command‟s 
intelligence had correctly identified the Dutch East Indies as the target of a large IJN convoy at 
sea he was reluctant to commit it as a complete formation, much to the dismay of 18
th
 Division‟s 
HQ which planned for such a counterattack.
314
 Instead, Percival asked Heath, GOC Northern 
Area, to send a brigade group of three battalions to the Bukit Timah Race Course area to be 
placed under Bennett, now GOC Western Area, by the evening of the 10th.
315
 He justified his 
over-caution by to the lesson he learnt while on an exercise in the UK, „not to commit your 
reserve until you are quite certain you are dealing with real thing‟.316 Yet Percival‟s caution was 
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not unique as it mirrored that of his subordinates in Malaya, and also Major General Bernard 
Freyberg at Crete. 
Probably mirroring Percival‟s preoccupation with the possibility of another Japanese 




 Brigades from the 18
th
 Division for 
this task. Instead, he “stitched” together three units of that division, previously not brigaded 
together, to form “Tomforce”. Unlike the permanent HQs of the above-two brigades, its 
commander, Lieutenant-Colonel H. Thomas, and his new staff, were typically totally 
inexperienced and untrained for their new appointments. Consequently, Major-General Merton 
Beckwith-Smith, GOC 18
th
 Division, had to mentor Thomas during the battle.
317
 As at Bukit 
Pelandok, Percival and Heath‟s tendency to deploy units piecemeal with no regards for formation 
cohesion was to be disastrous. However, this was by no means unique to Malaya Command. 
As with 53
rd
 Brigade at Bukit Pelandok, “Tomforce” was asked to do too much with too 
little. The fault lay with the British Army‟s poor C3I. Bennett envisaged “Tomforce” 
counterattacking at dawn on the 11
th





 AIF brigades, to secure Bukit Timah, retake Bukit Panjang and restore the Kranji-
Jurong switchline.
318
 As Farrell noted, had Bennett been able to coordinate the offensive of all 
these three brigades together, it would have troubled the Japanese considerably. Unfortunately, as 
was common throughout the campaign, British field communications broke down. In any case, 
the 15th Indian Brigade had already disintegrated while Brigadier D. S. Maxwell, commanding 
27
th
 AIF Brigade, typically sited his HQ so far away that he lost touch of the situation. Yet 
Bennett, in accordance with British military doctrine, also sited his HQ a distance to the rear, and 
declined to visit his brigades to re-establish contact with them. It was only the next morning when 
“Tomforce” had already started moving that he sent a liaison officer to press it on and a dispatch 
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rider to contact Maxwell a while after that, which was too late.
319
 Although let down by poor C3I, 
Bennett had also showed typical British lethargy, which compromised the outcome of the 
counterattack. 
Even so, the solo counterattack by “Tomforce” still had a chance to make an impact had 
it been launched soon after dark on the 10
th
 when the Japanese had not yet reached the vicinity. 
However, the breakdown in communications and the British Army‟s typical lack of emphasis on 
fighting patrols gave Bennett no inkling about the great strength of the enemy and the extent of its 
breakthrough. He thus did not hasten the counterattack. It was not till the next morning, when the 
counterattack had already started, that Paris arrived to report on the gravity of the situation.
320
  
In any case, the British Army typically eschewed high tempo operations, especially at 





Division advancing south down Bukit Timah Road had secured the hill (the highest point on the 
island) and the village with two regiments forward, while the 18
th
 Division advancing east along 
the Jurong Road had linked up with it at the village and junction, also with two regiments 
forward.
321
 Even though “Tomforce” was now outnumbered four-to-one, a counterattack timed at 




 divisions were now 
intermingled with some confusion.
322
 However, “Tomforce” moved ponderously at dawn and 
missed the “golden opportunity”. As Farrell noted, the counterattacked was doomed by the time it 
was launched as the Japanese had already consolidated their strength.
323
  
 Thomas‟ initial counterattack plan was rigidly linear, according to British Army doctrine, 
which exposed his inexperience in local terrain. However, Bennett had also autocratically 
imposed wide frontages to each battalion with no regards to ground conditions. In the centre, the 
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 Reconaissance Battalion was to move up the trunk road frontally in both armoured vehicles 
and on foot to capture Bukit Timah village and remove the enemy roadblock there, before going 
into reserve. After that, it was to „swing slightly to the right‟, bypass the Bukit Timah Hill and 
advance up the road to form a line through Bukit Panjang village. On the right, the 4
th
 Norfolks 
was to move between the trunk road and the pipeline at a depth of 2,000 yards to take Hill 255, 
while on the left, the 1/5th Sherwood Foresters was to move south of the trunk road at a depth of 
2,000 yards to take Hill 180.
324
 The long frontages given to the battalions on the left and right 
necessitated them deploying all their companies forward without reserves in dense terrain, which 
hampered command and control and facilitated the kind of infiltration tactics the IJA excelled in. 
Farrell aptly commented that „extended line abreast made sense in the open country of northwest 
Europe but quickly snarled in the bushes around Bukit Timah Hill.‟325  
The 25
th
 Army‟s C3I, on the other hand, worked smoothly and its tactics were flexible 
and suited to the ground here. The Japanese had a great intelligence advantage over the British 
with the use of air reconnaissance and the capture of high ground. Tsuji recorded that he and 
Lieutenant-General Takuro Matsui, GOC 5
th
 Division, were both on the peak of Bukit Timah Hill 
to watch the progress of the battle, while Lieutenant-General Renya Mutaguchi, GOC 18
th
 
Division was doing the same from Hill 186.
326
 Unlike Bennett and Thomas, they did not need to 
control the tactics and dispositions of their formations and units closely. The IJA‟s “mission 
command” and common understanding of doctrine meant that field commanders, junior officers 
and even NCOs instinctively knew what to do. Their men were experienced and well-trained in 
„battle-drills‟. The Japanese initially sought to make maximum use of the cover and clear fields of 
fire afforded by the railway embankment to disrupt the enemy‟s advance. At the same time, patrol 
detachments would be sent to “feel” for the flanks and rear of the enemy. Once the enemy‟s 
attack had been stalled along this natural defensive ground, an aggressive counterattack would be 
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launched, using the usual encirclement tactics. This was in accordance to Japanese tactical 
manuals, in facing a determined enemy offensive, field commanders were to be on the defense 
temporarily while seeking opportunities to take the counteroffensive.
327
 
In the centre, the 18
th
 Reconnaissance Battalion‟s progress along the congested trunk road 
was slow. Its unsophisticated frontal assaults were unable to take Bukit Timah village the whole 
morning, despite Bren carrier, mortar and artillery support. This was partly due to neglect in 
minor tactics when artillery fire could not be used.
328
 By 1100 hours, all three companies were 
held up along the line of the railway embankment by Japanese light machine gun posts, mortars 
and dive-bombers. In the afternoon, the Japanese then counterattacked briefly and „pushed back‟ 
the battalion east of the railway, until later driven back by British artillery.
329
  
On the right, from Tsuji‟s account, one can surmise that the 4th Norfolks on the right 
sector counterattacked in typical British linear fashion with the artillery seeking to suppress the 
enemy, while the infantry then moving behind this barrage „like a gigantic wave‟ to occupy 
enemy ground. This was typical of British barrage tactics introduced during World War I, which 
illustrated how their offensive tactics had remained stagnant since then.
330
 However, the battalion 
could get no further than Hills 255 and 275 by 1300 hours, after it had correctly reorganized to 
attack in echelons.
331
 Typically, more Japanese battalions of the lead regiment of the Sugiura 
Brigade marched towards Hill 255 throughout the afternoon which blunted the advance of the 4
th
 
Norfolks. Meanwhile, the lead regiment of the Kawamura Brigade was already probing past the 
right flank of the 4
th
 Norfolks in the crucial gap that existed between the latter and the reservoir 
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earlier in the morning. By evening, 5
th
 Division had retaken Hill 275 and forced 4
th




On the left, the inexperience and inadequate training of the 1/5
th
 Sherwood Foresters were 
thoroughly exposed, despite it making the most progress after reorganizing to attack in echelons. 
Its lack of training with artillery was demonstrated when in the late morning half of its “C” 
Company took Hill 180, cleared it of the enemy, was then shelled by the enemy and automatically 
withdrew, thinking it was “friendly fire”. Three of its companies were then subsequently swept up 
in the general rout of the 22
nd
 AIF and 15
th
 Indian Brigades, which they came into contact with 
along the Reformatory Road. So disorganised was the battalion that it eventually passed through 
AIF positions at Point 127 and rested there the whole afternoon.
333
 
 By late afternoon, “Tomforce” was dispersed in unfamiliar „bush terrain,‟ running out of 
supplies and sustaining increasing casualties. Yet the enemy was steadily reinforced to such a 
point that the British were by now pushed to the defensive and in danger of being outflanked on 
the right.
334
 Fearing that his command would disintegrate in a night melee with the IJA, Thomas 
ordered a withdrawal back to the Race Course at 1700 hours.  
When the roll calls were mustered the next day, the 18
th
 Recce, the 4
th
 Norfolks and the 
1/5
th
 Sherwood Foresters were down to a hundred and twenty, two hundred and a hundred men 
respectively.
335
 Tsuji admitted the fighting at Bukit Timah had been so severe that he was 
concerned that both Japanese divisions „appeared somewhat exhausted‟ to advance.336 The 25th 
Army Official History also credited “Tomforce” with putting up „strong resistance‟. While 
showing disdain for the British infantry, it credited the British artillery for inflicting „heavy 
casualties upon the [18
th] division‟, which prevented its infantry and artillery from concentrating 
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on the evening of the 11
th
 in time for the general assault on the following day.
337
 This was a most 
accurate assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the British Army. The close terrain of 
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CHAPTER 6: THE BRITISH ARMY’S DELAYING MISSIONS IN THE MALAYAN 
CAMPAIGN 
The way an army conducts a delaying mission against a tenacious and aggressive attacker 
is a good gauge of the training of its troops, the work of its staff officers and the leadership of its 
commanders. Throughout the campaign Malaya Command had to conduct numerous delaying 
missions to buy time to bring in reinforcements, deny the enemy use of a key military facility for 
a certain period of time, or for the next defensive line to be prepared. Malaya Command‟s record 
in delaying missions was mixed, although overall, it succeeded in getting its troops safely back to 
Singapore from the mainland. This chapter examines Telok Anson and Kuantan, to illustrate how 
the success or failure of delaying missions depended on the feasibility of the objective given and 
the state of discipline, morale and training in high tempo operations.  
Telok Anson, 2
nd
 – 3rd January 1942  
 Telok Anson is an example of a tactically successful fighting withdrawal limited by 
typical over-caution and pessimism from British senior commanders. Despite the 12
th
 Indian 
Brigade possessing overwhelming artillery support to cover the trunk road to Bidor in relatively 
open terrain, the British High Command timidly chose to delay Watanabe Detachment, a 
Japanese coastal landing task force of roughly a regiment, for only a day. Japanese warplanes 
gave some support to its troops on this occasion, but this was by no means decisive. As a result, 
the 11
th
 Indian Division had to withdraw from Kampar earlier than necessary. If the best brigade 
of III Indian Corps could not confidently hold a comparable force of Japanese troops for a longer 
time, it was reasonable to suppose that other formations were even less capable.  
The IJA, used to high tempo operations, had landed elements of the 11
th
 Regiment at 
Utan Melintang on the evening of the 1
st
. It then swiftly followed this up by landing the III/4
th
 
Guards Battalion the next morning at Telok Anson. Colonel Watanabe, commanding this 
detachment, was conscious of his task force‟s role as the outer coastal pincer to „threaten the 




 Typical of a professionally selected and trained IJA officer, he understood the 
importance of speed and marched his regiment rapidly overnight from Utan Melintang to link up 
with and absorb the Guards battalion at Telok Anson the next morning.
339
  
By contrast, without even bothering to visit this sector or to send a liaison officer there, 
Paris instinctively opted for a passive rather than aggressive stance - cordoning off with the 12
th
 
Indian Brigade rather than annihilating the enemy beachhead. That decision guaranteed that the 
enemy would break inland. The usually dynamic Paris was undoubtedly influenced by his given 
mission to „preserve his division as a fighting force‟. This led him to display typical British over-
caution, pessimism and over-concern for the security of line of communications.
340
 
Percival and Heath proved just as “defensive-minded” as Paris. British air reconnaissance 
and coastal patrols overestimated the strength of the enemy‟s landing party as two battalions and 
many mortars at Telok Anson and a „considerable‟ force at Utan Melintang. They also received 
reports of enemy numerous ships making southwards for Kuala Selangor.
341
 Both became so 
concerned with the general threat to the west coast that on the afternoon of the 2
nd
, they ordered 
Paris to withdraw from the Kampar position that night. 12
th
 Indian Brigade‟s mission then 
became that of delaying the enemy along the two trunk roads that forked at Changkat Jong to 




Stewart, like Paris, being inexperienced and untrained in his new appointment, was losing 
his usual cool and optimism after having been overworked for weeks. When enemy bombing and 
pressure on the ground mounted on his brigade throughout the 2
nd
, he became so convinced he 
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was facing „at least a regiment in strength‟ that he reported to Paris „he could not guarantee to 
keep the main road open by more than twenty-four hours‟.343 This was pessimistic, given the fact 
that he had well-trained and experienced troops in comparable numbers, with superior artillery, 
and on good defensive ground consisting of young low rubber trees and open tin mines.
344
 That 
night, Paris had to order 12
th
 Indian Brigade to „deny Ayer Kuning village to the enemy until 
midnight on the 3
rd
/4
th‟ to prevent it from interfering with the division‟s withdrawal down the 
trunk road southwards to the Slim River position.
345
  
Stewart was otherwise sound in his tactical deployment. To block the advance from the 
coast on the 2
nd
, he placed his brigade in-depth along the two trunk roads to Ayer Kuning and 
Degong. 2
nd
 Argylls deployed in depth six miles along the road forward of the crucial Changkat 
Jong junction. 5/2
nd
 Punjabs deployed behind the 2
nd
 Argylls with bridgeheads along the two 
trunk roads to a depth of four miles, followed by 4/19
th
 Hyderabads behind up to two miles on the 
Ayer Kuning road. A platoon of the 5/2
nd
 Punjabs was placed as a fighting patrol in the “bush” to 
the north of the trunk road and the parallel Bidor River. The squadron of 3
rd
 Indian Cavalry was 
to patrol the trunk road and railway to Degong up to the 5/2
nd
 Punjabs‟ position. When the 
Japanese switched to wider enveloping tactics on foot and motor boats up the Bidor River aimed 
at the Changkat Jong junction the next day, the British artillery, directed by a forward observer on 
a strategic hill near here, punished them in the favourable terrain twice that evening. 
Simultaneously, the three battalions took turns to successively “leapfrog” through one another 
                                                 
343
 Percival, Despatch; Moffatt & McCormick, 97-98; Kirby, 248; Smith, 313-314; Stewart, 65. 
344
 The brigade‟s three battalions were brigaded together since their arrival in August 1939, with a common 
set of standard operating procedures. Unlike other units, they trained to maneuver and fight confidently in 
the “bush” and had taken part in a rather realistic four-day brigade exercise in November 1941 against an 
„enemy‟ landing on the west coast of Malaya. This was in addition to two similarly tasked brigade single-
day schemes to practice counterattack in November. In a two-day air-ground co-operation scheme in 
February, the RAF was so impressed by its ability to move off-road unnoticed from the air. It had just 
successfully fought along the Kroh-Grik Road against the Japanese 41
st
 Regiment for two weeks. Stewart, 
67, 68; WO 172/112 “12th Indian Brigade War Diary”; WO 172/22 “Force Emu War Diary”. 
345
 Kirby, 248; WO 172/18 Appendix O20; Bhargava & Sastri, 211. 
 86 
towards Ayer Kuning, where they finally gave up Changkat Jong at 2300 hours and „withdrew 
according to plan through 15
th
 Indian Brigade at Bidor to the Slim River area‟ at midnight.346 
Stewart‟s tactical skill was matched by the capable leadership of his subordinate officers 
and the good training and experience of the brigade‟s troops. When at 1400 hours on the 2nd, 
advance elements of the Watanabe Detachment were in contact with “A” Company, 2nd Argylls, 
Major K.D. Gairdner, the new CO, pulled the company three miles back along the trunk road 
where “D” Company had positioned itself. Japanese attempts to follow up the withdrawal were 
fired upon by “D” Company on the trunk road, supported by the artillery, while their infiltration 
parties were dealt with by the fighting patrol platoon of 5/2
nd
 Punjabs. Then as night fell, “D” 
Company withdrew another mile across a demolished bridge to prepare for the anticipated 
Japanese “jittery parties” attempting night infiltrations around the 2nd Argyll positions. These 
came after dark but the enemy attempts were all contained, by the counterattacks of lightly armed 
“tiger patrols” supported by the battalion‟s armoured cars on the road. The 2nd Argylls had only 
conceded some four miles that day and still held a position three miles forward of the crucial 
Changkat Jong junction, which was a real achievement, as the enemy‟s infiltration tactics rarely 
failed to produce a hasty and panic retreat amongst British Empire troops.
 347
 
Watanabe also displayed typically Japanese tactical flair. When the IJA‟s usual “pin-and-
encircle” tactics on the trunk road were repulsed throughout the 2nd by British artillery and 
infantry counterattacks, he was resilient enough to switch to outflanking maneuvers on a wider 




 Throughout the battle, Watanabe Detachment, 
although made up of units from two different divisions, were able to fight cohesively thanks to 
the IJA‟s standard battle drills. This was rare in the British Army. Stewart noted that the Japanese 
troops were well-practised and swift with their outflanking tactics. When “pinned” on the road, 
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they instinctively moved on through the “bush” to “feel” for and exploit weakly held areas in the 
rear of the enemy.
349
 Their lack of success on this occasion was due to their misfortune to be 
facing the best brigade of the III Indian Corps. 
The 12
th
 Indian Brigade achieved its delaying mission comfortably, with little real 
pressure from the enemy and losing only ninety men (half from enemy air attacks).
350
 This was a 
great testimony to its having been trained differently from the rest of Malaya Command‟s 
formations and indeed from the usual “British way”. However, given the advantages Stewart had 
in this battle, it was most disappointing that the British High Command chose to delay the enemy 
for just over a day. Percival, Heath, Paris and Stewart all seemed to be convinced of the futility of 
counterattacking Watanabe Detachment and instead opted for a passive, delaying stance. When 
under prolonged stress of combat, the two “stars” of Malaya Command‟s senior officers, Paris 
and Stewart, both turned out to be typically cautious and “retreat-minded” as the others. This 
reflected typical over-pessimism, over-caution and “logistic-mindedness” of British senior 
commanders. Japanese senior commanders would have, instead, boldly and aggressively chosen 
to launch an “all-or-nothing” counterattack to annihilate a coastal landing force threatening their 
rear. This was a clear difference between the two military systems. 
Kuantan, 2-3
rd
 January 1942  
 Kuantan is an example of how the combination of contradictory British campaign 
objectives and the British Army‟s penchant for slow tempo operations and lapses in planning and 
staffwork seriously compromised the outcome of battles in Malaya. 22
nd
 Indian Brigade was 
asked to deny an abandoned airfield in an indefensible area far longer than necessary. This was 
exploited by the aggressive, swift-moving and opportunistic Japanese Nasu Detachment (56
th
 
Regiment). As a result, the brigade‟s withdrawal from Kuantan nearly failed and it suffered 
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unnecessarily high casualties breaking clear from the enemy, to no purpose. This battle again 
revealed the shortcomings of the British Army‟s C3I, which was inferior to that of the IJA‟s. 
The typical British military tendency to stick rigidly to pre-war plans again created a 
contradiction between operational and tactical objectives, which was mainly responsible for the 
partial disaster at Kuantan. Brooke-Popham insisted that the army defend Kuantan Airfield even 
after the RAAF evacuated it on the first day of war, as its possession by the enemy would allow 
Japanese warplanes to harass British convoys bringing in reinforcements to Singapore. Percival 
thus gave the 22
nd
 Indian Brigade, commanded by Brigadier G.W.A. Painter, the task of denying 
the airbase to the enemy for „as long as possible‟, which risked having it cut off, in an area 
unsuited for defence, by the Japanese 56
th
 Regiment, moving across country hastily southwards 
along the coast.
351
 Fortunately, Heath, who was aware of the speed of the enemy‟s advance 
through patrols, acted contrary to Percival on the 29
th
 – he insisted that Painter withdraw the 
2/18
th
 Garwhal Rifles, across the Kuantan River,.
352
 While this withdrawal was taking place the 
next day, the enemy attacked down the Jabor Valley into the battalion‟s flank and rear. 
Consequently, it had to fight its way back to Kuantan town and only succeeded in crossing the 
river on the 31
st
 with considerable loss.
353
 
Even after this encounter highlighted the risk of staying put at Kuantan, Percival rigidly 
stuck to Brooke-Popham‟s order. He ignored Painter‟s request to withdraw the brigade to the 
safety of Maran, to the west, on the night of the 1
st
 of January. Instead, he gave the usual 
contradictory instruction that the brigade deploy to deny the airfield for five days without 
jeopardising itself, and only allowed an artillery battery to be withdrawn to Jerantut.
354
 
Fortunately, the next day, Heath managed to persuade Percival to let the brigade withdraw along 
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the trunk road westwards to Selangor, to rejoin the rest of 9
th
 Indian Division. This was because a 
key reinforcement convoy had already arrived safely in Singapore, which made it unnecessary to 
risk holding the airfield in the face of increasing Japanese infiltration.
355
 Farrell was correct in 
stating that Percival should have given Painter and Barstow greater leeway to decide when to 
withdraw once the enemy was in strength around Kuantan, instead of making such decisions 
when he had not even visited the front to appreciate the situation for himself.
356
  
By contrast, the Japanese 18
th
 Division HQ had typically empowered Colonel Nasu and 
his subordinates with initiative. As a well-trained and experienced professional who fully grasped 
the Japanese doctrinal emphasis on speed, surprise and opportunism, Nasu opted to annihilate the 
22
nd
 Indian Brigade rather than just taking Kuantan Airfield. By the 2nd, elements of the 56
th
 
Regiment had already forded the Kuantan River upstream and were threatening to cut off the 
brigade‟s withdrawal route.357 His regiment was part of the well-trained and battle-hardened 18th 
Division which had been fighting in China since 1937.
358
 
Compromised by Percival‟s late withdrawal order, Barstow‟s lack of urgency, used to the 
low tempo nature of training for operations at the Staff College, further jeopardised the success of 
the ensuing delaying action. Malaya Command HQ had communicated to him at 1950 hours that 
„it must be accepted that Kuantan Aerodome could not be denied after the 3rd of January‟.359 In 
essence, this meant that Percival had not specified the time of withdrawal the next day. Given the 
IJA‟s usual speed and flair for encirclement tactics, a further delay of even a single day could 
mean disaster for the brigade. Barstow should have pushed for an early withdrawal the next day. 
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Malaya Command HQ, which had not even sent a liaison officer to inspect the ground, 
drew up the plan of withdrawal which Painter adopted.
361
 While consistent with the British 
Army‟s autocratic system of command, this also reflected the typical inexperience and inadequate 
training of Painter and his staff. A brigade fighting withdrawal along a road had to be carefully 
covered by successive “leapfrogging” battalions and companies, with mobile reserves ready to 
counterattack any enemy outflanking through the “bush”. Artillery batteries should also be 
positioned to cover areas where the enemy might attempt to follow or outflank. In addition, 
timing and distance of the withdrawal of each company and battalion had to be carefully planned 
and executed. In the event, the flawed plan violated these principles. The 5/11
th
 Sikhs withdrew 
on the afternoon of the 3
rd
 and by evening, it and the 63/81
st
 Battery, minus a section of two guns, 
had reached a harbour at Gambang, some ten miles west of the airfield, without incident. Painter 
claimed that „the close nature of the jungle now to be traversed precluded its [the artillery 
battery‟s] effective employment‟. This was a mistake. By allowing these elements to withdraw so 
far, Painter ensured that they could not cover the withdrawal of the rest of the brigade.
362
 
Fortunately, Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Cummings, CO 2/12
th
 Frontier Force, the rearguard, 
utilised his Northwest Frontier experience to good use by posting a company at a potentially 
dangerous defile six miles west of the airfield.
363
  
 Another mistake Painter made was to assume his troops could withdraw unscathed in one 
long leap under cover of darkness, to escape from enemy air interference. This was standard 
British practice whenever the enemy had air control. It was predicated by the British Army‟s 
heavy reliance on motor transport, which made the withdrawal of long convoys vulnerable to 
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 However, Painter underestimated the speed of the advancing Japanese troops, 
who were typically well-trained to fight at night, unlike British Empire troops. At dusk, when 
troops of the leading 2/18
th
 Royal Garhwal Rifles were boarding their motor transports, Japanese 
mortars shelled the northwestern side of the perimeter. Just when its last vehicles left the airfield, 
the Japanese mounted an attack on the northern and western perimeter. In the desperate close 
quarter fighting, the rest of the brigade managed to fight its way through the closing Japanese 
pincers and withdrew safely through Gambang - except the 2/12
th
 Frontier Force, completely 
surrounded by superior enemy forces. It had to run a gauntlet, and suffered accordingly.
365
  
Painter‟s main force pulled out just in the nick of time. Had Percival, Barstow or Painter 
delayed the withdrawal from the airfield for even a while more, the 22
nd
 Indian Brigade, heavily 
laden with transports, would be trapped and forced to fight its way out on foot with little chance 
to escape.
366
 Senior British commanders habitually underestimated the tempo by which the IJA 
conducted warfare, as the British Army habitually waged slow tempo battle. Unfortunately, the 
IJA operated according to a different system. The Japanese were probably kept busy by the 
sacrificial rearguard action of the 2/12
th
 Frontier Force and so could not pursue closely. Thus, the 
bulk of the brigade withdrew to safety but at the sacrifice of half a battalion. This could have been 
avoided had Percival and Barstow allowed the brigade to withdraw earlier and Painter carefully 
“leapfrogged” the units through one another, covered by artillery fire. By contrast, Nasu and his 
battalion and company commanders were clear about their mission and recognized the 
importance of proper coordination, speed and flexibility. The differences between the two 
military systems were yet again demonstrated. 
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CHAPTER 7: THE BRITISH ARMY IN THE GREEK, CRETE AND BURMA 
CAMPAIGNS 1941-1942 
In the previous three chapters, we examined battles from the Malayan Campaign to 
analyse how institutional forces influenced their course and outcome. If the British military 
system indeed caused the British tactical defeat in Malaya, then the string of British tactical 
defeats elsewhere in the world should also be due to the influences and impact of this system. 
Thus, this chapter will focus on various aspects of the Greek Campaign of 1941 and the Burma 
Campaign 1941-1942 to examine how institutional forces shaped the course and outcome of the 





 April 1941  
The Greek Campaign was particularly relevant to Malaya as it was also fought on a 
peninsula and an island not particularly conducive to mechanised forces, barely seven months 
before the outbreak of the Pacific War. Moreover, it pitted the British Army against the German 
Army, whose military system influenced the IJA. There were thus many similarities between 
them. First, German staff planning for the Greek campaign was typically thorough and 
meticulous as evidenced by the divisional composition of 12
th
 Army‟s three corps. Two of its 
three corps had at least a tank and an infantry division each, while 18th Corps even had two 
mountain divisions to maneuver in the central mountain ranges of Greece.
367
 Second, the German 
Army favoured the “mission” command system, which helped them overcome command and 
control difficulties over great distances in the rough Greek mountains, where signal 
communications were poor.
368
 Third, German tactical doctrines emphasized combined arms co-
operation, encounter battles and encirclement attacks. Fourth, German military training was 
realistic and rigorous, achieved through systematic battle-drill training and exercises from sub-




 and the 40
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unit to formation levels.
369
 Fifth, the pack mules and horse transports of German mountain and 
infantry units, respectively, gave them greater off-road mobility in the Greek mountains. Finally, 




Circumstantial factors that handicapped “W” Force‟s defence of Greece were similar to 
those facing Malaya Command. It had to fight without air support as the RAF was heavily 
outnumbered by the combined German and Italian air forces. This negated the RN‟s superiority in 
the Mediterranean, severely demoralised the British Empire troops while disrupting troop 
movements.
371
 “W” Force was also not given time to acclimatise and train to fight in mountain 
warfare, a requirement the Germans themselves understood.
372
 The fact that it had to perform a 
series of delaying mission deprived its troops of rest and lowered morale, due to the need to 
prepare defences and then being asked to retreat for no apparent reason, only to repeat the whole 
cycle again.
373
 However, Lieutenant-General Maitland Wilson, GOC “W” Force, had accurate 
access to the order of battle of the German Army and their intentions through ULTRA, a system 
which allowed British code-breakers to tap into many German Army code messages.
374
 
Moreover, Greece‟s mountainous terrain, like Malaya‟s jungle terrain, seemed to favour defence 
and handicapped the movement and use of German mechanised troops, the main component of 
their all-conquering “blitzkrieg” tactics.375 Instead, it placed the British Empire troops at a tactical 
disadvantage against German infantry and mountain troops, and the former could only hold on in 
Greece for a mere three weeks.
376
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As in Malaya, the British Empire forces displayed symptoms and influences of the British 
military system which hampered their ability to defend mainland Greece more effectively. First, 
there was no unified command over the three services.
377
 Second, “W” Force used the 
“autocratic” command system, which made command and control difficult in the mountains of 
Greece, where signal communications were poor.
378
 Third, its training was geared towards 
motorised warfare in open terrain, rather than mountain warfare, and was neither realistic nor 
rigorous enough. As the Germans observed, patrolling, counter-patrolling, fire discipline, night 
operations and off-road flanking maneuvers were consequently neglected.
379
 Fifth, “W” Force‟s 
units were so heavily motorized they were overly dependent on the few roads in the Greek 
mountains, which made them vulnerable to traffic jams and enemy air attacks.
380
 Sixth, “W” 
Force units were multi-national in composition, had never trained together in peacetime and were 
uneven in experience.
381
 Finally, British Empire field commanders used cautious set-piece linear 
defence tactics and were typically so conscious about the safety of their flanks, rear and lines of 
communication that they became “retreat-minded”. Wilson‟s operational plan for defending 
mainland Greece was conservatively based on a series of thin linear defences across great 
distances, susceptible to enemy outflanking attempts – the seventy-mile long Aliakmon-Vermion 
Line, the Olympus-Servia Line and the thirty-mile long  Thermopylae Line. In each case, he 
withdrew prematurely without counterattacking the Germans or seriously engaging them.
382
  
A rearguard action that illustrated these problematic British characteristics was the 
fighting withdrawal of Mackay Force‟s, 19th Australian Brigade Group under Brigadier Alan 




 April. In conformity with British doctrine, Major-General Ivan 
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Mackay dispersed the brigade group‟s four battalions along a front of ten miles, which was far 
too long and extended. It would have been better for Mackay to allow Vasey to deploy his 
brigade according to the ground, but this was unthinkable given the British preference for 
autocratic command.
383
 As a result, Lieutenant-Colonel Mitchell, CO 2/8
th
 AIF, had to deploy its 
four companies in a thin line along a ridge to the right for some two thousand and five hundred 
yards, which made it easier for the Germans to threaten both flanks of the battalion.
384
  
The British army‟s reliance on autocratic command system proved nearly disastrous. 
When the signal wires with brigade HQ and some of his companies were cut at 1630 hours on the 
12
th
 Mitchell insisted on meeting his company commanders to brief them on the withdrawal plan. 
Thus, when German tanks and infantry were scaling the slopes and making an all-out attack on 
the entire battalion front, the companies were left leaderless. Individual men and subalterns 
withdrew with much difficulty by abandoning heavy equipment and weapons. Meanwhile, the 
breakdown in signal communications meant that the 2/4
th
 AIF did not receive Vasey‟s order to 




The battalion and company commanders of the two AIF battalions also lacked initiative 
and remained passive when they should have counterattacked. Following the retreat of the 1
st
 
Rangers, the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler SS Mechanised Regiment focused on occupying the 
abandoned valley and did not make any serious attempt to dislodge the 2/8
th
 AIF on the right. All 
this while, its two right-most companies were not attacked but, inexplicably, sat tight without 
counterattacking the Germans below them. Instead, Mitchell merely reinforced his left flank with 
a platoon from the right. It was only at 1400 hours that Mitchell led a limited counterattack to 
regain some vacated high ground lost to the Germans, between the two left-most Australian 
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companies. Similarly, the 2/4
th
 battalion had been sitting tight all day despite being unengaged 
instead of “marching to the guns”.386   
Vasey displayed the usual preference for British senior commanders to stay in their HQs 
and became out of touch with developments. By 1500 hours, the retreat of the1
st
 Rangers two 
miles to the rear created a gap between it and the two Australian battalions on the high ground to 
its left and right. According to Long, the 19
th
 Australian Brigade HQ seemed unaware of the 
critical situation all this while. Vasey should have intervened by now to order both Australian 
battalions to counterattack downhill in a pincer attack towards the Germans in their centre. 
Failing this, he should have ordered both battalions to withdraw. Instead, he did not venture out 
of his HQ to discover what was going on and so did nothing.
387
  
The inactivity of British field commanders, coupled with the typical British Army‟s lack 
of training in combined arms understanding, led to the Germans capturing five anti-tank guns in 
the valley, which was devoid of friendly infantry troops. The lack of cohesion and understanding 
between the two units from two nationalities was also evident. According to Long, the 1
st
 Rangers 
began withdrawing from the valley by 1100 hours, as they mistakenly thought the 2/8
th
 AIF had 
been overwhelmed. This exposed the left flank of the latter which forced Mitchell to pull back his 
two left-most companies 150 yards to refuse it.
 388
 The withdrawal at Vevi was too premature and 
unnecessary losses were suffered due to the faults of the British military system. Three field guns 




To the dismay of British Empire senior commanders, the mountains of Greece, like the 
jungles of Malaya, proved most conducive to German offensive tactics based on a combination of 
bold and rapid armour thrusts down the roads and flanking infantry attacks across country, 
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 A panel of West Point military historians commented: 
 „As had been the case in France, they [Germans] made aggressive thrusts with armoured 
columns under commanders who stayed well forward. They exploited every advantage 
rapidly and with little regard for flank security.‟391  
 
By contrast, “W” Force seemed unable to react to the fast tempo German attacks other 
than to sit tight and defend in isolated companies. Insufficient active fighting patrols were sent to 
gather information about the enemy‟s strength and to disrupt his preparations for attack. Instead 
static observations on high ground by day provided limited information and insufficient warning 







 May 1941  
 If the campaign on mainland Greece bore similarities with the campaign on the Malay 
Peninsula, the Crete Campaign also had many commonalities with the Malayan Campaign. First, 
Wavell neglected to order the construction of fixed defences and communication lines on Crete in 
the six months after November 1940 while there was time to do so. In addition, he also failed to 
order the destruction of the island‟s three airfields when the RAF departed three days before the 
invasion.
393
 Second, there was again no unified command of all services.
394
 Third, Freyberg, C-in-
C “Creforce”, displayed typical British caution despite having a significant strategic intelligence 
advantage over the Germans through the use of ULTRA and the fortuitous discovery of a map 
case containing their plans and orders for the invasion in a crashed German plane.
395
 Not entirely 
trusting the intelligence he obtained Freyberg prepared the defences of Crete for both airborne as 
well as seaborne attack – he split “Creforce” into five equal battlegroups around the three 
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airfields on the island at Maleme, Retimo and Heraklion, Canea and Suda Bay Anchorage. Each 
battlegroup was effectively isolated and unable to support one another due to the lack of motor 
transport and roads on the island. Moreover, Freyberg also spread out the elements of each 
battlegroup thinly to cover the coast as well as the airfields, not understanding that the three 
airfields were the key objectives of the enemy.
396
 Finally, although “Creforce” had numerical 
superiority over the Germans, they were an assortment of hastily collected formations that had 
little collective cohesion and lacked heavy equipment and transport, lost on mainland Greece.  
Their worst shortage was in wireless signal equipment.
397
 
 By contrast, the Germans had a unified command under General Kurt Student, who 
commanded all land and air troops. Although outnumbered two to one, they were made up 
entirely of well-trained and experienced elite formations.
398
 These formations were rapid 
deployment forces and lacked heavy equipment, especially after the sinking of a convoy carrying 
some tanks and field artillery. Fortunately, for the Germans, the Luftwaffe had complete 
superiority of the air as the island was out of range of British warplanes from the airfields of 
North Africa and the Middle East. This restricted the RN‟s supremacy over the Mediterranean 
Sea to the hours of darkness. It also allowed the Germans to utilize air reconnaissance and tactical 
air support, which compensated for their lack of artillery.
399
 The German Army‟s patent “mission 
command” system proved to be its “saving grace” in Crete. It helped to overcome the command 
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 May, as it decided the outcome of 
the entire Crete Campaign. This sector was defended by the 5
th
 NZ Brigade, commanded by 
Brigadier Hargest.
401
 In the first two days of the airborne assault on Crete, the Germans came 
close to failure everywhere on the island due to their intelligence failure, which could not account 
for the strength and disposition of Creforce, Student‟s insistence to conduct airdrops on Maleme, 
Canea, Retimo and Heraklion rather than concentrating on one, and the German tactics of 
dropping containers of heavy weaponry which were often separated from the paratroopers.
402
 
However, they had a better military system than that of the British and this was sufficient to 
wrench victory from the jaws of defeat. 
 Hargest and Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew, CO 22
nd
 NZ Battalion displayed typical British 
caution rather than dynamism. The German Airlanding Regiment landed with heavy casualties 
around the airfield and Hill 107. After a failed counterattack by C Company 22
nd
 NZ Battalion 
with two tanks, Hargest refused to launch a coordinated counterattack with the 21
st
 and the 23
rd
 
NZ battalions in the evening, when requested by Andrew, as he imagined them to be heavily 
engaged. Andrew displayed “retreat mentality” caused by pessimism over the fate of his subunits, 
which he lost touch with, and over-concern for the integrity of supply lines. Neglecting to send 
out patrols to locate them and discover their true strength, he withdrew from the airfield and the 
hill, convinced this was necessary to save his battalion. Similar to British commanders in Malaya, 
Hargest, Andrew and Freyberg only considered their own difficulties without considering that the 
enemy might be in similar or even worse predicament. The British Army‟s autocratic command 
system made the 22
nd
 NZ‟s companies sit tight instead of attacking when communications was 
lost. Moreover, Hargest and Andrew lost touch with the battle as they typically set up HQ a little 
distance from the front and miss the chance to counterattack.
403
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The German airborne troops, by contrast, never lost their aggressive and opportunistic 
instinct even when split up into many small detachments and had many of their field commanders 
killed. Junior officers were familiar with their immediate superior‟s plans and objectives. They 
simply rose to the occasion and used their initiative to carry them out. Moreover, German 
commanders, often set up their HQ near the front and so were intimately acquainted with the 
course of the battle. It was their senior medical officer who led the capture of Hill 107, after 
virtually all their officers became casualties.
404
 Despite gaining a foothold on Maleme Airfield 
and occupying Hill 107 on the morning of the 21
st
, the surviving German airborne troops were 
still in dire straits. They had only two thousand tired and unsupplied troops as opposed to seven 
thousand New Zealand troops in the vicinity, and were nowhere near being reinforced. Yet 
Hargest, Brigadier Puttick, GOC 2
nd
 New Zealand Division, and Freyberg did not order a 
counterattack by all available troops of their commands, partially due to fears of an enemy coastal 
landing. The difference between British sluggishness and caution and German haste and boldness 
was demonstrated again the next day. 
Student reinforced his beleaguered troops at Maleme Airfield with two companies of 
paratroopers and two mountain battalions, which helped to secure the airfield by 1700 hours. 
Freyberg finally ordered a night counterattack that evening with the 5
th
 Brigade‟s reserve 
battalion – the 28th (Maoris), the 20th Battalion of the 4th Brigade and a troop of three tanks. 
However, 20
th
 Battalion reached the startline only in the early morning on the 22
nd
, as Freyberg 
insisted it had to be first relieved by an Australian battalion along the coast, in case of an enemy 
seaborne landing. By then, the Germans had consolidated their positions and were reinforced and 
resupplied. Unsurprisingly then, the counterattack by too small a force failed amidst heavy 
bombing by the Luftwaffe by late afternoon. Freyberg finally planned to send in the other two 
battalions of the 4
th
 NZ Brigade to retake the airfield that night, supported by 5
th
 NZ Brigade. 
However, Puttick heard exaggerated reports of German infiltration through Prison Valley towards 
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Galatas on the coastal road. As this threatened to cut off 5
th
 NZ Brigade‟s supply and 
communication route, he decided to withdraw and concentrate the division at Canea. Freyberg 
agreed with him and commenced withdrawal in the early hours of the 23
rd
 just when the Germans, 
reinforced by two battalions of mountain troops by air in the afternoon, were beginning to 
advance eastwards towards Platanias.
405
 At this point the campaign was essentially lost, despite 
the fact that the Germans failed to capture any of the other airfields and were hanging on 
precariously in the other sectors.
406
 
 In the Crete Campaign, the Germans suffered six thousand and five hundred casualties 
(half of whom missing or dead), compared with the British losses of three thousand and five 
hundred (half of whom missing or dead) and twelve thousand men captured. The heavy losses 
made Hitler ban the use of major airborne operations for the rest of the war.
407
 More could have 
been achieved, however, as “Creforce” could have annihilated the enemy had it launched, in 
Stewart‟s words, a „swifter and stronger counterattack on the 20th or 21st.‟408 Macdonald put it 
down to the „First World War mentality of the officers involved,‟ who were familiar with 
positional rather than mobile warfare, and reported Freyberg‟ later regretted not putting younger 
senior commanders, who were physically and mentally fitter, in charge of the division.
409
 While 
acknowledging that Freyberg should have pushed Puttick to counterattack according to his plan 
rather than simply trusting the judgement of his subordinates, Callahan and Stewart rightly 
attributed the defeat to a failure of the whole system from Freyberg down to battalion 
commanders.
410
 D.M. Davin, the official New Zealand historian of Crete, wrote „The conclusion 
is inevitable that he [Freyberg] began with a battle plan which gave his battalion commanders too 
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much choice of role with too little guidance on which roles were prior and that in the battle he 
failed to give his commanders firm direction.‟411  
 British military historian Sir David Fraser hit the nail on the head when he reflected that:  
„the chaos and disorganizations of the [British] retreat through Cyrenaica were African 
versions of the early disasters in Norway. The Germans had appeared to be everywhere 
and everywhere prevailed. They were better equipped, better led, more boldly and 
intelligently handled and had been masters of the field … By contrast the British High 
Command appeared indecisive and amateur. All could see that the balance of armoured 
strength and anti-tank guns had given the British little chance. But this was happening at 
the same time too in Greece and Crete … It was too habitual.‟412  
 
Raymond Callahan noted that a „fair commentary‟ on Crete would be that, just like in Norway, 
the British had “an army over-deliberate, slow…‟413 In the Greek Campaign as in the Malayan, 
Norwegian and North African campaigns, institutional forces were responsible for the string of 
British tactical disasters from 1940 to 1942. 
Burma, 8
th
 December 1941 – 30th May 1942  
The Japanese invasion of Burma in 1941-1942 had the same ingredients for disaster as 
the Malayan Campaign. Burma suffered from the same pre-war neglect and was given even lower 
priority in defence than Singapore. Greatly outnumbered, the RAF was unable to prevent 
Japanese warplanes from dominating the Burmese skies, harassing and interdicting British supply 
lines and giving support to the IJA at will. In the face of enemy air supremacy, the RN could not 
prevent the enemy from carrying out amphibious landings.
414
 Moreover, with the exception of the 
dry, open, rice-cultivated central plains, the terrain of Burma was very much like that of Malaya – 
plantations, mountains and jungles in the interior, mangrove swamps along the coast with few 
metalled roads and large settlements. These hampered signal communications and firepower, 
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while favouring the infantry arm. Like Malaya, Burma also had a hot and humid climate but with 
a different annual wet monsoon period, from late May to October.  
The course and outcome of the Japanese invasion of Burma was set and decided from 8
th
 
December 1941, when the IJA commenced its invasion, to 7
th
 March 1942, when the British 
Army abandoned Rangoon, the capital. After heavy losses suffered during the withdrawal across 
the Sittang River, which made Rangoon untenable, Burma Command‟s mission essentially 
changed to that of a fighting withdrawal to delay the enemy‟s occupation of upper Burma, until it 
reached eastern India by the end of May.
415
 This thesis will only focus on the first phase of the 
Japanese invasion of Burma. 
 The Japanese 15
th
 Army, tasked with the conquest of Burma, was not very far behind the 
25
th
 Army in combat readiness. General Shojiro Iida, its GOC, like Yamashita, was renowned for 
being a meticulous, brilliant and dynamic commander. His 33
rd
 Division, although a relatively 
new formation, had at least seen combat experience and realistic field training in China for over 
two years. It was typically led by well-trained and experienced senior commanders who were all 
subsequently promoted after the conquest of Burma. The 55
th
 Division was a newly raised 
inexperienced formation but had the benefit of typically thorough and realistic field training. The 
two divisions were well-equipped with light artillery pieces and mortars and a combination of 
motor and animal transport, which allowed them to move across country easily.
416
  
 By contrast, the combat readiness of Burma Command mirrored that of Malaya 
Command. It was made up of two newly formed and inexperienced divisions – the 1st Burma and 
the 17
th
 Indian. Lieutenant-General Thomas Hutton, a rather conservative staff officer, had no 
experience of recent command. Both his predecessor and him did not give any directive on 
training in jungle warfare and also failed to impose any centralized training system. Morever, 
Hutton was overstretched, having to assume the roles of theatre and corps commander. His two 
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divisional commanders were also inexperienced and inadequately trained for their command. 
Their use of “autocratic command” system slowed down decision-making. Both divisions were 
made up of improvised brigades with no collective training, which after having been heavily 
“milked” were left with a large proportion of inexperienced and ill-trained Indian and Burmese 
recruits and some British regulars, who had little effective training in anything other than static 
and motorised warfare. They were also typically well-supplied with motor transport but short of 
artillery and heavy weapons, which proved to be a serious handicap as British Army tactical 
doctrines emphasised firepower to compensate for the weaknesses of the infantry.
417
  
 Wavell and Hutton decided to use the same operational strategy as Brooke-Popham and 
Percival in Malaya – delay the Japanese as far away as possible from Rangoon so as to deny them 
use of the three key airfields, which would allow them to threaten British troopships bringing 
reinforcements to Burma through the capital.
418
 Thus, Major-General John Smyth, GOC 17
th
 
Indian Division, was also forced to hold indefensible ground over a large area with too few 
troops. Both Hutton and Smyth typically placed faith in the linear defence of successive rivers 
such as the Salween and the Sittang.
 419
 The result was predictable – the thin, widely dispersed 
linear positions were easily outflanked by Japanese units moving through the jungles or along 
rivers to form roadblocks, cutting off the supply and communication lines of the defenders. 
 The rout of the 16
th
 Indian Brigade under Brigadier Hugh Jones at Kawkareik from 20-22 
January 1942 by two regiments of the Japanese 55
th
 Division, in an encounter battle, was a good 
example of the mismatch in tactics of the opposing sides. Kawkareik set the trend for the first 
stage of the Burma Campaign very much like Jitra did for the Malayan Campaign. Jones, with 
Smyth‟s approval, erroneously made his battalion commanders spread their companies to cover 
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all tracks, which gave little depth in defence. This was despite there being no wireless set, while 
the units were too far apart for sufficient cables to be laid. Consequently, the brigade had to rely 
on civilian telephone lines instead, to the detriment of signal communications. Unsurprisingly, 
two battalions of the 112
th
 Regiment of the Japanese 55
th
 Division overran the isolated company 
of the 1/7
th
 Gurkhas on the main trunk road, on the 20
th
 of February. To the south, on the Palu 
track, the Japanese 55
th
 Reconnaissance Regiment dispersed the lone company of the 1/9
th
 Jats, 
which uncovered the right flank of the 16
th
 Indian Brigade. Many companies, though not 
seriously engaged, became jittery when Japanese patrols and snipers infiltrated their positions. 
They wasted ammunition firing at real or imagined enemies in the dark, which only revealed their 
positions. Jones, responded by sending a reserve company of the 1/9
th
 Jats to cover each of the 
two tracks that branched out of the Palu track at Kwingale. This piecemeal effort was totally 
insufficient and the reserve company at Myohaung was overwhelmed by the enemy the following 
morning. Even though his brigade positions on the main trunk road were still intact, Jones feared 
that his isolated companies would soon be enveloped between the two enemy forces. He ordered 
a disorganised retreat on the evening of the 21
st
, which led to much loss of morale, as there were 
several friendly fire incidents in the dark by inexperienced troops who had never trained in night 
operations and never worked with each other previously.
420
  
 If Kawkareik resembled Jitra, then the battle of the Bilin River, the first set-piece battle 
between the two armies in Burma, resembled Kampar. Hutton asked that Smyth delay the 
Japanese for as long as possible along the Bilin River, which was fordable at many points. By the 
16
th
 of February, Smyth placed his three brigades in depth from the Bilin River northwestwards to 
the Sittang River Bridge (which was held by 2
nd
 Burma Brigade) over a distance of thirty miles to 
counter the usual enemy encirclement tactics – 16th Indian Brigade along the Bilin, 48th Indian 
Brigade several miles in reserve behind the Thebyu River, and the 46
th
 Indian Brigade much 
further back at Kyaikto. However, Smyth placed his three brigades too far apart, which gave Iida 
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the chance to concentrate his two divisions to defeat the British brigades in detail. Everything 
depended on how swiftly Smyth could bring up his reserves to counterattack the expected 
Japanese penetrations in the gaps of the leading 16
th
 Indian Brigade‟s overextended fifteen-mile 
positions along the Bilin River, from Yinon to Bilin.
421
   




 Indian Brigade had three battalions, from left to right, along the river 
with one in reserve. However, two battalions of the 214
th
 Regiment of the Japanese 33
rd
 Division 





 Gurkhas, the 1/4
th
 Gurkhas of the 48
th
 Indian Brigade and even the 4/12
th
 
Frontier Force of the 46
th
 Indian Brigade fought to eliminate, or at least contain, the Japanese 
bridgehead on the west bank of the Bilin, which had now been reinforced by a third battalion in a 
roadblock position. At the same time, a battalion of the 215
th
 Regiment of the Japanese 33
rd
 
Division was locked in a similar struggle with the 16
th
 Indian Brigade‟s 8th Burma Rifles and the 
1/9
th
 Jats and the 2/5
th
 Gurkhas from the 48
th
 Indian Brigade. By the 18
th
, stalemate ensued on all 
fronts but the 215
th
 Regiment still had two battalions in reserve on the east bank of the Bilin, 
while the British had none in the vicinity. More important, the Japanese 55
th
 Division performed 
the same kind of coastal outflanking maneuver which had unhinged the tough British defence at 
Kampar. Its 143
rd
 Regiment crossed the Bilin to the south and landed at Zokali, some six miles 
behind the British lines. British failure to contain the enemy‟s coastal landing forced Smyth to 





 Although Smyth‟s division fought better than previously, his brigades and battalions 
reacted slower than the enemy and were often defensive-minded. On the British right flank, the 
British had a Japanese battalion in between the 8
th
 Burma Rifles and the 1/9
th
 Jats, with the 2/5
th
 
Gurkhas reinforcing them by the 18
th
. Brigadier Hugh-Jones, commanding the 48
th
 Indian Brigade 
should have aggressively launched a three prong counterattack with all three battalions to “pinch” 
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out this Japanese bridgehead on the 18
th
, rather than containing it with the Gurkha battalion while 
the other two sat tight. However, it could be argued that the 1/9
th
 Jats and the 8
th
 Burma Rifles 
were too raw and inexperienced. They were involved in “friendly fire” incidents and suffered loss 
of morale through enemy “jitter” parties.423  
 Smyth made the same mistake of using his reserves in driblets, similar to senior British 
commanders in Malaya. He wasted the raw 5/17
th
 Dogras as outpost which only resulted in their 
being defeated in detail on the 17
th
, as was the case at Changlun and Asun. At least he dispatched 
them in complete battalions rather than in companies, like Murray-Lyon at Jitra and Paris at 
Kampar. Still, he should have sent the entire reserve 48
th
 Indian Brigade to eliminate the Japanese 
bridgehead on the left, before shifting them south to counter the Japanese coastal “hook”. 
However, that was unthinkable in a British Army accustomed to cautious and ponderous 
maneuvers and counterattacks. By committing his reserves in battalions instead of brigades, 
Smyth had to artificially divide the Bilin Line into two sectors on the second day of the battle - 
the 16
th
 Indian Brigade on the left and the 48
th
 Indian Brigade on the right, as there were now six 




 The sustained four-day failed action at Bilin Line delayed the 17
th
 Indian Division‟s 





 This was the most significant disaster that befell the British in Burma in 
1942, as two-thirds of the 17
th
 Indian Division was left on the hostile side of the river. Counting 
the stragglers who had to abandon their motor transports, heavy weaponry and equipment to cross 
the Sittang, the division mustered only three thousand and five hundred men, not enough to hold 
Rangoon. This made Hutton decide that Rangoon had to be abandoned. However, the physically 
unwell Smyth displayed the British trait of excessive caution by organising a typical staff college 
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methodical and controlled withdrawal back to the Sittang. Thus, he did not urge his tired division 





This allowed the partially motorized Japanese 33
rd
 Division to reach the bridge first, despite 
having to move across poor country tracks, while the fully-motorised 17
th
 Indian Division had the 
advantage of using the only all-weather road.
426
  
 However, Smyth‟s subordinates were not blameless either. In the absence of Smyth‟s 
direction and leadership, the brigade and battalion commanders did not grasp the need for haste 
and did not take the initiative to push their men on. This reflected the British Army‟s autocratic 
command system and the typically luxurious time given to British officers to make decisions in 
their peacetime TEWTs and exercises, which proved inadequate in fast tempo warfare. Given the 
IJA‟s mission command system and its emphasis on speed and realism during training, it is hard 
to imagine Japanese field commanders allowing their regiments and battalions to stay immobile 
for a day, even if their divisional commander was inactive due to ill-health. That was a key 
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CONCLUSION 
 This thesis argues that institutional forces, in the form of the British military system, were 
more responsible for the British tactical disaster in the Malayan Campaign than personalities and 
circumstances. In chapters 2 and 3, we examined the differences in the British and Japanese 
military systems in terms of their ethos, C3I, doctrine, training, organisation, equipment and 
morale. In chapters 4, 5 and 6, we examined how the differences in the two opposing military 
systems interacted with circumstances and personalities shape the course and outcome of six 
crucial Malayan battles from three different tactical missions – defensive, counteroffensive and 
delay. In Chapter 7, we examined how the same British system fared poorly against two superior 
enemies – the German Army in the Greek Campaign and the IJA in the Burma Campaign - which 
suggested that the British tactical defeat in Malaya was systemic. As noted by Warren, the British 
Army‟s defeat in Malaya was not an “isolated occurrence.”427 It was part of what Farrell called 
„the great wave of defeats that exposed the weaknesses of the British Empire‟s military system 
[which] ran from Norway in spring 1940 to Burma in spring 1942.‟428 
 Finally, this concluding chapter will glance at the later stages of the Burma Campaign. It 
examines how changes in the British military system in 1943 essentially transformed the combat 
effectiveness and performance of the British Indian Army. In 1942-1943, the inferior British 
military system was the main cause of the Indian Army‟s expulsion from Burma and tactical 
defeat in the First Arakan Campaign by the IJA. However, unlike in Singapore, the defeated 
Indian Army was able to retreat to India in both instances, where it was given a chance to prepare 
for a rematch. By 1944, the transformation of the British system led to the same Indian Army 
surpassing the IJA, whose military system remained stagnant after the outbreak of the Pacific 
War. The effects of this “wind of change” were first demonstrated in the two Chindit operations, 
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 Arakan and the Kohima and Imphal campaigns in 1943-1944, and confirmed in the 
reconquest of Burma at Meiktila and Mandalay in 1945. 
 After the successful “longest retreat” into India, Wavell, now GOC India Command, 
commissioned an inquiry to gather reports from escaped senior officers from Singapore and 
Burma.
429
 Circumstances and personalities aside, the reasons for the British Army‟s tactical 
defeat in Burma were essentially similar to those for its tactical defeat in Malaya. They included 
lack of intelligence about the enemy, lack of training and preparation in jungle warfare, over 
motorization of units, unsuitable linear defensive tactics, lack of morale, experience and 
ruggedness in troops, amongst others.
430
 That pointed to a common origin, a flawed military 
system. Notwithstanding its ethno-centric report, a rather accurate evaluation of the early war 
British Army and system was reported by the Japanese 15
th
 Army HQ in Burma: 
The British forces were superior in weapon, tanks, artillery and vehicles but their fighting 
spirit was inferior. They did not carry out aggressive actions and were lazy in digging 
trenches and positions. They were excellent at concentrating artillery, mortar and machine 
gun fire on the front line but were not good at jungle fighting. Commanders did not control 




 Out of Wavell‟s commission came a new jungle warfare school for the 14th Indian 
Division at Comilla in June 1942 (later absorbed into at Sevoke set up by GHQ India in February 
1943), a jungle warfare training centre at Raiwala Bara in December 1942, and increased 
emphasis on jungle warfare in the syllabus of the Officer Training School at Bangalore and the 
Tactical School at Poona. A training manual, “Military Training Pamphlet No. 9: Notes on Forest 
Warfare” was also issued by GHQ India Command in August 1942. Besides noting down the 
many shortcomings of the British Army in the Malayan and Burma campaigns and incorporating 
a section on Japanese tactics, this useful manual emphasised aggressive patrols, ambushes, 
encirclements and defensive “boxes” (a concept already used in North Africa) when on the 
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 Wavell also authorized the reorganization of two Indian divisions to “light” divisions 
and another five Indian divisions to “animal and transport” divisions in October 1942. Part of the 
scale of motor transports in these divisions was replaced by mules to carry supplies, heavy 
equipment and weaponry, allowed them to have better cross-country mobility.
433
 These first 
important steps in rectifying the flaws of the Indian Army coincided with positive reforms within 
the British Army in the UK during the summer of 1942 to bring about a “wind of change” in the 
British military system, which would transform the British Army. However, despite these positive 
reforms, Wavell failed to centralize the training of all its formations and units, which partially led 
to the British Army‟s defeat in the First Arakan Campaign 1942-1943.434 
 Changes taking place in the British Army in the UK also affected the combat 
performance of the Indian Army. To improve the quality of potential officer cadets, the War 
Office Selection Board (WOSB) finally reformed the much criticized officer selection system. 
Following the German Army‟s (and IJA‟s) system a more realistic and meritocratic selection 
process consisting of a three-day interview, practical leadership tests and screening by 
psychologists was implemented in April. More distinguished NCOs were also selected to attend 
OCTUs.
435
 Similarly, a more effective selection procedure using aptitude and psychological tests 
was implemented to assign recruits to the various arms and services of the army. This led to more 
suitable recruits being assigned to the infantry arms than previously.
436
 These two reforms were 
introduced in India Command in June 1943, which allowed the Indian Army to have the 
necessary raw materials for jungle warfare - better leaders and better infantrymen.
437
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 The quality of British Army officers was enhanced during the war as the trials of war 
weeded out unfit, incompetent and rigid officers and replaced them with more dynamic and 
capable ones, usually younger in age.
438
 This was especially important for India Command as the 
rigours of jungle warfare required fitter officers.
439
 The training of officers in the UK also became 
more realistic. Human management courses with role-plays were now taught to officers by 
psychologists to help them better understand their men in order to improve their welfare and 
better motivate them. Morale also improved with the narrowing of the gap between officers and 
men, as more ECOs came from the same working class background as the men.
440
 In addition, 
acting on the recommendation of the Infantry Committee commissioned by Wavell in June 1943 
to re-evaluate the recent British Army‟s defeat in the Arakan Campaign, the Indian Army 
recruited more ethnic Indian officers, who understood Indian soldiers better. Although 
“Indianisation” of the officer corps had begun in the 1920s, this process had been slow with only 
7.65% of the officer corps being native Indians in 1941.
441
 This trend was now reversed. Officer 
cadet training within India Command was also extended to five months, to allow British Army 
officers enough time to study the language and culture of their sepoys. Finally, the same Infantry 
Committee recommended that a more realistic jungle warfare training syllabus be commonly 
taught to officers and NCOs at the various jungle warfare training and tactical schools, which 
were now expanded to meet increasing demand.
442
  
Learning from the failure of the First Arakan Offensive, General Claude Auchinleck, the 
new GOC India Command, appointed Major-General Reginald Savory as the inspector and 
director of infantry with authority to ensure that all infantry training in India Command was 
according to the official jungle warfare doctrine, exemplified in a new and updated fourth edition 
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of “Military Training Pamphlet No. 9: The Jungle Book” of September 1943.443 The presentation 
of this jungle warfare manual was revolutionary as it included many photographs and cartoons to 
appeal to all unit officers and NCOs to read. The manual retained all the relevant content of 
previous manuals but had new lessons on taking out IJA bunkers, tank-infantry co-operation, 
common jungle “battle drills” for units to train their men, and also incorporated lessons learnt in 
the First Arakan Campaign and by the Leithbridge Mission of June 1943, which visited the 
Australian Army fighting the IJA in the jungles of the Southwest Pacific. It also emphasized the 
importance of night training, jungle craft, marksmanship, physical fitness and decentralized 
leadership in jungle warfare.
444
  
The traditional British Army pre-occupation with logistics would not be changed due to 
the emphasis on firepower and technology to substitute for the country‟s lack of manpower, 
which was running dry by 1944. Instead, the RAF‟s regaining of air supremacy over Burma 
allowed the Indian Army to use air supply to augment existing supply arrangements, an idea first 
experimented by the First Chindit Operation. This allowed the Indian Army to counter the IJA‟s 
encirclement tactics with the combination of air supply and defensive boxes.
445
 Following 
recommendations by the Leithbridge Mission, the standard divisional organization was also 
changed in June 1944 to standardise all previous experimental organisations. Henceforth, each 
division would have a “light infantry” battalion to provide better reconnaissance and patrols. The 
early war standard scale of one machine gun battalion and an anti-tank regiment per division was 
reintroduced, while one of the standard three field artillery regiments was replaced with a 
mountain artillery regiment. The partial animal and motor transport system of Indian divisions 
was retained.
446
 The setting up of the Indian Intelligence Corps in 1942 gave overdue official 
recognition to the importance of this neglected arm. Learning from the mistakes of Malaya, the 
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Indian Army gathered better intelligence about the Japanese through the use of friendly 
indigenous people operating behind enemy lines in V Force, Z Force and Force 136.
447
 
 The training of the infantry arms took a big step forward in the summer of 1942, when 
the Director of Military Training enforced a common understanding of doctrine across the British 
Army in the UK and set up a School of Infantry to train infantrymen in common “battle drills”, 
like the German Army‟s (and IJA‟s) system. 448  This development was adopted by India 
Command following the recommendation of the Infantry Committee. In the summer of 1943, the 
system of “milking” was officially abolished while a very systematic, thorough and centralised 
training program was implemented to train units and formations for jungle warfare. Soldiers who 
passed out of basic infantry school (now extended to six months) would now be trained for two to 
three months in jungle warfare through one of two training divisions and, later, a training brigade, 
set up for this purpose. Upon completion, they would receive further training at reinforcement 
camps before being posted to units for a series of training from sub-unit training to higher 
formation, combined arms exercises which included battle inoculation under realistic conditions. 
Besides enhancing the jungle warfare combat techniques of the Indian Army, this reform ensured 
that units and formations had better collective cohesion.
449
 
It is appropriate at this point, to pause to analyse the roots of the British Army‟s inability 
to fight a sustained high tempo jungle conflict in the first half of the war. No doubt this was due 
to the British Army‟s reliance on motor transport, field cables, their autocratic command system 
and failure to train officers, NCOs and men for independent thinking and initiative. However, 
although the IJA used “mission command”, it also favoured the use of field telephones and its 
officers training also emphasised rote learning and obedience to authority, which militated against 
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independent thinking and initiative.
450
 What then made the IJA better able to react to the 
confusion of jungle warfare than the British Army in 1941-1943?    
 The secret lay in the IJA‟s common understanding of doctrine, enforced and applied 
through battle drills in realistic conditions. This allowed every officer, NCO and man to 
instinctively know what to do when the unexpected happened, such as when communications 
failed or when a superior officer was absent, wounded or dead. By contrast, the early war British 
Army lacked a common understanding of doctrine and had no enforced battle drills. Thus, when 
the unexpected happened or when contact with higher HQ was cut, junior officers and men were  
thrown into confusion without a standard operating procedure to follow. Under such conditions, 
they instinctively followed the British Army‟s traditional emphasis on caution and the security of 
supply lines. Retreat became the norm when the situation seemed hazy and the flanks were “up in 
the air”. The possibility that the enemy himself was also in danger of being cut off by an instant 
and strong counterattack was not contemplated in the light of the British Army‟s post-World War 
I instinctive belief that defence was better than offense, as it incurred less casualties. 
 Lieutenant-General William Slim, the GOC 14
th
 Army tasked with the reconquest of 
Burma, realized that the British Army‟s traditionally autocratic command system was 
incompatible with the demand for decentralized control in the jungle terrain of Burma. 
Improvements in wireless signals technology and the proliferation of their use in formations and 
units, coupled with the emulation of the German Army (and IJA) emphasis on senior field 
commanders leading close to the front, and their use of staff officers as liaison at the front, 
improved the typically inadequate field communications of the British Army, but did not 
fundamentally change its autocratic command and control system.
451
 Slim recognized the need to 
further imitate the German Army (and IJA) system by adopting “mission command”. He sought 
to imbibe junior officers with the spirit of initiative and independent thinking within the 
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boundaries of their given objectives, through practical training. Slim‟s endorsement of this 
particular Infantry Committee‟s recommendation went against the grain of British Army tradition, 
but enabled the 14
th
 Army to fight the kind of high tempo battles that were formerly associated 
only with the IJA and the German Army. This made Slim and his 14
th
 Army unique amongst 
British senior commanders and their commands.
452
 
 By November 1943, when the Second Arakan Offensive commenced, the British 14
th
 
Army was a radically different army from the British Army that surrendered Singapore and quit 
Burma in 1942. While the defensive battles of the Admin Box, Imphal and Kohima in the jungles 
of Burma and India in 1944 demonstrated British ability to repulse the favoured pin-and-encircle 
aggressive offensive tactics of the IJA, the offensive battles of Meiktila and Mandalay on the 
open plains of Burma in 1945 demonstrated the new-found British ability to maneuver and smash 
through the toughest of the IJA‟s stubborn bunker defences. The Indian Army had undergone a 
transformation which, as Slim aptly titled his memoirs, brought “defeat into victory.” 
 Meanwhile, in the Mediterranean and Europe too, the British Army was also onto 
winning ways as the “tide” turned against the Axis Powers globally. No doubt, strategic factors 
such as the American and Soviet alliance, the regaining of air and naval supremacy, and the boost 
in the quantity and quality of British Army material guaranteed victory. But the tactical 
performance of the British Army improved significantly and was now able to match and, for 
some units, even surpass in combat its tactically stagnant German and Japanese enemies, whose 
manpower and material resources declined. The final irony was that the British Army became 
better tactically by shedding some of the aspects of the British military system and adopting many 
aspects of the German (and Japanese) military system. In winning, the British military system had 
become more “German” and “Japanese”, while still retaining some core “Britishness”. 
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Warren rightfully commented, „The [British Army‟s] defeat [in Malaya] was a team 
effort‟ and so neither one factor, nor one individual nor one nationality should be blamed.453 The 
common claim that the British Army‟s tactical performance in Malaya was poor due merely to a 
lack of jungle warfare skills and the novelty of IJA tactics was not borne out by the fact that the 
latter, too, had little specific training in jungle warfare, but adapted its system to jungle warfare. 
The reality was that the British military system in the first half of the war was so deficient that it 
was not prepared even to fight a conventional, fast tempo, war against a modern enemy. This was 
evident on the wind-swept hills of Hong Kong in 1941 and in the central plains of Burma in 1942, 
where the British Army, even with the use of tanks at the latter battle, was still defeated by the 
IJA.  
 This thesis asserts that the flawed and rigid British military system of the pre-war and 
early war years was the underlying, overarching and unifying main cause of the many well-
known shortcomings of Malaya Command. The jungle terrain, so often quoted as a circumstantial 
factor, worked against the British Army because its rigid, defensive, motorized and firepower-
oriented military system was not suitable for fighting in the jungles. This was unlike the IJA‟s 
flexible, offensive, infantry-oriented military system.  
 The flawed tactical thinking and rigidity of many British senior commanders in Malaya 
were not merely their personal failures. These reflected the British military system, which they 
came from. Finally, the British Army‟s tactical disaster in Malaya was not an isolated case but 
was part of a global chain of failures, notably in Greece, Crete and Burma, which revealed the 
general failure of the British military system from 1940-1942. While British strategic defeat in 
Malaya and Singapore was ultimately inevitable due to circumstances, British tactical disaster 
was avoidable, having been largely self-inflicted by systemic forces. Thus, institutional forces in 
the form of the British military system, more than personalities or circumstances, turned strategic 
defeat into tactical disaster in the Malayan Campaign.  
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APPENDIX ONE – PROFILE OF SELECTED BRITISH AND INDIAN ARMY UNITS454 
 
Infantry Units 
Unit/Date of Arrival Selected 
Battles  











Eight recorded exercises as a battalion - only two 
were single-day events, one was an exclusively night 
flanking scheme and another was a week-long route 
march of over 100 miles in July 1941. Some involved 
movement through jungle terrain. 
Carpendale, was very impressed by the swift and 
aggressive attack of this battalion during an exercise 
in November. 
Suffered from “milking” of trained personnel. A draft 
of 62 other ranks arrived in November, while 10 
officers were new and inexperienced. Stewart‟s 
assessment was that only a third was fully “jungle-










Eleven recorded exercises as a battalion - all were 
half or single-day schemes involving defence of static 
positions and motorized counterattacks; two of them 
being night schemes. 
From August 1941 onwards, had to detach a 
company or two at a time to prepare the Jitra 
defences.  
Suffered from “milking” of trained personnel. By late 





 Frontier Force 
(March 1941) 
Kuantan Training was only at company level only. 
Frequent detachments sent to prepare defences and 
other fatigue duties for the equivalent of five months.  
“Milked” of 37 officers and 385 sepoys before 
embarkation for Malaya. By December 1941, only 






 Garwhal Rifles 
(November 1940) 
Kuantan Four recorded exercises as a battalion – Only one was 
a multi-day scheme involving beach defences while 
the others were single-day withdrawal exercises. 
Training at company level for three weeks in August 
in field craft, patrolling, route marches, night 
operations and withdrawal. Frequent detachments 
                                                 
454
 Units represented here are those involved in the six Malayan battles included as case studies in the 
thesis. Units are listed in alphabetical and numerical order. 
455
 The training record of infantry units here is based on field combat exercises before the outbreak of the 
Pacific War, rather than on drills, “paper” schemes and TEWTs. 
456
 WO 172/22 “Force Emu War Diary”; WO 172/112 “12th Indian Brigade War Diary”; WO 172/113 “2nd 




 WO 172/152 2
nd
 East Surreys War Diary 10/40-1/41; WO 172/100 2
nd
 East Surreys War Diary 2/40-
2/42 
458
 WO 172/105 & 129 2/12
th
 Frontier Force War Diary; Perry, p. 105 
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sent to prepare defences and other fatigue duties for 









Three recorded exercises as a battalion – one was a 
24 hour scheme without Bren platoons, while the 
others were single-day. 
Only one single-day company-level exercise in 
November 1941 on debussing from motor transport 
and moving through jungles. 
“Milked” of 26 other ranks in November. By 











Only one recorded exercise as a battalion – involved 
artillery firing overhead to inoculate troops to actual 
battle conditions in November 1941. 
Training was otherwise at platoon and company level 
- weapon training, three weeks of route marches in 
September and a week of jungle training in October. 
Received Bren carriers as late as October. 








Only two recorded exercises as a battalion – all 
multi-day affairs. 
Training was otherwise at platoon and company level 
- jungle warfare training in September.  
Received Bren carriers and Bren guns as late as 
October and November 1941. 







Five recorded exercises as a battalion - one was an 
exclusively night scheme while the rest were all 
single-day affairs. Some involved movement through 
jungle terrain. 







Four recorded exercises as a battalion - none was 
overnight, one involved the defence of slit trenches, 
while the others involved motorized counterattacks. 
Frequent detachments sent to prepare the Jitra 
defences and other fatigue and sentry duties in 
October and November 1941. 
Received full allotment of Bren carriers and Bren 
guns only in June and October respectively. 
“Milking” of 2 officers, 3 NCOs and 42 other ranks 









Only two recorded exercises as a battalion - one of 
which was a single-day scheme. Practised defence of 
                                                 
459
 WO 172/107 & 130 “2/18th Garhwal Rifles War Diary.” 
460
 WO 172/136  “2/1st Gurkhas War Diary”. 
461
 WO 172/134 “2/2nd Gurkhas War Diary”. 
462
 WO 172/135 “2/9th Gurkhas War Diary”; CAB 106/53-58 
463
 WO 172/115 “4/9th Hyderabad War Diary”; WO 172/22 “Force Emu War Diary”; WO 172/112 “12th 
Indian Brigade War Diary” 
464
 WO 172/121 “2/9th Jats War Diary” 
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static positions and motorized counterattacks. 
Frequent detachment of a company or two at a time 
to prepare the Jitra defences.  
Suffered from “milking” of trained personnel. A 
large draft of 10 officers, 4 NCOs and 138 men 
arrived in late May. Still short of 6 officers and 137 
men in November 1941. Lieutenant-Colonel 







Bukit Pelandok As Singapore Fortress‟ only mobile reserve battalion, 
six of the recorded schemes as a battalion involved 
static defence and motorised counterattacks; all 
except one were multi-day affairs. Only two schemes 
involved movement through jungle for two days 
each, in 1940.  
Suffered from “milking” of trained personnel. Still 







Bukit Timah In the UK, training was in manning coastal and 
airfield defence and motorized counterattacks. Had 
insufficient exercises with “live” ammunition. 
Suffered from “milking” of trained personnel. 
Arrived in Singapore after a long voyage with no 
opportunity to train and acclimatise in Malaya. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Knights, assumed command only 
in September 1941 – a month before the battalion 
sailed.
467
 Captain Thorpe, the 2IC of “C” Company, 
noted in his diary that his men were “depressingly 
slack and careless” and “completely indifferent” and 
confessed that “I myself only feel mildly excited and 





Bukit Pelandok In the UK, training was in manning coastal and 
airfield defence and motorized counterattacks. Had 
insufficient exercises with “live” ammunition. 
Arrived in Singapore after a long voyage with no 
opportunity to train and acclimatise in Malaya. 
Brought up to strength only in June 1940 with a large 
draft of 140 recruits. “Milked” of best 16 NCOs in 
1939 and many changes in officers in the latter half 
of 1940. Remaining NCOs of poor quality. 
Arrived in Singapore with Bren carriers and mortars 
that it had not been trained to use. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Lywood, took command in May 





 Punjabs Kampar Seven recorded exercises as a battalion - one was a 
                                                 
465
 WO 172/120 “1st Leicesters War Diary” 
466
 WO 172/147 2
nd
 Loyals War Diary; CAB 106/174 An account of the 2
nd
 Loyals in Malaya; Smith, 385; 
WO 172/146 “1st Malayan Brigade War Diary”. 
467
 Neil, 7-8; Smith, 510; Taylor, “Royal Norfolks in the Far East”, http://www.britain-at-
war.org.uk/WW2/Royal_Norfolks_in_Far_East/html/enlisting_and_training.htm 
468
 Smith, 504-505. 
469
 WO172/89 “6th Norfolks War Diary”; Neil, 15, 18-21; Ron Taylor, “Royal Norfolks in the Far East” 
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(August 1939) Telok Anson three-day affair while another was an exclusively 
night scheme. Some involved movement through 
jungle terrain. 







Four recorded schemes as a battalion – all were 
single-day ones. Carpendale followed the unit for a 
scheme in November 1941 and had mixed opinions 
about its combat readiness. 
Frequent detachments of personnel for fatigues and 
digging trenches at Jitra from April onwards. 
“Milked” of 3 Viceroy Commissioned Officers 
(VCOs) and 44 other ranks to India in March 1941 
and another 4 officers and 36 other ranks to India in 
October. By the last week of November, it was still 









Six recorded schemes as a battalion – all except one 
were single day ones, with one lasting for only half a 
day. Mostly involved defence of static positions and 
motorized counterattacks. Rarely trained in jungle 
terrain. 
Frequent detachments of personnel for fatigues, road 
building and digging trenches at Jitra from August 
onwards. 
Receiving Bren guns and mortars as late as August 
1941. 
Received a large draft of 1 officer and 72 other ranks 
in May. 











Only two recorded schemes as a battalion – one of 
which was a single-day one. Mostly involved defence 
of static positions and motorized counterattacks. No 
evidence of jungle training. 
Frequent detachments of personnel for fatigues, road 
building and digging trenches at Jitra from August 
1941 onwards. 
“Milked” of 2 officers, 4 VCOs, 50 other ranks to 
India and received constant drafts of a total of 4 










Only one recorded scheme as a battalion, which was 
a single-day one. Involved motorized counterattacks. 
No evidence of jungle training. 
Frequent detachments of personnel for fatigues, road 
building and digging trenches at Kroh from March 
                                                 
470
 WO 172/114 “5/2nd Punjabs War Diary”; WO 172/22 “Force Emu War Diary”; WO 172/112 “12th 
Indian Brigade War Diary”. 
471
 WO 172/101 “1/8th Punjabs War Diary”; WO 172/102; WO 106/2579B Carpendale 
472
 WO 172/122 “1/14th Punjabs War Diary”; Singh, p. 36. 
473
 WO172/144; WO 172/123; WO 172/102 2/16
th
 Punjabs War Diary. 
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1941 onwards. 
“Milked” of 2 Subedars and 25 other ranks and 






 Recce Battalion 
(January 1942) 
Bukit Timah Rescued from a ship sunk by Japanese bombers. Had 
insufficient exercises with “live” ammunition. 
Suffered from “milking” of trained personnel. 
Arrived in Singapore after a long voyage with no 
opportunity to train and acclimatise in Malaya. Only 
had a partial replacement of ten armoured carriers to 







Kuantan Three recorded schemes as a battalion – all two days 
affairs involving defence of static positions. No 
evidence of jungle training.  
Receiving mortars and Bren guns as late as August 
and October respectively. 
“Milked” of 1 officer, 2 VCOs, 8 NCOs and 16 other 









Bukit Timah In the UK, training was in manning coastal and 
airfield defence and motorized counterattacks. Had 
insufficient exercises with “live” ammunition. 
Suffered from “milking” of trained personnel. 
Arrived in Singapore after a long voyage with no 
opportunity to train and acclimatise in Malaya. 
 
Artillery Units 
Unit/Date of Arrival Selected 
Battles  









Consisted of three batteries. 






 Field Regiment 
(November 1941) 
Kampar Consisted of three batteries. 





 Field Regiment 
(February 1941) 
Kampar Consisted of three batteries. 
Only one recorded training exercise by three troops 









Consisted of three batteries. 
No opportunity to train and acclimatise in Malaya.
481
 
                                                 
474
 WO172/144; WO 172/123; WO 172/102 2/16
th
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475
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th
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477
 The training record of artillery units here is focused on combined training with infantry before the 
outbreak of the Pacific War. Goodman stated that all artillery units had insufficient charged wireless 
batteries and many batteries were short of equipment and not up to strength. 
478
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479
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480
 WO172/112 “12th Indian Brigade War Diary”; WO172/154 “122nd Field Regiment War Diary”; 
Goodman. 
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Consisted of two batteries. 
Only one recorded training exercise by three troops 











Consisted of four batteries.  






 batteries were 
trained and armed with Breda anti-tank guns; only 
managed to fire 42 rounds of armour piercing shells 
during range. 
These batteries had eight recorded separate exercises 
with infantry and another similar scheme as a 
regiment in 1941.  












Consisted of four batteries. 
Unit formed in the UK in July (a month before 
sailing for Malaya) of other rank personnel not 
trained in anti-tank artillery; personnel of each 
battery were from a different regiment. 








Bukit Timah Consisted of three batteries. 
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 WO172/64-68 “22nd Mountain Regiment, 4th, 7th, 10th & 20th Batteries War Diary”; Goodman. 
484
 WO172/188 “80th AT Regiment War Diary”; Goodman 
485
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 – 12th December 1941486 
Imperial Japanese Army 
5
th
 Division:  
 Saeki Detachment (5
th
 Reconnaissance Regiment): 
  Two truck-borne infantry companies 
  A light tank company 
  A medium tank company from the 1
st
 Tank Regiment 
  A mountain artillery platoon 
  An engineer platoon 
 41
st
 Regiment:  
  Regimental Gun Company 
  II Battalion 










































 Gurkhas (one company as reserve on coast, the rest overrun at Asun) 
  2/2
nd
 Gurkhas (became 15
th
 Brigade reserve) 
  2/9
th
 Gurkhas, minus two companies guarding Alor Star Airfield (available 12
th
  
  December) 
 22
nd
 Mountain Regiment: 
  4
th 
Battery (left behind during withdrawal of outpost) 
  7
th
 Battery (with an anti-tank section in lieu of guns) 
 137
th
 Field Regiment: 





 Field Regiment: 
  Two batteries 
 80
th
 Anti-tank Regiment: 





 December 1941 – 2nd January 1942487 
Imperial Japanese Army 
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 Rottman & Takizawa, p. 9; Tsuji, 94; 25
th
 Army HQ, p. 101; Kirby, Loss of Singapore; Warren, pp. 86, 
88; Percival, Despatch; CAB 106/53; WO 172/117; WO 172/97; WO 172/64; WO 172/77; WO 172/155; 
WO 172/188. 
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  One and a half battalions (II & III battalions) 
 41
st
 Regiment (3 battalions) 
 42
nd
 Regiment (3 battalions) 
 5
th
 Field Artillery Regiment 
 1
st



















  Jat/Punjab Battalion (reserve) 
  88
th
 Field Regiment: 
   351
st
 Battery 





 Field Regiment: 





 Anti-tank Regiment: 
   273
rd
 Anti-tank Battery 






 Gurkhas (in reserve with only two companies) 
  2/2
nd






 Field Regiment: 
   Two batteries 
  80
th
 Anti-tank Regiment: 
   A troop of 215
th
 Anti-tank Battery 
 12
th














 Field Regiment: 
   Three batteries 






 Mountain Battery 
  A troop of 215
th







 of January 1942
488
 
Imperial Japanese Army 
Imperial Guards Division: 
 I/5
th
 Battalion, less two companies (Bukit Pelandok-Bukit Belah Defile) 
 III/4
th
 Battalion, less a company (Parit Sulong Bridge) 
                                                 
488












 Norfolks (one platoon detached to hold the Parit Sulong Bridge and another to 
   patrol the trunk road) 
  3/16
th
 Punjabs (with only three combat companies) 
  2
nd





 Field Regiment: 
   336th Battery (4.5inch howitzers) (withdrawn on the 19
th
) 
   344
th
 Battery (25 pounders) (in support at long range west of Yong Peng) 
  2 anti-tank troops (along trunk road from defile to Yong Peng) 
 









 21st Brigade (at least one regiment deployed in the morning): 
  21st Regiment (3 battalions) 




 Division (at least one regiment deployed in the morning): 
 56
th
 Regiment (3 battalions) 
 114
th






  “Tomforce” brigade group: 
  18
th
 Recce Battalion 
  4
th
 Norfolks  
  1/5
th
 Sherwood Foresters  
  85
th
 Anti-tank Regiment: 
   A troop from 45
th
 Bty (attached to 18
th
 Recce Battalion) 
   A troop from 270
th
 Bty (attached to 4
th
 Norfolks) 
   A troop from 251
st
 Bty (attached to 1/5
th
 Sherwood Foresters) 
  Composite battery from 5
th
 Field Regiment RA: 
   A troop of 4 x 25 pdrs field guns 
   A troop of 4 x 4.5 inch howitzers 
   A troop of 3 x 4.5 inch howitzers 
  Supported also by 2/15
th




 – 3rd January 1942490 








  One and a half battalions (I & II battalions) 
 A section of mountain guns 
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 Warren, p. 90, 309; Kirby; 25
th
 Army HQ, pp. 161-162; CAB 106/70; CAB 106/173. 
490
 CAB 106/53-58; Tsuji, p. 125; Kirby. 
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 Field Regiment: 
   Two batteries 
 1
st
 Independent Company (withdrawn morning of 2
nd
 January) 
 „B‟ Squadron, 3rd Indian Cavalry (withdrawn morning of 2nd January) 
 A troop of 215
th


























 Royal Garwhals 
 2/12
th
 Frontier Force 
 5
th
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 Tsuji, p. 78; WO 172/20 Appendices R18 & C19; WO 172/42; WO 172/124; CAB 106/192; Kirby. 
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APPENDIX THREE: ORDERS OF BATTLE, SELECTED BATTLES, GREEK, CRETE 











Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler SS Mechanised Division 
 




 Australian Brigade Group: 
  2/4
th
 Australian Battalion 
  2/8
th






 NZ Machine Gun Battalion (less two companies) 
  2
nd
 Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery 
  2/3
rd
 Australian Field Regiment 
  64
th
 Medium Regiment (less one troop) 
  2/1
st
 Australian Anti-Tank Regiment 
  102
nd














 Airborne Division: 
Airlanding Regiment (around Maleme): 
  1
st
 Parachute Battalion 
 2
nd
 Parachute Battalion 
 4
th
 Parachute Battalion 
 Glider Battalion (less two companies) 
2
nd
 Parachute Regiment (two companies; dropped, 21
st
 May around Maleme) 
3
rd
 Parachute Regiment (around Prison Valley) 
 I Battalion 
 II Battalion 
 III Battalion 
 Engineer Battalion 
 Glider Battalion (two companies) 
5
th





 Regiment (arrived, 22
nd
 May): 




  I Battalion 
  II Battalion 
 95
th
 Pioneer Battalion (arrived, 22
nd
 May) 
British Empire Forces 
New Zealand Division: 
 4
th
 Brigade (around Galatos): 
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 Playfair, The Germans Come to the Help of Their Ally; Long, Greece, Crete and Syria. 
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 Battalion (“Creforce” reserve) 
  19
th
 Battalion (“Creforce” reserve) 
  20
th





 Field Regiment: 


















 (Maori) Battalion (reserve) 
  5
th
 Field Regiment: 
   Equivalent of one battery 
  One troop, 7
th
 Royal Tank Regiment 
 10
th
 Brigade (around Galatos): 
  Composite Battalion 
  Divisional Cavalry Battalion 
  27
th
 NZ Machine Gun Company (one platoon) 
1
st
 Greek Battalion (Kastelli) 
6
th
 Greek Battalion (around Galatos) 
8
th










Imperial Japanese Army 
55
th
 Division:  
 55th Reconnaissance Regiment 
 112nd Regiment: 
  I Battalion 











 Burma Rifles 
  1/9
th
 Rajputs (less one company) 
  1/7
th















 Regiment (3 battalions) 
 215
th
 Regiment (3 battalions) 
55
th
 Division:  
 143
rd
 Regiment (3 battalions) 




 Indian Division: 
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 Kirby, India’s Most Dangerous Hour; Grant & Tamayama. 
495







 King‟s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry 
  8
th












 Field Battery, Burma Auxiliary Force 





















 Brigade (defending Kyaikto): 
  4/12
th
 Frontier Force (divisional reserve) 
  3/7
th
 Gurkhas  
  4
th
 Burma Rifles (less a company) 
 28
th







   
 
 
 
 
 
 
